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CUBIOUS  QUESTIONS. 


REV.  HEMY  A.  UKM,  D.D. 


NEWARK,  N.  J.: 

J.  J,  O'oomroR  &  oo,  59  aitd  ei  new  street. 

1866. 


Emtebbd,  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  In  the  year  1866,  by 

J.  J.  O'CONNOR  &  CO., 

in  the  Cleric's  Office  of  the  District  Court  of  the  United  States  for  the 
District  of  New-Jersey. 


TO  THE 

YEKY  REV.  T.  J.  O'MAHONY,  D.D.,  D.C.L., 

MS  A 

PLEDGE    OF    FRIENDSHIP 

WHICH      TIME      OR     DISTANCE     CAN     NOT     CHANGE, 


r 


R    E    F   A    C    E 


This  book  has  been  written  with  the  hope  of  do- 
ing some  good.  The  author,  in  reading  the  works 
of  American  writers,  has  observed  that  their  errors 
arise  from  a  lack  of  first  principles,  from  a  defect 
in  their  primary  education.  Those  who  read  the 
following  questions  will  find  that,  for  the  most 
part,  they  treat  of  all  that  is  most  difiicult  and  at 
the  same  time  most  essential  in  human  knowledge. 
When  the  first  principles  are  correct,  errors  are 
rare.  Logic,  and  natural  humility,  which  con- 
sists in  the  consciousness  of  the  mind's  weakness, 
render  man  infallible. 

The  book  might  be  longer  and  better.  It  will 
be  longer  if  it  meet  with  an  appreciation  sufficient 
to  encourage  the  author.  Abler  and  more  ex- 
perienced pens  must  make  it  better.  There  are 
many  who  have  the  ability  to  aid  our  literature  j 


VI  PREFACE. 

yet  indolence  or  excess  of  modesty  restrains  their 
pen.  They  forget  that,  although  it  is  better  to 
write  no  book  than  a  bad  one,  it  is  better  to  have 
a  book  of  mediocrity,  to  supply  a  want  or  help  a 
cause,  than  none  at  all.  We  must  all  work ;  we 
mast  all  strive  to  fulfill  our  mission  in  the  plan  of 
creation.  Hence,  if  we  can  write  a  book  that 
may  do  good,  natural  or  supernatural,  we  should 
not  hesitate  even  though  the  purity  of  our  mo- 
tives should  be  suspected. 

The  author  wishes  to  say  but  one  word  in  con- 
clusion, to  propitiate  the  ciitics.  No  one  will  be 
more  delighted  than  he  to  find  that  his  critic  has 
written  a  better  book  than  this.  The  author 
wishes  to  evoke  the  thoughts  of  others  as  well  as 
express  his  own.  In  the  friction  of  minds  there 
must  be  scintillations  of  light,  and  intellectual 
light  is  truth. 

Fort  Lek,  August  15,  1S66. 


p 


ONTENTS. 


FAGB 


ISTBODUCTION, 

CaAPTBR  L— The  Utility  of  Philosophy,       ....  0 

Cqapteb  II. — Philosophical  Terms,   ,       ,       ,  ,       ,         29 

QnESTION  FlKST. 

What  is  Science  ? •       ....      87 

Question  Second. 
What  Relation  has  Philosophy  to  other  Sciences  ?  .        .       .        ,         58 

Question  Third. 
What  is  the  Difference  between  Mental  and  Oral  Terms  ?  .       .        .65 

Question  Fourth. 
What  is  the  Criterion  of  Certitude  ?    Degrees  of  Certitude,   .       .         70 

Question  Fifth. 
Whatis  the  True  Notion  of  an  Idea? 75 

Question  Sixth. 
Is  Idea  a  Possible  Being,  or  an  Existing  One  ?    System  of  Rosmini,        85 

Question  Seventh. 
What  Kind  of  Existence  has  Idea  ?    System  of  Giobertl, ...      99 

QcxsTiON  Eighth. 
Does  the  Intellect  apprehend  Contingent  Facts  ?     .        .        .       .       180 

Question  Ninth. 
What  is  Meant  by  the  History  and  Solution  of  the  Controversy  con- 
cerning the  Uiiiversals  ? 138 


VUl  CONTENTS. 

'rJMM 
QussnoH  Tkhth. 

What  is  the  Difference  between  the  Direct  and  Reflex  State  of  Uie 

Soul? ■     .       IJi 

Question  Elbtekhi. 
Does  God  Exist  ? .       .       .    VM 

QcKSTios  Twelfth. 
Is  God's  Existence  Identified  with  the  Existence  of  other  Beings  f       167 

QCESTION  XniRTKKNTn. 

What  is  Beauty  in  Art? 198 

Question  Foubteknth. 
Does  Beauty  Consist  in  Magnitude  or  Exaggeration  ?    lu  Illusion  or 

Imitation? 214 

QCBSTIOS  FlFTEBNTH. 

'      Does  Beanty  Consist  in  Proportion  and  Order  of  Parts  or  in  Unity 

and  Variety? SS4 

Qrasnos  Sixteenth. 
Is  the  Beautiful  the  " Splendor  Veri "  as  Plato  defines.it?     .       .       235 

QeESTios  Setentbesth. 
Are  there  bat  two  Real  Causes  in  the  World— Man  and  God  ?  .       .261 

QtrsSTION  ElOBntEHTH. 

Why  is  the  Sphrit  of  the  Age  Anti-Christian  and  Antl-Phllosophic  ?       S&l 


CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 


Introduction. 

chapter  i. 

the  utility  of  philosophy. 

|E  live  in  a  most  unpliilosopliical 
age:  principles  are  despised, 
and  iniquity  respected.  In  re- 
ligion, in  government,  in  the  family  cii^cle, 
all  is  confusion.  Sects  swarm,  and  tear 
Christianity  into  bits  like  ants  with  a 
crumb;  some  of  them  destroy  not  only 
revealed  religion,  but  reject  even  the  law 
of  nature.  Political  heresies  brood  among 
the  nations.  Robbery  is  applauded  on 
the  ground  of  expediency;  rebellion  is 
justified  in  the  press,  and  shows  itself 
boldly  on  the  field  of  battle;  plots  for 


10  INTRODUCTION. 

the  overthrow  of  established  thrones, 
round  which  grow  the  moss  of  centuries, 
are  hatched  in  the  countless  secret  socie- 
ties of  Europe  and  America.  The  family- 
tie  has  been  broken  by  the  civil  laws  in 
admitting  divorce;  the  state  in  this  case 
showing  the  corruption  of  the  citizens,  for 
the  state  is  sound  so  long  as  its  members 
are  incorrupt.  Children,  in  consequence 
of  social  vices,  have  been  dragged  from 
their  mothers'  ai'ms,  and  allowed  to  gi'ow 
up  ignorant  of  true  principles ;  their  minds 
warped  from  their  natural  bent  to  good- 
ness by  the  example  of  fathers  without 
religion,  or  mothers  without  virtue.  The 
age  is  illogical ;  unreasonable  in  its  insti- 
tutions, for  it  eschews  religion  in  its  edu- 
cation, allows  the  extreme  of  tyranny  and 
licentiousness  in  its  civil  governments,  and 
consequently,  partially  if  not  completely 
ignores  the  immutable  principles  of  the 
natural  law.  Such  a  diseased  state  of 
human  society  cries  out  for  a  remedy.  Re- 
ligion is  that  remedy,  and  after  religion 


ENTRODUC'CrON'.  11 

sound  philosopliy.  We  say  sound  pliiloso- 
pliy,  for  tlie  aberrations  of  tlie  Germans 
of  modern  times  have  done  harm  instead 
of  good.  The  philosophy  of  Kant,  Fichte, 
and  Schelling,  imported  into  France  by 
Victor  Cousin  and  Ernest  Renan,  and 
sown  broadcast  in  Italy  by  the  pantheists, 
has  been  wafted  on  the  wings  of  the  winds 
to  our  own  land.  .  It  has  taken  root,  and 
its  fruits  are  an  unprincipled  press,  fanat- 
icism, and  general  unbelief.  The  Christian 
philosopher  must  try  to  do  his  part  in 
healing  these  eye-sores  of  modern  times. 
It  is  a  duty  he  owes  to  his  God  and  to 
his  fellow-beings;  he  is  bound  to  be  an 
active  member  of  society,  influencing  its 
thought ;  not  a  mere  passive  spectator  of 
the  scenes  enacted  on  the  world's  theatre. 
Hence,  he  must  study  sound  philosophy, 
and  hence  one  of  the  great  advantages  of 
intellectual  philosophy,  so  often  sneered 
at  and  so  much  neglected  in  our  schools. 
It  is  our  intention,  in  this  preliminary 
chapter,  to  expose  the  utility  of  this  sci- 


12  INTRODUCTION. 

ence,  that  the  reader  may  be  induced 
the  more  zealously  to  apply  himself  to 
the  acquiring  of  a  perfect  mastery  of 
it.  In  order,  therefore,  that  we  may  pro- 
ceed with  greater  clearness,  we  shall  di- 
vide our  remarks  into  three  parts.  In 
the  first  we  shall  «peak  of  the  utility 
of  this  study  considered  with  regard 
to  the  subject-matter  of  which  it  treats. 
In  the  second  we  shall  discourse  of  its 
importance,  subjectively  considered,  as  a 
means  of  mental  culture;  and  in  the 
third  we  shall  glance  at  it  as  relating  to 
revealed  religion  and  smoothing  the  way 
to  theology,  being  in  this  respect  the 
footstool  of  faith  and  the  handmaid  of 
religion. 

Sec.  1.  The  utility  of  PMlosopliy  sliown 
from  tlie  nature  of  the  matter  of  which  it 
treats. 

What  is  the  object  of  philosophical  re- 
search? It  is  God,  the  world,  and  man. 
There  is  a  great  part  of  this  science  that 


INTEODUCTION".  13 

treats  of  tlie  existence,  nature,  and  attri- 
butes of  the  Divinity.  The  whole  of 
Theodicy  has  no  other  scope  than  to  prove 
the  existence  of  God  and  explain  his  at- 
tributes. Now,  no  one  will  deny  the  im- 
portance of  this  part  of  intellectual  phi- 
losophy ;  for  what  is  of  more  importance 
than  the  knowledge  of  Grod?  God  is  the 
Being  of  beings,  the  Creator  of  all  things, 
and  man's  final  cause.  To  know  such  a 
being  is  important  to  man.  He  was  made 
for  no  other  being  but  God,  he  tends  to 
God  as  to  his  centre.  God  is  the  sun  of 
his  planetary  system;  hence  the  utility 
of  studying  a  science  that  makes  of  God 
a  special  study ;  that  investigates  the  na- 
ture of  the  Divinity,  examines  his  infinite 
perfections,  his  goodness,  omnipotence, 
and  immensity.  The  advantages  to  be 
derived  from  such  a  study  are  manifest; 
for  by  knowing  our  Creator  better  we 
love  him  more,  and  are  more  inclined  to 
aim  at  possessing  Him.  Now,  the  posses- 
sion of  the  end  for  which  we  were  formed 


14  INTRODUCTION. 

is  that  wliicli  is  most*  important  to  us ; 
therefore,  the  study  of  intellectual  philoso- 
phy which  helps  us  to  arrive  at  the  term 
of  our  existence  is  of  the  greatest  import- 
ance to  us.  The  second  object  of  which 
our  science  treats  is  the  universe.  The 
world  of  possibilities,  which  is  the  world 
of  ideas,  cosmology  describes  and  en- 
deavors to  explain.  This  world  is  the 
link  that  binds  us  and  God  together;  for 
other  beings  have  their  proximate  end  in 
man,  though  their  last  end,  like  that  of 
man  himself,  must  be  God.  To  know  the 
means  of  arriving  at  our  end,  to  know 
the  reason  of  the  existence  of  other  beings 
around  us,  is  of  great  utility  and  advan- 
tage to  us.  We  must  always  in  these 
matters  go  on  the  hypothesis  that  nothing 
is  useful  or  advantasreous  to  man  which 
does  not  tend  either  mediately  or  immedi- 
ately to  the  end  for  which  he  was  created. 
For  what  is  meant  by  the  word  useful,  if 
not  apt  for  a  purpose  ?  Usefulness,  then, 
supposes  a  pui'pose — an  end  in  the  acquisi- 


INTRODUCTION.  15 

tion  of  whicli  useful  things  are  employed. 
Hence,  to  man  nothing  is  useful  but  what 
leads  to  his  final  end,  to  which  all  other 
ends  are  subservient,  and  compared  with 
which  they  are  secondary.  Now  creatures 
are  made  to  serve  man,  to  aid  him  in 
knowing  his  Creator.  St.  Augustine,  a 
great  philosopher,  says  that  moral  de- 
formity consists  in  endeavoring  to  enjoy 
what  is  only  meant  to  be  used,  "  frui 
utendis  et  uti  fruendis."  When  we  know 
creatures  and  their  causes  we  know  the 
greatness  of  their  Creator,  as  well  as  their 
own  littleness  better.  Besides  this  there 
is  a  great  benefit  derived  from  the  know- 
ledge of  creatures ;  we  know  their  exact 
worth ;  they  can  not,  therefore,  cheat  us ; 
and  this,  certainly,  is  a  very  useful  know- 
ledge. The  poet  has  said,  "  Felix  qui  po- 
test rerum  cognoscere  causas,"  and  he  said 
truly ;  for,  besides  the  incontestable  plea- 
sure derived  from  such  examinations  in 
the  satisfaction  of  our  intellectual  curi- 
osity, the  utility  also  is  very  great,  as  we 


16  INTRODUCTION. 

have  shown;  great  because  of  the  chaiv 
acter  of  means  which  the  universe  bears 
in  our  relation  to  God ;  great,  also,  on  ac- 
count of  the  subjective  improvement  of 
our  intellectual  capacities.  And  here  we 
touch  on  the  third  great  utility  of  philoso- 
phy, considered  in  relation  to  the  objects 
of  which  it  treats.  There  is  a  veiy  exten- 
sive part  of  our  science  which  treats  of 
the  soul  and  its  faculties,  and,  taken  even 
in  its  more  general  sense,  which  treats  of 
man's  body  also.  Logic  and  psychology 
in  a  special  manner  deal  with  hiunan 
thought,  and  the  different  operations  of 
the  mind.  The  old  philosophers  said  that 
science  consisted  in  the  yi^w0e  Oeov  xai  aeavrovy 
"the  knowledge  of  God  and  of  our- 
selves." Now,  both  these  parts  of  science 
are  embraced  by  philosophy.  Self  know- 
ledge is  very  important  for  all.  It  is  use- 
ful to  know  our  failings  and  our  strengtli, 
so  that  we  may  not  be  tempted  to  go  be- 
yond it.  Now,  to  know  our  strength,  we 
study  in  philosophy  the  character  of  our 


INTRODUCTION.  17 

mental  faculties,  and  their  ways  of  work- 
ing; tlie  mechanism  of  the  mind,  and'the 
play  of  the  passions.  Psychology  and 
logic  are  mental  anatomy.  We  fathom 
the  depth  of  our  intellect,  and  learn  to 
distrust  its  shallows  and  quicksands ;  we 
feel  the  pulse  of  the  will,  to  learn  wheth- 
er it  be  feverish  and  wayward,  or  firm 
and  resolute.  We  drag  our  imagination 
to  the  bar  of  reason  and  interrogate  it  as 
to  its  intentions,  so  that  it  may  not  hur- 
riedly lead  us  astray  before  reflection  has 
time  to  recall  it  to  the  right  path.  Man's 
mind  is  a  kingdom  which  philosophy  ex- 
amines, classifying  its  products,  arranging 
in  order  its  powers,  as  a  geologist  places 
fossils  in  a  cabinet.  Knowledge  is  power ; 
and  hence  the  knowledge  we  acquire  of 
ourselves  by  the  philosophical  examina- 
tion of  the  faculties  of  the  soul  gives  us  a 
better  appreciation  of  our  own  ability. 
In  a  word,  if  we  reflect  for  a  moment  on 
the  character  of  the  objects  with  which 
philosophy  deals,  taking  reason   as  the 


18  INTRODUCTION. 

judge,  we  shall  charge  strongly  for  the 
utility  of  the  science.  Nor  will  the  result 
be  otherwise  if  we  examine  the  question 
of  the  utility  of  philosophy  from  the 
subjective  point  of  view. 

Sec.  2.  The  importance  of  the  study 
of  Intellectual  Philosophy  as  a  means  of 
intellectual  culture. 

Those  who  are  best  able  to  judge  of 
the  utility  of  our  science  place  it  the  last 
in  the  course  of  classical  education.  The 
reason  is  obvious,  "Because  it  is  the  crown- 
ing science  of  all — it  caps  the  climax  of 
elementary  education.  It  is  the  scientia 
scientiarum,^  the  basis  of  all,  and  it  i*uns 
through  all,  for  it  is  the  science  of  reason, 
and  reason  is  necessaiy  everywhere.  The 
boy,  after  having  gone  through  his  clas- 
sics and  the  greater  part  of  his  mathe- 
matical studies,  is  gradually  being  trans- 
formed into  a  man.  He  now  needs  a 
gi'eater  aid  in  controlling  his  passions  than 
heretofore.      Though  grace  is  more  than 


INTEODUCTION.  19 

sufficient,  still  lie  must  not  disdain  to  use 
her  handmaid,  Nature.  Hence,  the  science 
of  reason  as  well  as  of  faith  is  imparted 
to  him,  till  his  mind  becomes  inoculated 
with  right  principles.  The  play  of  his 
fancy  is  checked,  the  'waywardness  of  his 
will  controlled,  and  the  reluctance  of  his 
intellect  to  meditate  overcome  by  con- 
stant application  to  the  study  of  matter, 
which  brings  out  all  the  reflective  pow- 
ers. His  mind  is  drilled  by  syllogisms 
daily ;  he  argues ;  he  proposes  his  thesis, 
lays  down  his  premises,  and  draws  his 
conclusions  according  to  rule,  as  an  archi- 
tect builds  a  mansion.  He  had  been  ac- 
customed to  think  as  the  ostrich  flies,  by 
fits  and  starts ;  now  his  reasoning  is  close, 
connected,  solid.  Heretofore  there  was 
an  exaggerated  growth  of  the  imagina- 
tion apparent  in  his  style;  weeds  grew 
along  with  flowers;  now  his  judgment 
assumes  the  office  of  pruner.  The  style 
becomes  chaster  and  more  elegant.  He 
has  passed  from  being  an  author  of  bom- 


20  INTRODUCTION. 

bastic  verses  to  being  the  writer  of  sound 
prose ;  and  if  he  still  preserves  the  charac- 
ter of  a  poet,  his  productions  are  more 
labored  and  exact. 

There  is  more  common-sense  appearing 
in  him  as  his  reason  improves  under  logi- 
cal discipline  and  metaphysicaT  drill. 
He  obeys  more  readily,  for  the  principles 
he  is  imbibing  influence  his  will.  Excep- 
tions there  may  be  to  this  rule,  but  the 
exceptions  prove  the  rule  here  as  well  as 
in  many  other  cases. 

In  fact,  the  improvement  of  his  intel- 
lect, will,  and  imagination  is  apparent. 
His  intellect  grows  robust,  it  seizes  great 
difficulties  by  the  hair,  it  dives  into 
abysses,  scales  precipices,  it  has  the 
600  TTov  arw  of  Archimedes,  nothing  can 
shake  it,  and  it  can  move  the  world.  The 
intellect  becomes  more  impartial,  it  ex- 
amines both  sides  of  questions,  acquires  a 
love  of  justice,  stability,  and  strength,  and 
loves  to  see  them  everywhere,  in  religion 
as  well  as  in  government.  The  thoughts  be- . 


INTRODUCTION.  21 

come  clear — for  pMlosopliy  is  an  intellec- 
tual claiifier — the  conceptions  exact,  and 
the  expression  of  the  thought  more  just, 
according  to  the  rule  of  Boileau  :  "  Ce  qui 
se  con§oit  bien  s'enonce  clairement." 
Clearness  of  expression  is  a  consequence 
of  clearness  of  thought.  On  the  will,  it 
(our  science)  produces  similar  effects,  for 
volition  generally  follows  the  intellect. 
Mental  conviction  is  the  next  step  to  per- 
suasion. The  young  man's  ardor  is  not 
quenched  by  our  science,  but  tempered. 
We  had  seen  more  of  the  animal  in  the 
boy  and  child ;  philosophy  brings  out 
the  rational,  so  that  we  finally  have  the 
definition  of  the  metaphysicians  proved : 
"  Homo  est  animal  rationale."  The  effect 
of  serious  study  on  a  wild  imagination  is 
evident  from  experience.  Young  men, 
whose  passions  were  mad  as  Charybdis, 
whose  fancy  never  dismounted  Pegasus, 
ani  never  let  the  winged  charger  relax 
from  a  breakneck  gallop,  have  gradually 
become  tamed  under  the  influence   of 


22  INTEODUCTnON. 

pLilosopliy.  The  boiling  of  the  Cbaryb- 
dis  of  the  classics  has  ended  in  a  quiet 
simmer ;  and  the  farious  Pegasus  has 
taken  to  a  quiet  and  steady  walk.  We 
have  seen  it,  and  others  more  competent 
to  judge  bear  testimony  to  this  good  re- 
sult obtained  from  the  study  of  intellect- 
ual philosophy.  It  is  so  useful,  too,  at 
a  time  when  young  men  are  going  to  de- 
cide the  all-important  question  of  voca- 
tion, to  have  their  minds  rendered  capable 
of  serious  reflection,  that  the  choice  may 
be  made  with  pinidence  and  calmness.  In 
fact,  philosophy  is  useful  to  the  statesman  ; 
for  how  can  he  decide  on  questions  of 
civil  policy  without  knowing  the  princi- 
ples of  the  natural  law  and  law  of  na- 
tions ?  It  is  useful  to  the  lawyer  for  the 
same  reasons,  but  it  has  a  special  useful- 
ness for  him  besides.  He  is  a  pleader; 
he  must  know  how  to  refute  his  adver- 
sary's arguments,  as  well  as  to  prove  liis 
own  case ;  he  needs  logic.  To  be  able 
to  form  a  judgment  on  the  character  of 


INTRODUCTION.  23 

tbe  witnesses,  he  must  have  studied  tlie 
workings  of  the  minds  of  men.  Even  if 
he  be  a  physician,  the  knowledge  of /the 
connection  between  the  body  and  soul 
will  help  him  immensely  in  the  cur- 
ing of  sick  imaginations  as  well  as  cor- 
poral infirmities.  But  if  he  be  a  Christ- 
ian minister,  the  utility  of  this  science  is 
incontestably  suitable  to  his  character  and 
to  the  nature  of  the  sciences  to  which  he 
must  apply  his  mind  in  the  holy  ministry. 
This,  however,  brings  us  to  the  third 
great  utility  of  intellectual  philosophy  as 
it  appears  from  its  connection  with  the 
supernatural  order  of  things. 

Sec.  3.  The  utility  of  the  study  of  In- 
tellectual Philosophy  as  the  handmaid  of 
Religion. 

There  is  a  philosophy  of  religion  as 
well  as  of  history ;  there  is  pliilosophy  in 
every  science.  No  science  seems  to  be 
more  closely  joined  to  intellectual  philo- 
sophy than  theology. 


24  INTRODUCTION. 

Theology  treats  of  revealed,  pLilo- 
sophy  of  natural  religion;  but  the  lat- 
ter is  the  footstool  of  the  former,  for 
grace  builds  on  nature.  It  might  be  said 
with  truth,  that  theology  is  not  specifi- 
cally distinct,  but  only  a  degree  higher 
up  the  scale  than  philosophy ;  it  gives  us 
a  better  knowledge  of  God  than  philoso- 
phy. In  the  latter  science  we  see  him 
faintly,  as  the  sun  in  a  cloudy  sky ;  in 
the  former,  though  not  visible  as  in  noon- 
day brightness,  still  we  behold  him  more 
clearly.  Reason  points  him  out  in  the  one, 
faith  in  the  other.  In  philosophy,  t^e  ar- 
gue from  first  principles,  given  by  intui- 
tion or  discovered  by  the  mere  workings 
of  intellectual  power;  in  theology,  we 
build  our  science  on  facts  which  we  have 
learned  by  revelation,  and  by  uniting 
these  facts  together  we  have  the  prin- 
ciples of  a  science. 

Theology  treats  of  God,  of  the  soul, 
and  of  creatures  considered  in  a  super- 
natural light ;  and  as  philosophy  treats  of 


INTRODUCTION.  25 

them  in  a  natural  point  of  view,  it  follows 
that  the  philosophical  knowledge  we  ac- 
quire of  them  serves  us  greatly  in  rising 
to  the  higher  sphere.  There  is,  as  it  were, 
an  echo  of  the  supernatural  in  the  natural 
order.  Revelation's  shadow  falls  into  the 
natural  order.  In  fact  the  two  orders  are 
inseparable  and  .dovetailed  into  each 
other,  if  we  may  so  speak,  in  time  as  well 
as  in  eternity. 

It  was  the  observation  of  this  fact  that 
made  Gioberti  invent  the  mental  faculty 
which  he  calls  sovrintelligenza,  or  superin- 
telligence — the  natural  power  of  appre- 
hending in  the  supernatural  order.  We 
say  which  made  him  invent  the  faculty, 
for  its  existence  is  problematic.  It  was 
this  connection  between  theology  and. 
philosophy  that  made  the  scholastics 
give  the  latter  science  the  name  of  "  An- 
cilla  Theologias."  In  modern  times  this 
name  has  been  rejected  by  many  philo- 
sophers, wlio  could  not  bear  to  hear  their 
favorite  science  receive  a  name  that  would 


26  INTRODUCTION. 

imply  inferiority.  This  feeling,  how/^yeTy 
is  one  of  unreasonable  pride,  for  there  is 
no  insult  meant  to  philosophy  by  giving 
her  her  natural  position.  She  is  a  hand- 
maid, and  though  rationalists  may  endea- 
vor to  put  reason  above  faith,  they  will 
never  succeed  in  their  undertaking,  for 
things  must  be  as  God  wills  them.  At 
the  same  time,  therefore,  that  we  give 
our  science  all  the  honor  that  is  due  to 
her,  we  must  never  exaggerate  her  worth. 
Men  have  done  so  in  our  days,  and 
their  conduct  has  been  the  cause  of  the 
general  fear  that  has  crept  into  some 
minds  of  philosophy  and  every  thing  that 
sounds  like  it.  They  look  on  a  philoso- 
pher as  a  bugbear,  a  humbug,  or  a  mad- 
man. He  is  supposed  to  be  a  human 
being  who  deals  only  with  ethereal  ob- 
jects, and  can  not  descend  from  his  ele- 
vated position  to  the  ordinary  mundane 
sphere.  This,  in  fact,  is  one  of  the  great 
objections  against  the  study  of  philoso- 
phy ;  we  shall  answer  it,  therefore,  before 


INTRODUCTION.  27 

we  end  this  chapter.  Does  pliilosopby 
make  men  unreal  and  exaggerated  ?  We 
have  shown  its  utility  from'  the  na- 
ture of  the  matter  of  which  it  treats, 
as  well  as  from  its  great  power  in  cul- 
tivating the  mind.  We  should  not,  there- 
fore, be  induced  to  consider  it  a  dan- 
gerous study  on  account  of  the  abuse 
which  some  have  made  of  it.  There  is  no 
contesting  the  fact  that  all  the  danger- 
ous systems  of  modern  times  have  had 
founders  who  prided  themselves  on  be- 
ing philosophers.  Communism  in  France, 
claims  St.  Simon  and  Pierre  Le  Koux 
as  its  authors;  the  Pantheists,  in  Ger- 
many, glory  in  Hegel,  Fichte,  and  Schil- 
ling. We  need  not  mention  some  of 
our  own  philosophical  scapegoats,  whose 
exaggerations  are  as  great  as  any  of  the 
worst  European  speculations.  The  abuse 
never  destroys  the  thing  used.  The  Bible 
is  abused,  yet  the  Bible  is  the  best  of 
books ;  and  though  food  is  abused  by 
those  who  eat  to  excess,  it  does  not  there- 


28  INTRODUCTION. 

fore  follow  that  we  are  to  die  of  hunGrer. 

o 

So  is  it  with  philosophy ;  we  do  not 
praise  bad  philosophy,  but  sound  philo- 
sophy. We  speak  of  the  advantages  of 
sound  philosophy,  not  of  the  creations  of 
bewildered  brains.  There  are  objections 
against  every  thing  that  is  good.  It  is 
not,  therefore,  astonishing  that  there 
should  be  objections  against  philosophy. 
But,  after  all,  those  who  know  the  sci- 
ence, feel  that  there  is  none  more  useful 
or  more  important;  none  more  beloved 
of  reason  and  more  respected  by  faith. 
Let  us,  therefore,  proceed  to  examine  some 
of  the  most  interesting  questions  which 
the  science  proposes  to  be  solved  by  the 
human  intellect. 


CHAPTER  II. 

PHILOSOPHICAL   TERMS. 

Section  1. — Logical  Terms. 

N  artist  slioiild  know  the  names 
and  uses  of  his  instruments  be- 
fore undertaking  to  use  them. 
"We  shall  therefore  explain  some  of  the 
terms  used  in  logic,  in  psychology,  and  in 
ontology,  before  examining  some  of  the 
most  interesting  questions  of  philosophy. 
The  first  simple  act  of  the  mind  is  per- 
ception or  apprehension,  and  the  object 
of  this  act  is  an  idea.  An  idea  is  every 
object  apprehended  by  the  mind,  or  it  is 
the  object  of  thought.  "We  call  the  first 
operation  of  the  mind  an  act,  though 
Gioberti  holds  the  mind  to  be  passive  in 
the  first  gleam  of  thought,  which  he  calls 


80  INTBODUCTION. 

intuition.     In  his  system,  intuition  is  the 
presentation  of  the  object  to  the  mind. 

When  the  mind  has  apprehended  an 
idea,  it  may  compare  it  with  another 
idea,  and  thus  judge.  Judgment  is  there- 
fore the  second  act  of  the  mind,  and  con- 
sists in  the  affirmation  or  negation  of  an 
agreement  between  two  ideas.  The  ele- 
ments of  a  judgment  are,  therefore,  two 
ideas,  and  a  copula  or  connecting  link 
between  them.  The  oral  expression  of  a 
judgment  is  called  a  proposition.  The 
first  term  of  a  proposition  is  called  the 
subject,  which  is  affirmed  or  denied  of  a 
second  idea,  which  is  called  the  predicate. 
The  next  operation  of  the  mind  consists 
in  comparing  different  judgments  with 
each  other,  and  this  is  done  by  reasoning 
or  argumentation.  The  simplest  mode  of 
argumentation,  and  the  one  to  which  all 
species  of  argument  may  be  reduced,  is 
the  syllogism.  A  syllogism  or  argument 
is  the  act  of  the  mind  by  which  we  re- 
duce one  proposition  from  two  others. 


INTRODUCTION.  81 

The  elements  of  a  Byllogism  are  therefore 
three — the  two  extremes  and  the  middle 
term.  In  every  syllogism  we  compare 
two  terms  or  ideas  with  a  third,  either 
pronouncing  that  they  agree  with  this 
third  and  hence  agree  with  each  other, 
or  that  they  disagree  with  the  third  and 
hence  disao;ree  with  each  other.  The  two 
terms  compared  are  the  two  extremes; 
one  of  them  is  called  the  minor  extreme, 
and  it  is  the  subject  of  the  conclusion. 
The  middle  term — the  term  of  compari- 
son— must  never  be  found  in  the  conclu- 
sion. Another  term  explained  in  logic  is 
that  of  certitude. 

Certitude  is  said  to  exist  when  a  judg- 
ment has  an  essential  connection  with 
truth.  Certitude  has  three  branches — 
evidence,  common-sense,  and  authority. 
Judgments  certain  by  evidence  are  those 
which  are  certain  in  the  very  act  of 
thought.  Judgments  certain  by  common- 
sense  are  those  which  derive  their  cer- 
tainty from  the  infallible  voice  of  nature. 


82  ^  INTEODUCTION. 

Judgments  certain  by  authority  are  those 
which  are  derived  from  the  testimony  of 
a  rational  being,  which  we  admit  as  a 
rule  of  truth. 

Demonstration,  another  logical  term, 
consists  in  showing  that  a  given  proposi- 
tion is  certain  by  some  one  of  these  three 
kinds  of  certitude. 

PSYCHOLOGICAL   TERMS. 

Psychology  is  that  part  of  philosophy 
which  treats  of  the  soul.  The  soul  is 
conceived  by  us  as  the  subject  of  thought, 
or  as  that  substance  whose  specific  termi- 
nation is  thought.  We  are  conscious  of 
thought  by  that  internal  monitor  called 
conscience  or  internal  sense,  which  tells 
us  of  our  soul  and  its  modifications. 
There  are  three  elements  in  thought.  The 
first  is  the  representation  of  some  object 
distinct  from  the  soul  and  constituting 
the  object  of  thought.  This  object  con- 
sidered in  itself  is  called  being.  But 
considered  as  illuminating  the  mind,  it 


INTRODUCTION-.  33 

is  called  idea.  The  operation  of  tlie  mind 
in  appreTiending  tMs  object  is  called  per- 
ception. When  the  soul  perceives  it  acts, 
and  by  this  exercise  of  its  activity,  it,  as 
it  were,  creates  its  own  thoughts.  The 
principal  exercise  of  the  activity  of  the 
soul  is  in  judgment;  that  is  to  say,  the 
mental  affirmation  by  which  the  mind 
pronounces  such  or  such  a  notion  to  be 
included  or  not  included  in  such  or  such 
another  notion.  The  various  sensations, 
namely,  of  color,  sound,  etc.,  etc.,  which 
affect  the  mind  when  it  perceives  and 
acts,  constitute  the  third  element  of 
thought.  This  element  produces  speech. 
It  is  the  sensible  element  of  thought. 
Speech  serves  as  the  sensible  exponent 
of  the  mind's  ideas.  It  is,  as  it  were,  the 
mirror  in  which  ideas  are  represented. 
Hence  the  three  elements  of  thought  are 
perception,  activity,  and  sensibility,  if  we 
look  at  thought  from  a  psychological 
stand-point ;  if  we  look  at  it,  though,  ob- 
jectively, its  elements  are  object,  copula, 


84  INTRODUCTION. 

and  subject.  The  old  division  of  tlie 
faculties  was  into  intellect,  Avill,  and 
memory;  but  as  we  know  sufficiently, 
well  the  meaning  of  those  faculties,  we 
will  not  dwell  upon  them,  but  pass  im- 
mediately to  some  of  the  ontological 
terms. 

ONTOLOGICAL   TERMS. 

We  often  see  the  term  being  employed. 
We  mean  by  being  reality ;  eveiy  reality 
that  is  the  object  of  thought  is  being. 
There  are,  however,  different  classes  of 
being,  and  there  are  certain  conceptions 
subordinate  to  the  general  notion  of 
being,  namely,  essence  and  existence.  The 
essence  of  a  thing  is  that  which  makes  a 
being  what  it  is ;  or  to  use  a  scholastic 
term,  essence  is  the  quiddity  of  a  thing. 
The  elements  of  an  essence  are  several, 
which  are  called  its  modes  or  properties. 
Some  are  so  peculiar  to  an  essence  that 
they  distinguish  it  from  every  thing  else. 
These  are  called  specific  properties,  and 


INTRODUCTION.  85 

distinguisli  the  dilfferent  species  of  being. 
Otlier  modes  are  common  to  several  es- 
sences, and  "by  these,  species  are  distin- 
guished into  kinds  or  genera.  That 
kind  which  has  none  above  it  is  called 
being  in  general.  In  speaking  of  any 
essence,  we  must  distinguish  the  exten- 
sion from  its  comprehension.  The  com- 
prehension of  an  essence  is  given  in  its 
definition,  in  which  we  have  an  enumera- 
tion of  its  specific  properties.  The  exten- 
sion is  given  by  a  division,  where  we  have 
the  enumeration  either  of  the  different 
species  or  of  the  different  individuals  in 
a  species.  From  essence  we  pass  to  exist- 
ence. This  term  expresses  the  actuation 
of  the  essence.  In  the  idea  of  essence  is 
included  the  possibility  of  the  creation  of 
an  indefinite  number  of  individuals  bear- 
ing its  stamp.  This  is  true  of  all  essences 
except  the  essence  of  God.  But  in  the 
idea  of  existence  you  have  the  notion  of 
but  one  individual.  In  this  individual 
you  distinguish  two  elements,  1st.   The 


86  INTRODUCTION. 

substance^  which  is  th6  fundamental  sup- 
port of  every  thing  that  happens  in  the 
existing  being,  and  hence  it  may  be  called 
being  subsisting  in  itself,  or  better,  .an 
active  force,  as  Leibnitz  defines  it.  The 
other  element  is  the  mode,  and  it  varies. 
Modes  are  the  different  ways  in  which 
different  substances  exist.  Every  essence 
is  immutable  and  necessary ;  but  not  so 
with  eveiy  existence.  Some  are  merely 
contingent.  God  alone  exists  immutably. 
As  contingent  existences  have  not  the 
principle  of  actuation  in  themselves,  they 
suppose  it  to  rest  in  some  other  being, 
which  is  their  cause  and  whose  effects 
they  are.  A  caiise,  therefore,  is  whatever 
exists  perfectly  in  itself,  and  gives  the 
beginning  of  existence  to  another.  Its 
production  is  called  the  ejfect 


Question     -Pir^t. 
what  is  science? 

UDGMENTS  are  of  two  kinds- 
certain  and  doubtful.  Judor- 
ments  are  certain  when  there 
is  an  essential  connection  between  the 
object  apprehended  and  the  subject  ap- 
prehending. Judgments  are  only  proba- 
ble when  this  essential  connection  be- 
tween the  object  and  the  subject  does  not 
exist.  ScientifiG  Icnowledge  is  a  series  of 
certain  judgments,  all  derived  from  one 
common  principle.  The  links  of  the  se- 
ries are  called  common  principles.  There 
may  be  different  classes  of  common  prin- 
ciples, and  different  series  of  certain  judg- 
ments, hence  there  may  be  different  kinds 
of  scientific  Icnowledge.    A  series  of  cer- 


88  CUEIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

tain  judgments,  joined  together  by  com- 
mon principles  and  constituting  one  class, 
is  called  a  science. 

Science  and  art  are  not  synonymous, 
either  in  sound  or  sense.  Art  is  the  as- 
semblage of  the  rules  by  which  human 
activity  is  directed  in  the  attainment  of 
any  end  ;  for  instance,  the  rules  necessary 
to  the  painter,  in  order  that  he  may  exer- 
cise his  profession,  constitute  the  art  of 
painting.  In  a  subjective  sense,  however, 
art  is  often  used  synonymously  with  sTcill. 
Still,  mere  manual  skill  is  not  art.  Sci- 
ence has  very  little  direct  relation  with 
.manual  exercise,  while  art  is  seldom  or 
never  without  this, relation. 

All  philosophers  agree  that  science 
should  be  divided  into  different  branches. 
They  often  agree  upon  the  names  even  to 
be  given  to  those  classes,  but  there  is 
very  little  agreement  about  the  reason  of 
the  division  of  science.  The  ancient  phi- 
losophers divided  science  into  speculativo 
and  practical,  and  an  intermediate  science, 


CTJRIOUS  QUESTIONS.  39 

which  they  called  instrumental.  This 
diyision  is  commonly  attributed  to  Aris- 
totle, though  Brucker  says  that  Plato  is 
the  author  of  it.  Instrumental  science  is^ 
called  logic^  which  teaches  the  rules  of 
reasoning.  Speculative  science  goes  no 
farther  tljan  the  knowledge  of  the  object, 
while  practical  science  endeavors  to  re- 
duce speculative  knowledge  to  practice. 
The  speculative  sciences  are  physics, 
metaphysics,  and  mathematics.  Physics 
treats  of  visible  existences ;  metaphysics 
of  invisible  and  immutable  things,  and 
comprises  general  ontology  and  tlieodicy  j 
while  the  Tnatliematics  treat  of  divided 
and  continued  quantity.  The  practical 
sciences  are  ethics,  politics,  and  private 
economy.  The  philosophers  of  the  mid- 
dle ages  divided  the  sciences  according  to 
the  three  faculties  of  the  universities, 
namely,  tlieology,  law,  and  medicine.  The 
other  sciences  were  called  arts,  and  were 
divided  into  the  liberal  and  the  mechani- 
col.    The  liberal  arts  were  seven  in  num- 


40  CUEIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

ber,  and  subdivided  into  two  classes :  tlie 
first  called  tlie  trivium,  wLicli  included 
grammar^  rhetoric^  and  dialectics;  tlie 
second  called  the  quadrivium^  which  com 
prised  music,  geometry,  astronomy,  and 
arithmetic.  The  mecJianical  arts  were 
also  seven  in  number,  namely,  agricul- 
ture, hunting,  the  art  of  war,  architecture, 
navigation,  painting,  and  surgery.  In 
these  categories  neither  logic  nor  ethics 
was  mentioned,  because  up  to  the  twelfth 
century  these  sciences  were  not  taught 
under  their  present  names.  When  Aris- 
totle's philosophy  was  in  fashion,  they 
were  numbered  among  the  arts.  The 
faculty  of  arts  in  modern  universities  has 
been  subdivided  into  two  others,  namely, 
that  of  letters  and  that  of  matliematics 
and  physical  sciences,  so  that  now  uni- 
versities have  five  faculties  instead  of 
three.  Among  the  modern  divisions  of 
science,  the  first  is  that  of  Bacon.  Fran- 
cis Bacon,  who  lived  in  the  seventeenth 
century,  and  published  a  work  entitled 


CUEIOUS  QUESTIONS.  41 

"  De  Augmentis  Scientiarum,"  gives  tlie 
following  division  of  science.  He  says 
that  it  may  be  classified  according  to  the 
three  faculties  of  the  mind — memory,  im- 
agination, and  understanding  or  reason. 
To  memory  belongs  history,  which  is  sub- 
divided into  civil  and  ecclesiastical.  .  To 
the  imagination  must  be  referred  poetry, 
which  may  be  divided  into  narrative,  dra- 
matic, and  parabolic.  Finally,  to  reason 
belongs  science,  properly  so-called,  which 
is  divided  into  philosophy  and  theology. 
Bacon  divides  philosophy  into  divine,  na- 
tural, and  human,  while  he  leaves  theolo- 
gy to  be  subdivided  by  the  theologians. 
The  authors  of  the  great  work  published 
in  France,  in  the  eighteenth  century,  un- 
der the  name  of  "  Encyclopaedia,"  give  al- 
most the  same  division  of  science  as  that 
of  Bacon.  They  divide  it  into  history, 
philosophy,  and  poetry.  They  subdivide 
history  into  sacred,  civil,  and  natural. 
Philosophy,  according  to  these  authors, 
comprises   general   metaphysics,    natural 


42  CUEIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

and  revealed  theology,  the  science  of  good 
and  bad  spirits,  the  science  of  man,  which 
is  subdivided  into  pneumatology  and  uni- 
versal logic,  and  finally  into  moral  sci- 
ence and  the  science  of  nature,  which  com- 
prises the  metaphysics  of  bodies;  pure 
and  applied  mathematics,  and  special 
physics.  Poetiy  is  divided  into  sacred 
and  profane,  and  each  of  these  subdivided 
into  narrative,  dramatic,  and  parabolic. 
The  next  division  of  science  is  that  of  M. 
Ampere,  a  French  writer  of  the  present 
century.  His  division  is  very  detailed. 
According  to  him,  there  are  two  primary 
kingdoms  of  science,  which  are  subdivid- 
ed into  two  more,  and  these  two  again 
into  two  others.  The  two  latter  ai*e 
called  two  general  series,  and  are  subdi- 
vided into  two  sub-series,  and  each  sub- 
series  contains  two  sciences  of  the  first 
order,  and  each  science  of  the  first  order 
two  sciences  of  the  second  order,  and  each 
of  the  second  two  of  the  third  order.  The 
sciences  of  the  third  order  are  one  hun- 


CUEIOUS  QUESTIONS.  43 

olred  and  twenty-eiglit  in  number.  The 
two  general  kingdoms  of  science  are  cos- 
mological  and  noological.  The  cosmolo- 
gical  sciences  are  either  cosmological,  pro- 
perly so  called,  or  psychological.  The  cos- 
mological are  divided  into  mathematical 
and  physical,  and  the  psychological  into 
natural  and  medicinal.  The  noological 
sciences  are  either  noological,  properly  so- 
called,  or  social.  The  noological  are  di- 
vided into  philosophical  and  dialegmati- 
cal.  The  social  are  divided  into  ethnolo- 
gical and  political. 

Of  these  four  divisions  of  science,  three 
follow  reason ;  but  all  the  authors  of 
these  three  divisions  differ  in  their  man- 
ner of  explaining  them.  Plato  divides 
science  according  to  the  end  which  it  has 
in  view ;  Bacon,  according  to  the  facultj'' 
which  is  principally  exercised  in  acquir- 
ing the  science;  while  Ampere  attends 
only  to  the  object  of  which  science  treats. 
What  are  we,  then,  to  think  of  these  re- 
spective divisions  ?     We  reject  the  first 


44  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

one,  because  it  does  not  divide  the  sci- 
ences so  as  to  distinguish  one  part  from 
another.  There  is  no  practical  science 
which  is  not  in  a  certain  sense  specula- 
tive, and  there  is  no  speculative  science 
which  may  not  be  made  more  or  less 
practical.  Hence'  the  division  of  Aristo- 
tle must  be  rejected,  for  it  does  not  dis- 
tinguish the  parts  from  each  other ;  and 
this  is  necessaiy  according  to  the  rules 
of  logic.  Neither  can  we  admit  the  divi- 
sion of  Bacon ;  for  although  science  bears 
a  necessary  relation  to  the  faculties  of  the 
mind,  nevertheless,  according  to  the  defi- 
nition of  science  which  we  have  given 
above,  memory  and  imagination  can  have 
no  part  in  the  division  of  science,  since 
they  can  have  no  share  in  the  acquisition 
of  what  we  have  termed  common  princi- . 
pies.  Reason  alone  holds  sway  over 
this  department.  We  reject  the  divi- 
sion of  the  authors  of  the  "Encyclo- 
paedia" for  nearly  the  same  reason,  since 
the  foundation  of  theii'  division  is  sub- 


CURIOUS   QUESTIONS.  45 

stantially  the  same  as  that  of  Bacon. 
The  division  of  M.  Ampere  is  faulty 
for  the  reason  that  he  divides  the  sci- 
ences according  to  the  different  objects 
about  which  they  treat,  instead  of  stating 
the  common  principles  as  the  basis  of  his 
division.  The  object  of  a  science,  and  the 
principle  on  which  a  science  rests,  'are  two 
different  things.  Science,  then,  according 
to  our  definition,  should  be  divided  ac- 
cording to  the  different  classes  of  common 
principles ;  for  if  we  were  to  divide  with 
M.  Ampere  according  to  the  object,  then 
it  would  follow  that  two  different  sci- 
ences could  not  treat  of  the  same  object, 
(God,  for  instance,)  which  is  false,  since 
theology  and  theodicy  treat  of  the  same 
object,  God,  and  yet  they  are  not  the 
same  science. 

There  are  as  many  sciences,  therefore, 
as  there  are  distinct  classes  of  common 
principles;  but  here  arises  the  question. 
How  can  one  series  of  common  principles 
be  distinguished  from  another  ?    The  dif- 


46  COBIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

ference  of  those  series,  we  think,  may  be 
determined  by  the  different  motives  of 
certitude  on  which  they  are  founded. 
There  are  different  kinds  of  certitude,  and 
when  the  certitude  of  one  series  of  prin- 
ciples differs  from  that  of  another  series, 
the  sciences  will  be  different.  Now,  there 
are  three  sources  of  certitude — evidence, 
common-sense,  and  authority.  From  evi- 
dence arises  the  certitude  of  philosophy, 
properly  so-called,  and  upon  common- 
sense  rests  the  certitude  of  the  laws  of 
bodies.  Hence,  the  physical  sciences  are 
based  upon  common-sense.  Now,  the 
physical  sciences  treat  either  of  the  phe- 
nomena of  bodies  or  of  individual  bodies, 
and  hence  we  have  the  physical  sciences 
proper  and  natural  history.  Authority 
may  be  either  natural  or  supernatural. 
Natural  authority  treats  of  social  facts; 
supernatural,  of  religious  facts. 

Having  premised  so  much  on  science 
in  general,  we  shall  now  proceed  to  give 
a  definition  of  the  science  of  philosophy. 


CURIOUS  QUESTIONS.  47 

A  definition  may  be  of  two  kinds; 
verbal  or  real.  A  verbal  definition  is  a 
definition  of  tlie  word.  A  real  definition 
is  a  definition  of  tlie  thing.  The  verbal 
definition  of  philosophy  is  love  of  wisdom. 
Cicero,  in  the  fifth  chapter  of  the  Tusculan 
Questions,  tells  us  "  that  those  who  for- 
merly spent  their  time  in  the  study  of 
sciences  were  called  ^o4>oi "  or  wise  men, 
by  the  Greeks.  Pythagoras,  however, 
thought  this  appellation  too  high-sound- 
ing, and  hence,  with  an  appearance  of 
modesty,  called  himself  simply  a  "  lover  of 
wisdom" — "  $tAo<7o0off."  Succeeding  philo- 
sophers have  adopted  this  title.  As  to  the 
real  definition  of  philosophy,  it  has  varied 
with  different  periods.  In  the  early  ages 
philosophy  meant  no  particular  science,  but 
only  "  the  disposition  of  a  learned  mind 
well  versed  in  the  sciences,  or  at  least,  of 
one  inflamed  with  the  desire  of  know- 
ledge." Objectively  considered,  philoso- 
phy meant  science  in  general ;  but  when, 
after  the  first  ages  of  the  Chui'ch,  sacred 


48  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

theology  began  to  be  treated  as  tlie  science 
distinct  from  mere  natural  sciences,  the 
name  Philosophy  was  restricted  to  those 
sciences  which  could  be  learned  by  the  eX' 
ercise  of  natural  reason,  without  having  re- 
course to  the  authority  of  God's  revelation. 
Hence,  pliilosophy  was  commonly  called 
in  the  schools,  "  Scientia  ex  ratione,  \el 
cognitio  ex  primis  principiis  evidenter  de- 
ducta."  Philosophy,  understood  in  this 
extended  sense,  included  not  only  meta- 
physics, or  the  science  of  God,  but  also 
physical  and  mathematical  sciences :  even 
jurisprudence,  economy,  and  politics,  as 
we  can  prove  by  opening  any  of  the  phi- 
losophical works  which  have  come  down 
from  the  middle  ages  to  our  days.  For 
in  those  works  we  find  philosophy  em- 
bracing four  parts,  logic,  physics,  which 
includes  also  metaphysics,  mathematics, 
and  ethics.  The  second  of  these,  namely, 
physics,  which  was  then  a  very  limited 
science,  has  been  so  developed  by  mod- 
ern   discoveries    that    it    now  fonns  a 


CURIOUS  QUESTIONS.  49 

brancli  by  itself.  Hence,  intellectual 
philosopliy  now  comprises  logic,  wMcli 
teaches  tlie  rules  to  be  followed  in  the 
acquisition  of  truth ;  metaphysics,  which 
treats  of  being  in  general,  as  well  as  of 
spiritual  being,  and  especially  of  the 
human  soul ;  and  ethics,  which  discusses 
about  the  principles  of  morality.  To 
these  three  parts  may  be  added  a  fourth, 
called  cosmology,  which  gives  us  some 
general  speculations  about  the  corporeal 
world. 

As  authors  differ  in  giving  a  verbal 
definition  of  philosophy,  in  circumscrib- 
ing its  limits  as  well  as  in  giving  a 
real  definition  of  it,  we  may  venture  to 
give  one  of  our  own.  Philosophy,  then, 
we  identify  with  the  first  part  of  the  de- 
finition of  science  already  given.  Hence, 
philosophy  is  a  series  of  certain  judg- 
ments based  on  evidence ;  but  as  evident 
judgments  are  those  which  are  included 
in  the  very  act  of  thought,  we  may  define 
philosophy  to  be  the  "  Science  of  thought." 


60  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

Let  us  run  through  the  different  parts  of 
philosophy,  in  order  to  see  how  this  defi- 
nition will  bear  upon  them.  In  the  act  of 
thought  there  are  three  things  to  be  dis- 
tinguished: the  object,  which  is  being; 
the  subject,  or  mind  which  receives  being ; 
and  the  laws  which  govern  the  mind  in 
the  production  of  thoughts.  Hence,  in 
philosophy  there  are  three  parts :  the  on- 
tological,  the  psychological,  and  the  no- 
mological.  The  object  of  thought  is  es- 
sentially distinguished  from  the  subject, 
and  it  is  called  idea  or  being.  It  may 
be  apprehended  in  two  ways — either  ab- 
solutely as  being  in  general,  or  relatively 
as  limited  being.  Being  which  is  abso- 
lute or  unlimited  must  be  God,  while 
restricted  being  must  be  a  creature. 
Hence,  ontology  treats  of  the  Creator  and 
the  creature.  But  as  these  two  realities 
are  made  known  to  us  by  certain  general 
abstract  conceptions,  we  must  discourse 
about  those  conceptions  before  speaking 
of  their   applications.     Hence,  in   nieta- 


CURIOUS  QUESTIONS.  51 

physics,  or  in  the  ontological  part  of  phi- 
losophy, we  have  three  treatises,  namely, 
general  metaphysics  and  special  metaphy- 
sics, which  is  divided  into  theodicy  or  the 
treatise  on  the  Creator,  and  cosmology, 
which  treats  of  the  world  or  creature. 
Psychology  has  but  one  treatise  on  the 
subject  of  thought  —  the  human  soul. 
The  third  part  of  philosophy  is  nomolog- 
ical,  which  treats  of  the  laws  of  the  mind. 
A  law  is  the  rule  which  the  activity  of 
any  being  must  follow  in  order  to  attain 
the  end  for  which  it  was  destined.  By 
thousrht  itself  is  meant  the  exercise  of 
the  soul's  activity.  This  exercise,  like 
every  other  evolution  of  a  being,  is  an  at- 
tempt to  attain  some  end,  and  this  end 
can  not  be  attained  except  by  following 
certain  laws.  Hence,  the  laws  of  thought 
are  the  rules  which  the  mind  must  ob- 
serve in  thinking  in  order  to  attain  its 
end.  But  the  operations  of  the  mind  are 
of  two  kinds,  cognoscitive  and  affective^  as 
they  have  reference  either  to  the  mind  or 


62  CTTRIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

to  the  will.  The  cognoscitive  or  judging 
operations  of  the  mind  aim  at  the  discov- 
eiy  of  tnith,  while  the  affective  deal  with 
the  love  of  God  and  the  hatred  of  vice. 
The  laws  of  thought,  therefore,  may  "be 
divided  into  two  classes,  since  they  may 
either  govern  the  cognoscitive  or  affective 
operations  of  the  mind.  Logic  treats  of 
the  first  class,  and  ethics  of  the  second. 
There  is  a  little  treatise  called  aesthetics 
— the  science  of  the  beautiful — which  we 
have  left  out  in  this  enumeration,  but  it 
may  be  considered  as  an  appendix  to 
theodicy. 


Question    Second. 

what  relation  has  philosophy  to  other 
sciences  ? 


HERE  is  a  great  controversy  re- 
garding the  order  to  be  fol- 
lowed in  studying  philosophy- 
We  have  seen  the  different  parts  of  this 
science ;  now  the  practical  question  arises, 
Which  part  should  we  treat  first  ?  One 
school,  called  the  school  of  the  dialecti- 
cians, begins  by  logic;  another,  called 
the  school  of  the  psychologists,  begins  by 
psychology  ;  while  another,  called  the 
ontologists,  maintains  that  we  should  be- 
gin philosophy  by  the  study  of  ontology. 
Let  us  weigh  the  reasons  of  these  three 
schools.  Most  of  the  scholastics  were 
dialecticians,  and  many  moderns  belong 
to  the  same  school.    The  origin  of  this 


64  GURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

first  system  is  found  in  tlie  great  dispute 
between  the  Stoics  and  Peripatetics  as  to 
the  nature  of  logic.  According  to  the 
Stoics  logic  is  a  science,  and  hence,  like 
all  other  sciences,  it  aims  at  giv^ing  us  a 
distinct  speculative  knowledge  of  some 
object.  Hence,  l6gic  could  have  the  first 
place  in  philosophy  only  inasmuch  as  the 
object  of  which  it  treated  would  be  the 
first  among  the  objects  of  science ;  but  as 
the  Stoics  denied  that  the  object  of  logic 
was  the  first  among  the  objects  of  science, 
they  denied  that  logic  should  have  the 
first  place  in  philosophy.  The  Peripatetics 
replied  that  logic  was  not  a  science,  but 
a  universal  instrument  necessary  for  the 
study  of  all  sciences,  and  hence  they  gave 
the  name  of  organon,  or  instrument,  to 
Aristotle's  works  on  logic.  The  Peripa- 
tetics, therefore,  contend  that  no  science 
can  be  acquired  unless  we  know  the 
foundation  of  human  certitude,  the  laws 
of  reasoning,  and  the  method  which  should 
"be  followed  in  investigating  and  distrib- 


CUKIOUS   QUESTIONS.  55 

uting  tlie  different  parts  of  science ;  and 
as  logic  teaclies  all  these  things,  it  is  not 
a  science  but  a  universal  requisite  for  the 
study  of  all  sciences;   and  hence  some- 
thing which  should  precede  the  study  of 
all  science.     Hence,  we  should  begin  the 
study  of  philosophy  by  logic.     The  psy- 
chological system  is  of  Scotch  origin ;  its 
author  being  Thomas  Reid,  the  founder 
of  the  Scotch  school  of  philosophy.     In 
this  century  there  have  been  many  disci- 
ples of  this  system  in  France,  the  principal 
of  whom  are  Royer  Collard,  Jouifroy,  and 
Damiron  of  the  Paris  University.     Victor 
Cousin,  also,  in  many  points,  admits  this 
system.       These    authors     almost    com- 
pletely neglect  the  other  parts  of  philoso- 
phy to  devote  themselves  especially  to 
the  study  of  the  thinking  subject.     They 
make  psychology  the  foundation  of  all 
philosophy,  and  endeavor  to  refute  the 
dialecticians  as  follows.     They  deny  that 
logic  is  a  necessary  and  universal  instru- 
ment for  the  acquisition  of  science.     For 


66  CUBIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

tlie  object  of  logic  is  to  give  us  a  scientific 
knowledge  of  the  rules  wliich  govern  the 
thinking  faculty,  and  hence  logic  could 
not  be  called  the  universal  instrument  of 
science,  only  inasmuch  as  a  knowledge 
of  these  rules  would  be  necessary  to  every 
scientific  disquisition.     But  this  know- 
ledge is  not  necessary.     For  just  as  we 
have  naturally  the  faculty  of  knowing,  so 
do  we  know  naturally  how  to  use  it,  as  it 
were  by  instinct ;  and  we  know  how  to 
distinguish  between  truth  and  error  with- 
out having  a  scientific  knowledge  of  the 
laws  and  principles  of  reasoning.     Thus 
we  see  every  day  men  without  education 
and  ignorant  of  the  rules  of  logic,  judging 
correctly  things  that  fall  under  their  ob- 
servation.    Again,  if  logic  were  the  uni- 
versal instrument  of  science,  it  would  fol- 
low that  as  often  as  we  exercise  the  think- 
ing faculty  we  should  be  conscious  of  the 
application  of  the  rules  of  logic ;  we  could 
approve  of  no  reason  without  having  first 
analyzed    it    logically ;    but    ex]3erience 


CURIOUS  QUESTIONS.  57 

teaches  us  tbat  this  is  false.  Moreover 
if  we  assert  that  logic  is  the  necessary  in- 
strument in  the  acquisition  of  science,  we 
fall  into  a  manifest  contradiction;  for  logic 
is  a  science,  no  matter  what  may  be  its 
object,  and  this  science  can  not  be  learned 
without  using  the  faculty  of  thought. 
This  is  as  true  of  logic  as  of  any  other 
science.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  we  can 
not  say  that  the  scientific  knowledge  of 
logic  is  necessary  to  acquire  the  science 
of  logic.  Therefore,  logic  is  not  a  uni- 
versal instrument,  as  the  dialecticians 
would  have  it.  The  psychologists,  how- 
ever, do  not  despise  logic.  They  ac- 
knowledge its  utility  in  common  with 
that  of  all  sciences ;  and  they  admit  that 
it  aids  us  in  the  investigation  of  truth. 
Truth  being  the  object  of  the  intellect, 
the  knowledge  of  it  is  useful  and  neces- 
sary ;  and  as  logic  helps  us  in  this  investi- 
gation, it  is  a  useful  science,  and  in  many 
respects  superior  to  the  other  sciences ;  be- 
cause to  know  the  laws  of  our  thought  is 


58  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

one  of  the  objects  most  deserving  our  at- 
tention. Besides,  logic  is  extremely  use- 
ful, because,  say  the  psychologists,  per- 
haps there  is  no  science  in  which  the 
mind's  reflecting  power  is  so  well  drilled  ; 
and  although,  without  the  knowledge 
of  logic,  we  may  reason  and  investigate 
truth,  still  it  is  only  the  experienced  lo- 
gician who  can  easily  refute  sophisms 
and  defend  truth.  After  having  thus  de- 
stroyed the  arguments  of  the  dialecticians, 
the  psychologists  proceed  to  show  that 
the  study  of  their  science  should  precede 
the  study  of  logic.  The  object  of  logic 
is  to  determine  the  laws  of  thought ;  but 
as  the  laws  of  thought  can  not  be  appre- 
hended unless  the  nature  of  thought  be 
first  understood,  it  follows  that  psycholo- 
gy, which  analyzes  thought,  and  explains 
its  nature,  should  come  before  logic.  In- 
deed, the  dialecticians  must  admit  this  in 
practice  if  not  in  theory.  For  there  is 
hardly  one  of  them  who  does  not  analyze 
the  coguoscitive  faculties  of  the  mind,  be- 


CUEIOUS  QUESTIONS.  59 

fore  describing  tlie  laws  of  reason.  In 
truth,  then,  the  dispute  between  the 
dialecticians  and  psychologists  would 
seem  to  be  merely  verbal.  On  the  same 
ground  the  psychologists  endeavor  to 
show  the  priority  of  psychology  to  every 
other  part  of  intellectual  philosophy. 
For,  in  the  first  place,  the  knowledge  of 
one's  self  should  go  before  all  other  know- 
ledge, since  we  should  know  what  we 
are  before  knowing  other  objects.  Again, 
our  faculties  are  the  means  of  acquiring 
all  science;  and  hence,  we  should  first 
study  their  nature  before  that  of  any  thing 
else.  Next  in  order  comes  the  system  of 
the  ontologists.  Men  of  marked  ability 
— some  of  the  greatest  philosophers  of  the 
age — defend  the  system  which  holds  the 
priority  of  the  ontological  order  in  the 
science  of  philosophy.  These,  on  the  one 
h^nd,  admit  the  reasoning  of  the  psy- 
chologists against  the  dialecticians,  while 
at  the  same  time  they  reject  the  psycho- 
logical method.     They  contend  that  on- 


60  CURIOUS  QUESTION'S. 

tology  should  have  the  first  place  in  phi- 
losophy, because  this  method  is  more  in 
conformity  with  the  order  of  priority 
which  the  objects  of  philosophy  hold 
among  themselves  in  the  primitive  act  of 
thought  and  in  reflection.  For  the  object 
of  thought  is  prior  to  the  subject  in  the 
order  of  real  existence.  The  object  is 
conceived  as  something  absolute  and  ne- 
cessaiy,  while  the  subject  is  relative  and 
contingent,  and  the  absolute  and  neces- 
sary precede  the  contingent  in  the  order 
of  reality.  Besides,  thought  is  primarily 
constituted  by  the  intuition  of  the  object, 
and  it  is  only  by  a  kind  of  rebound  from 
the  object,  in  the  act  of  intuition,  that  the 
soul  becomes  conscious  of  itself.  More- 
over, the  reflexive  order  requires  also  this 
ontological  priority.  We  mean  by  the 
reflexive  order,  that  which  is  distin- 
guished from  the  intuitive  order.  In  the 
intuitive  order  the  mind  is  conceived  by 
a  logical,  if  not  by  a  real  instant,  as  pas- 
sive; but  in  the  reflexive  order,  the  mind 


CURIOUS  QUESTIONS.  61 

acts,  and  thus  evolves  its  activity.  For, 
if  we  go  back  by  the  aid  of  memory  into 
the  history  of  our  past  life,  we  shall  ob- 
serve that  the  first  object  to  which  the 
soul  directed  its  attention,  was  not  itself, 
or  its  operations,  but  exterior  things. 
For  we  knew  how  to  distinguish  external 
objects  from  one  another,  nay,  even  to 
reason  abstractly  about  them,  before  we 
had  apprehended  ourselves  by  a  distinct 
thought.  The  principal  objection  against 
this  system  is  one  that  holds  equally  good 
against  the  other  two.  It  is  said  that  it 
is  impossible  to  treat  the  objective  part 
of  philosophy  without  supposing  many 
things  from  psychology  and  logic.  This 
difiiculty  is  unanswerable.  Hence,  we 
reject  the  three  systems,  not  for  the  pur- 
pose of  making  a  fourth,  but  with  the 
intention  of  giving  what  we  consider  to 
be  the  true  view  on  the  subject. 

Philosophy  is  the  science  of  thought. 
Now,  as  every  science  must  begin  by  its 
elements,  the  science  of  philosophy  must 


62  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

begin  by  treating  of  the  elements  of 
tliought.  The  elements  of  thought  are 
three.  The  subject,  the  object,  and  the 
copula,  or  link  between  subject  and  ob- 
ject. Hence,  we  should  begin  philoso- 
phy by  simultaneously  treating  the  logi- 
cal, psychological,'  and  the  ontological 
parts.  The  error  of  each  of  these  three 
systems  consists  in  not  admitting  what  is 
true  in  the  systems  of  its  adversaries. 
The  student  of  philosophy  should  then 
pursue  three  classes  at  the  same  time. 
But,  for  convenience  sake,  it  is  best  to 
begin  by  logic. 

Having  thus  defined  the  nature  of  the 
science  of  philosophy,  let  us  now  see 
what  relation  it  bears  to  the  other  sci- 
ences. A  science,  we  said,  was  a  series  of 
truths  reduced  to  unity  by  means  of  com- 
mon principles.  Hence,  in  every  science, 
these  three  things  are  to  be  considered, 
namely,  1st.  The  general  notions  w^hich 
constitute  its  subject-matter.  2d.  The 
foundation  on  which  their  certitude  is 


CUEIOUS  QUESTIONS.  63 

based.  3d.  Tlie  relation  of  the  particu- 
lar conclusions  to  tlie  general  principles. 
Now,  it  is  very  easy  to  show,  that  all 
other  rational  sciences  are  subject  to  phi- 
losophy in  these  three  respects.  It  is 
evident,  as  far  as  the  first  part  is  con- 
cerned; for  the  general  notions  of  any 
science  must  be  apprehended  by  thought ; 
and  as  philosophy  is  the  science  of 
thought,  these  general  notions  belong 
primarily  to  philosophy,  whose  object  it 
is  to  explain  them.  Again,  the  same 
may  be  said  of  the  foundation  on  which 
the  certitude  of  every  science  is  built. 
For  that  foundation  is  either  the  common- 
sense  of  nature,  or  some  authority  either 
sacred  or  profane ;  but  we  shall  hereafter 
demonstrate  that  neither  common-sense 
nor  authority  is  the  ultimate  criterion  of 
certitude ;  but  that  both  rest  on  evidence, 
which  is  the  foundation  of  philosophical 
certitude.  Therefore,  the  certitude  of  all 
sciences  is  based  on  philosophy.  The  ar- 
rangements of  the  judgments  constituting 


64  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

any  science,  consist,  especially,  in  deduc- 
ing tliem  legitimately  from  each  other. 
But  one  judgment  is  deduced  from  an- 
other by  means  of  reasoning,  and  as  it 
is  the  province  of  philosophy  to  deter- 
mine the  laws  of  reasoning,  it  follows 
that,  in  this  third  respect  also,  all  other 
sciences  are  subordinate  to  philosophy. 
This  subordination  of  other  sciences  to 
philosophy  is  called  the  philosophy  of 
science,  and  it  consists  in  reducing  the 
fundamental  conceptions  of  any  science 
to  its  first  principles  in  assigning  the  last 
foundation  of  its  certitude,  and  in  giving 
the  reason  of  the  order  of  its  subject-mat- 
ter. The  name  philosophy  of  science, 
however,  is  sometimes  understood  in  a 
different  sense ;  as  there  are  some  sciences 
which  have  a  double  object,  namely,  to 
expose  certain  facts,  or  determine  their 
laws  and  causes.  This  latter  object  is 
sometimes  called  the  philosophy  of  science. 
From  this  subordination  of  all  sciences  to 
philosophy  we  again  see  its  utility  and 
importance. 


Question    Third. 

what  is  the  difference  between  men- 
TAL   AND    ORAL    TERMS? 


HERE  are  two  kinds  of  terms — 
mental  and  oral;  tlie  mental 
term  means  the  idea,  and  the 
oral  term  the  means  by  which  we  render 
the  mental  term  visible,  or  the  expression 
of  an  idea.  These  terms  are  the  founda- 
tion of  human  logic ;  but  human  logic  is 
but  the  copy  of  divine,  sublime,  or  tran- 
scendental logic.  The  human,  mental 
term,  we  say,  is  the  idea,  and  the  idea  is 
God,  the  essence  of  God,  the  Xoyog  of 
Plato,  (the  word  of  God,)  the  6  Xoyog  of 
St.  John.  The  word  of  God  is  the  reposi- 
tory of  ideas.  God  sees  ideas  in  his  w^ord, 
and  his  word  is  God,  and  hence  God  sees 


66  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

ideas  in  God,  as  tlie  6  Xoyog,  or  the  word, 
not  in  God  as  the  Father.  Hence,  the 
Xoyog  is  the  mental  term  of  God,  and  the 
Xoyog  incarnate  is  the  oral  term  of  God ; 
the  6  Xoyog  of  St.  John,  the  6  Xo^og 
aapx  eyevETo  of  God  is  the  incarnation  of 
his  mental  term.  'So,  Qvxintum  licet parva 
componere  magnis^  our  oral  term  is  the 
incarnation,  as  it  were,  of  our  mental 
term.  Therefore  God's  oral  term  and 
God's  mental  term  are  the  same.  Our 
mental  term  and  God's  are  also  *the 
same.  Yet,  for  all  this,  we  are  not  God, 
for  our  mental  term  is  outside  of  us. 
God's  mental  term  is  inside  of  him ;  but 
our  oral  term  is  more  like  God's  oral 
term;  for  his  oral  term,  or  the  incarna- 
tion, is  outside  of  him  just  as  our  oral 
terai  is  outside  of  us.  Hence,  God's  logic 
and  man's  logic  have  the  same  object. 
God's  truth  or  God's  logic  is  man's  truth 
or  man's  logic ;  that  is  to  say,  it  is  derived 
from  God  himself.  This  is  reducing  hu- 
man logic  to  its  primary  principles ;  it  is 


CURIOUS  QUESTIONS.  67 

"building  logic  on  its  real  foundation — on 
God,  the  supreme  reality.  Hence,  our 
logic  is  real  logic — truth. 

There  is  but  one  truth,  one  species  of 
truth.  Logical,  metaphysical,  and  moral 
are  but  one  truth ;  for  truth  is  the  equality 
between  being  and  the  intellect  appre- 
hending beings ;  but  being  is  not  truth, 
but  being  as  apprehended  by  the  intel- 
lect is  truth.  Without  the  intellect  there 
is  no  truth,  for  truth  essentially  supposes 
an  intellect.  Without  being  there  is  no 
truth,  for  without  being  the  intellect 
could  apprehend  nothing,  and  nothing 
could  not  be  truth ;  truth  could  not  come 
from  nothing. 

Truth  is,  then,  a  relation  between  being 
and  intellect.  Being  is  that  which  is ;  the 
intellect  is  that  which  apprehends  that 
which  is;  and  the  relation,  the  essential 
relation,  between  that  which  is,  or  being, 
and  the  faculty  which  apprehends  that 
which  is,  is  truth.  Now,  as  this  relation 
between  the  intellect  and  being  is  never 


68  CUEIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

changed,  neither  is  trutli  changed.  Hence, 
the  division  of  truth  into  logical,  metaphy- 
sical, and  moral,  may  imply  different  modes 
of  truth,  but  not  different  species  of  it;  if 
it  implied  different  species,  the  division 
would  have  to  be  rejected  by  us  who 
found  all  science  on  reality — on  things  as 
they  are. 

This  distinction  between  our  mental 
and  oral  term  gives  us  the  real  distinction 
between  truth  as  it  is  in  itself,  and  truth 
as  expressed  in  language.  Truth  in  itself 
is  one  and  indivisible ;  truth  in  speech  is 
multiple.  It  is  divided  in  passing  through 
the  mind  as  the  colors  of  light  are  separ- 
ated by  a  prism.  All  truths  are  but  scin- 
tillations of  one  truth,  of  the  truth  eter- 
nal and  immutable.  Our  mind,  being 
finite,  can  consider  truth  by  reflection  only 
in  analysis.  Truth  in  synthesis  is  intued 
by  the  mind ;  but  it  can  not  be  reflected 
in  the  present  condition  of  the  intellect 
without  logical  divisions  and  distinctions. 
The  mind,  in  presence  of  truth,  sees  it  all 


CUKIOUS  QUESTIONS.  69 

in  a  confused  state,  but  can  not  clothe  it 
in  a  sensible  shape,  so  that  others  may 
reflect  upon  it,  unless  it  be  robed  in  gar- 
••nents  of  many  colors. 


Question    Fourth. 


WHAT   IS   THE    CRITERION    OP    CERTITUDE? 
DEGREES  OP  CERTITUDK 

\Y  the  criterion  of  certitude  we 
mean  the  last  foundation  of  all 
certitude.  This  criterion  must 
be  an  infallible  sign  of  truth;  for  if  it 
could  admit  the  possibility  of  an  eiTor, 
or  need  the  assistance  of  another  means 
to  detect  eiTor,  it  would  not  be  'the  last 
foundation  of  truth.  In  the  second  place, 
the  criterion  of  certitude  must  be  self  evi- 
dent ;  for  if  it  were  not,  we  should  have 
to  go  beyond  it  to  find  the  last  founda- 
tion of  truth.  The  criterion  must  also  be 
universal;  that  is  to  say,  all  the  other 
motives  of  certitude  must  rest  upon  it  as 


CURIOUS   QUESTIOIJS.  71 

their  basis.  For,  if  all  tlie  motives  of 
certainty  did  not  rest  on  it,  we  would 
have  certitude  outside  of  its  criterion,  and 
consequently  it  could  not  be  called  the 
last  foundation  of  truth. 

Authors  do  not  agree  on  the  criterion 
of  certitude.  We  hold  that  it  is  evi- 
dence. We  define  evidence  to  be,  "  The 
perfect  equality  between  receptive  and  ac- 
tive thought ;"  between  the  act  of  the 
mind  affirming  its  perceptions,  and  the 
intuitions  of  the  mind  receiving  its  ideas. 
All  certainty,  whether  of  common-sense 
or  of  authority,  is  based  on  this  internal 
fact  of  the  equality  between  receptive  and 
active  thought. 

In  the  first  place,  evidence  is  an  infalli- 
ble sign  of  truth.  It  is  a  motive  of  certi- 
tude, as  we  all  know;  and  there  is  no 
other  motive  presupposed  by  it. 

Evidence  is  self  evident ;  for  it  is  inter- 
nal to  the  mind,  and  it  is  impossible  by 
any  straining  of  thought  to  conceive  any 
thing  prior  to  it  in  the  mind,  since  it  is 


72  CUEIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

in  the  very  essence  of  every  mental  act. 
Receptive  facts  are  the  first  element  of 
thought,  and  evidence  consists  in  the 
equality  between  them  and  the  judgments 
which  affirm  them. 

Finally,  evidence  is  the  universal  foun- 
dation of  certainty.  Besides  evidence, 
there  are  only  two  other  motives  of  certi- 
tude— common-sense  and  authority — and 
both  these  motives  rest  on  evidence. 
Common-sense  is  the  invincible  propen- 
sity of  our  nature  to  affiam  certain  things 
to  be  true.  But  does  not  evidence  tell  us 
of  the  existence  of  such  a  propensity,  and 
of  the  presence  of  such  judgments  in  our 
mind?  As  for  authority,  it  is  evident 
that  it  presupposes  evidence,  since  au- 
thority presupposes  even  common-sense. 
How  can  we  know  the  existence  of  au- 
thority, unless  we  use  our  senses;  and 
does  not  the  certainty  of  the  senses  pre- 
suppose the  certainty  of  judgments, 
which  is  the  certainty  of  evidence  ? 

This  is  the  system  of  Des  Cartes,  who 


CURIOUS  QUESTIONS.  73 

was  the  first  philosoplier  to  investigate 
tlie  nature  of  the  criterion  of  certitude. 

A  very  common  error  regarding  certi- 
tude is  that  it  admits  of  degrees.  This 
error  is  founded  in  a  misconception  of  the 
nature  of  certainty.  Some  authors,  espe- 
cially theologians,  distinguish  two  kinds 
of  certitude :  that  of  faith,  and  that  of 
reason.  The  certitude  of  faith  they  con- 
sider greater  than  that  of  reason.  Others 
distinguish  in  certitude  two  elements: 
the  exclusion  of  fear  of  eiTor,  and  the 
firmness  of  mental  adhesion.  Considered 
imder  the  first  aspect,  they  deny  that 
there  are  degrees  incertitude;  but  they 
contend  that  the  adhesion  of  the  mind  to 
truth  may  be  greater  or  less,  and  conse- 
quently, in  this  respect,  they  admit  de- 
grees in  certitude,  according  to  the  greater 
or  less  number  of  motives. 

Now,  certitude  consists  in  the  essential 
connection  of  our  judgments  with  truth; 
but  there  can  be  no  deo-rees  in  such  a  con- 
nection.   If  this  connection  of  a  judgment 


74  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

with  truth  could  admit  of  degrees,  it 
would  be  either  because  there  could  be  a 
greater  or  less  doubt  or  fear  of  error,  or 
because  there  could  be  a  greater  or  less 
adhesion  of  the  mind  to  tmth.  But 
neither  of  these  hypotheses  can  be  main- 
tained. 

Not  the  first  one;  for  where  there  is 
doubt,  or  fear  of  error,  there  can  be  no 
certitude,  though  there  may  be  a  greater 
or  less  probability.  Nor  can  the  second 
be  held ;  for  the  firmness  of  mental  ad- 
hesion in  itself  adds  nothing  to  the  con- 
nection of  a  judgment  with  truth,  for  we 
know  by  experience  that  the  mind  can  ad- 
here as  pertinaciously  to  error  as  to  truth. 

It  is  a  great  error,  therefore,  to  say  that 
we  are  more  or  less  certain.  Certitude  is 
like  a  simple  point,  and  can  not  have  de- 
gi'ees  in  it.  In  the  last  analysis  all  certi- 
tude is  reduced  to  evidence,  which  is  the 
basis  of  all  scientific  certitude.  Scientific 
certitude  should  never  be  confounded 
with  probability. 


Question    Fifth. 
what  is  the  true  notion  of  an  idea? 


HE  word  idea  Las  different  mean- 
ings with  different  authors.  It 
is  sometimes  used  to  signify  an 
opinion  or  judgment,  and  again  it  is  ap- 
plied to  the  elements  of  judgment.  We 
mean  by  idea  the  object  of  thought.  As 
we  have  already  remarked,  the  analysis 
of  thought  gives  us  three  elements — the 
subject,  the  bond,  and  the  object.  Let 
us  examine  the  nature  of  ideas.  We  re- 
mark, before  entering  on  this  question, 
that  no  thought  is  possible  without  an 
idea ;  Jfor  when  the  mind  thinks  it  per- 
ceives, but  this  act  supposes  an  object 
perceived,  and  hence  it  supposes  an  idea, 
for  idea  and  object  of  thought  are  one 


76  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

and  the  same  thing.  What,  then,  is  an 
idea  ?  Is  it  a  reality  ?  and  if  so,  is  it  a 
possible  or  existing  one  ?  and  if  it  be  an 
existing  reality,  what  kind  of  existence 
has  it  ? 

Thomas  Reid,  founder  of  the  so-called 
Scotch  school  of  jphilosophy,  in  his  work 
entitled  "  Essays  on  the  Faculties  of  the 
Mind,"  denies  that  an  idea  is  a  reality, 
and  asserts  it  to  be  a  conception  or  image 
formed  by  the  mind  itself.  Hence  we 
can  be  certain  of  nothing  by  means  of 
ideas.  He  denied  the  axiom  of  the  schools, 
'■''Ideas  nostras  mensuram  esse possibilis 
et  impossihilw!''  which  means  that  an  idea 
always  implied  at  least  a  possibility.  He 
gives  us  examples  of  many  things  of 
which  we  have  ideas,  but  which  are  im- 
possible and  absurd,  for  example,  a  wing- 
ed horse.  It  is  objected  to  this  system  of 
Reid  that  it  leads  to  scepticism,  because, 
as  there  is  no  connection  between  the 
ideas  and  the  things  which  they  repre- 
sent, we  can  not  acquire  a  knowledge  of 


CURIOUS  QUESTIONS.  77 

the  things  themselves  ;  and  that  the  pas- 
sage from  the  subject  to  the  object  is 
impossible,  and  hence  that  all  certitude 
is  destroyed. 

He  endeavors  to  evade  this  difficulty 
in  the  following  manner.  As  he  abhors 
scepticism  and  does  not  wish  to  be  classed 
among  sceptics,  he  invents  a  faculty  which 
he  calls  external  perception,  by  means  of 
which  corporal  realities  existing  outside 
ourselves  are  apprehended.  In  this  fa- 
culty there  are  three  elements,  1st.  The 
conception  of  an  object  formed  a  priori 
by  the  mind.  2d.  An  affirmation  of  the 
object's  real  existence.  3d.  An  immediate 
persuasion  of  the  truth  of  this  affirmation. 
Whenever  we  know  an  object  in  this 
manner  we  are  certain  of  its  existence. 
This  is  the  sum  of  Reid's  system.  The 
difficulty,  however,  is  only  evaded,  not 
solved.  For  after  all,  even  in  the  case  or 
this  external  perception,  the  idea  is  but  a 
fetus  of  the  mind,  having  in  it  no  objec- 
tivity.    But  how  can  that  which  has  no 


78  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

objectivity  in  it  make  us  certain  of  the 
real  existence  of  an  object  ?  He  answers 
by  dividing  ideas  into  two  classes.  In 
one  of  these  classes  we  have  the  affirma- 
tion and  the  immediate  persuasion  as 
above  explained;  in  the  other  there  is 
a  simple  representation,  pure  conception 
without  reality.  In  the  first  case  we  have 
external  perception,  by  which  we  appre- 
hend an  object  not  merely  possible,  but 
enjoying  actual  existence.  But  still  the 
difficulty  is  unsolved;  for  every  idea 
must  imply  a  real  object.  Idea  is  the 
object  of  thought,  and  if  this  object  be 
not  a  being  it  is  nothing.  "  Si  non  est 
Ens  est  non  Ens."  But  the  mind  can  not 
think  nothing,  as  an  object  for  thought 
essentially  implies  a  real  object  distinct 
from  itself.  To  think  nothing  and  not  to 
think  at  all  are  one  and  the  same  thing. 
No  idea,  therefore,  can  be  a  mere  spectre 
conjured  up  from  the  depths  of  the  soul. 
Again,  three  hypotheses  may  be  made 
with  regard  to  the  connection  of  ideas 


CUEIOUS  QUESTIONS.  79 

"witli  being.  Either  all  ideas  are,  or  all 
ideas  are  not,  or  some  are  and  some  are  not 
realities  according  to  certain  circumstances 
given  by  Reid.  But  tlie  two  last  sup- 
positions are  absurd ;  for  if  there  be  no 
reality  in  any  idea,  there  can  be  no  judg- 
ment either  certain  or  doubtful ;  for  there 
will  be  nothing  upon  which  to  judge ;  and 
w^e  can  not  give  reality  to  some  ideas  and 
deny  it  to  others  according  to  certain  cir- 
cumstances, because  circumstances  do  not 
change  the  essence  of  intellectual  percep- 
tion. This  essence  consists  in  the  intui- 
tion of  an  object ;  but  this  intuition  either 
implies  the  reality  of  an  object,  or  it  does 
not.  If  it  does,  then  the  connection  must 
always  exist ;  if  it  does  not,  it  can  never 
exist.  Nor  will  it  do  for  the  Scotch 
philosophers  to  assert  that  the  presence 
of  an  affirmation  with  an  immediate 
persuasion  will  decide  the  question  of 
the  object's  reality,  for  as  w^e  have  al- 
ready remarked,  how  can  these  circum- 
stances give  reality  to  an  idea  which  is 


80  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

unreal?  Besides,  the  affirmation  wliicli 
distinguishes  the  real  ideas  from  the 
phantasms  must  be  a  judgment.  Reid, 
therefore,  makes  the  judgment  the  mea- 
sure of  our  ideas ;  whereas,  in  point  of 
fact,  it  is  ideas  that  are  the  measures  of 
our  judgments. 

Another  system  on  the  nature  of  our 
ideas  is  that  called  the  system  of  the 
intelligible  species  or  of  representative 
ideas.  This  system  contends  that  an  idea 
is  a  being,  in  the  sense  that  its  existence 
in  the  mind  always  proves  the  existence 
of  some  reality  either  existing  or  possible 
outside  of  the  mind.  The  being  of  idea, 
however,  is  not  being  in  itself,  but  the 
medium  or  image  through  which  being 
is  made  intelligible.  Ideas  in  this  system 
are  the  mirrors  in  which  the  faces  of 
beings  are  reflected ;  hence  the  mind  does 
not  immediately  apprehend  being,  but 
only  its  image ;  and  thus  it  judges  from 
the  image  to  the  existence  of  tlie  reality. 
All  masters  in  this  school,  however,  do 


CUKIOUS  QUESTIONS.  81 

not  agree  in  explaining  their  system,  for 
there  are  two  hypotheses.  According  to 
St.  Thomas  and  the  other  Christian  fol- 
lowers of  this  system,  ideas  are  certain 
forms  or  representations  of  things  which 
God  imprints  on  our  soul,  either  succes- 
sively or  in  the  first  instance  of  its  crea- 
tion. The  system  thus  explained  is 
commonly  taught  in  the  schools ;  but  it 
was  not  thus  understood  by  its  pagan 
inventors.  Democritus  and  Epicurus 
considered  ideas  as  the  images  or  species 
which  physical  objects  produced  in  us. 
According  to  those  authors,  bodies  emit 
particles  which  form  images  of  the  bodies. 
The  image  of  each  body  thus  formed 
passes  through  the  senses  to  that  part  of 
the  brain  called  anciently  "sensorium 
commune."  This  image  is  as  yet  mate- 
rial, but  the  acting  intellect  now  takes  it 
up,  etherealizes  it,  and  produces  from  it  a 
spiritual  image  of  the  body  from  which  it 
emanated.  The  passive  intellect  can  now 
contemplate  this  chemically  formed  idea 


82  CUKIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

of  the  external  object.  The  system  thus 
explained  is  pure  materialism.  For  in  it 
there  is  no  account  made  of  the  existence 
of  spiritual  realities,  nor  is  there  any 
means  of  having  their  ideas. 

But  this  school  of  philosophers,  whether 
Pagan  or  Christian,  does  not  give  us  the 
true  explanation  of  the  nature  of  ideas. 
Ideas  are  not  images  or  representations  of 
objects ;  for  in  order  that  one  thing  should 
be  the  image  of  another,  it  is  necessary 
in  the  first  place  that  we  should  have  an 
idea  of  the  thing  represented,  as  well  as 
of  its  representation  ;  and  that  we  should 
be  able  to  assert  a  similaiity  between  the 
image  and  the  object.  If  either  of  these 
two  conditions  be  wanting,  there  is  no 
true  representation.  But  the  system  of 
representative  ideas  fulfills  neither  of 
them ;  for  by  it  we  have  only  a  notion 
of  the  image.  The  object  represented  is 
not  perceived  by  the  mind. 

And  as  representative  ideas  have  no 
being  in  themselves,  (for  if   they  had 


CUEIOUS  QUESTIONS.  83 

these,  our  mind  would  perceive  being 
immediately,)  tliere  can  be  no  means  of 
deciding  a  similarity  between  tlie  idea 
and  the  object.  The  idea  in  this  system 
is  either  being  or  it  is  not.  If  it  be  being, 
then  the  mind  immediately  apprehends 
being,  and  there  is  no  necessity  for  in- 
venting the  intelligible  species  as  the 
media  between  realities  and  the  mind.  If 
it  be  not  being,  it  must  be  nothing;  it 
can  represent  nothing.  Moreover,  we 
have  ideas  of  the  infinite  and  the  neces- 
sary being ;  for  we  know  what  is  meant 
when  we  hear  this  being  spoken  of.  Now 
how  could  an  image  or  intelligible  species 
be  the  representative  idea  of  this  object  ? 
since  there  would  be  no  similitude  between 
the  object  and  the  image,  the  one  being 
infinite  and  the  other  finite.  Yet  simi- 
larity between  the  object  and  image  is 
necessary  to  constitute  true  representa^ 
tion.  Therefore  this  system,  besides  other 
defects,  has  that  of  not  being  able  to  ex- 


84:  CUBIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

plain  tlie  origin  of  the  idea  of  God  in  onr 
mind. 

The  third  system  with  regard  to  the 
nature  of  ideas  teaches  that  they  are 
being  in  themselves ;  hence  idea  and 
being  mean  one  and  the  same  thing ;  so 
that  being  as  well  as  idea  may  be  defined 
that  which  terminates  our  mind  as  the 
object  of  thought.  We  must  naturally 
admit  this  system  since  we  have  rejected 
that  of  Reid  and  of  St.  Thomas.  It 
follows  as  a  necessary  consequence,  from 
what  has  thus  far  been  argued ;  for  if  we 
apprehend  being  from  ideas,  as  all  admit, 
not  even  excepting  the  Scotch  school, 
which  admits  the  apprehension  of  being 
by  ideas,  at  least  in  the  case  of  external 
perception;  and  if,  again,  ideas,  as  mere 
images,  can  not  be  the  instrument  by 
w^hich  being  is  apprehended,  it  follows 
that  we  must  apprehend  being  in  itself. 
Ideas  and  being  are,  therefore,  identified 
in  signification. 


Question     jSixth. 

is  idea  a  possible  being,  or  an  existing 
one  ?  system  of  rosmini. 

NTHONY  ROSMINI    SEEBA- 

TI  was  born  at  Koveredo,  in  the 
Tyrol,  on  the  25tli  of  March, 
1797,  and  died  in  the  beginning  of  July, 
1855.  He  is  one  of  the  greatest  of  the 
Italian  philosophers,  and  stands  on  an 
equal  footing  with  Gioberti  and  Cardinal 
Gerdil.  He  founded  the  Society  of  Char- 
ity, which  was  sanctioned  by  the  Pope  as 
a  religious  congregation  in  1838.  His 
theological  ^nd  philosophical  works  fill 
thirty  volumes  in  octavo,  the  chief  of 
which  is  Nuovo  Saggio  suW  Origine  deW 
Idee^  which  he  published  in  four  volumes, 
and  in  which  his  philosophical  system  is 


86  CUBIOUS   QUESTIONS. 

contained.  It  may  he  summed  up  as  fol- 
lows :  In  order  to  explain  the  phenomena 
of  the  human  mind,  we  should  admit  no 
more  nor  no  less  than  is  sufficient.  But 
this  principle  has  not  been  followed  out 
by  the  different  schools  of  philosophy. 
The  mind,  in  order  to  judge,  necessarily 
requires  certain  general  notions  which  are 
not  the  products  of  the  mind,  for  the 
mind  finds  them  as  the  materials  with 
which  it  makes  its  judgments. 

There  is  in  our  mind,  therefore,  an  idea, 
the  basis  of  all  other  ideas,  and  yet  not 
produced  by  our  intellect.  Whence  comes 
it,  then,  if  not  from  the  mind?  Here, 
says  Rosmini,  we  have  different  systems. 
Locke,  Condillac,  and  the  Sensist  school 
say  this  primary  idea,  these  primary  no- 
tions, come  from  sensations.  Reid  makes 
them  come  from  a  natural  and  primitive 
judgment,  of  which  all  the  elements  are 
subjective.  Dugald  Stewart  derives  them 
from  the  common  name  used  to  designate 
a  collection  of  similar  objects,  which  the 


CURIOUS  QUESTIONS.  87 

intellect  does  not,  however,  perceive  as  a 
collection,  but  individually.  These  sys- 
tems do  not  admit  all  that  is  necessary 
to  explain  the  facts  of  the  human  mind. 
They  sin  by  defect.  The  other  class  of 
philosophers  sin  by  excess — at  least  in 
the  opinion  of  Rosmini — for  they  admit 
more  than  is  necessary  to  explain  the 
presence  of  ideas  in  our  minds.  Plato, 
Leibnitz,  and  Kant  make  all  ideas  innate. 
But  Rosmini  shows  that  ideas  engender 
each  other  ;  that  they  can  be  derived 
from  one ;  and  hence  there  is  no  necessity 
of  having  all  in  the  mind  from  the  be- 
ginning. It  is  in  refuting  these  different 
systems,  then,  that  Rosmini  explains  his 
own.  He  maintains  that  an  analysis  of 
our  ideas  will  show  them  all  to  be  modi- 
fications of  the  fundamental  idea  of  being 
in  general.  From  this  idea  we  can  de- 
duce all  others,  and  without  it  none  are 
possible.  This  idea  is,  therefore,  innate. 
But  this  heing  in  general  is  not  a  real,  ab- 
solute, concrete,  and  existing  being,  is  not 


88  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

God,  as  Gioberti  and  the  Ontologists  hold, 
but  it  is  possible  being  in  general.  It  is 
not  a  fetus  of  the  mind,  however,  for  it 
has  an  objectivity  in  itself.  It  is  not  God, 
nor  yet  a  creature,  but,  like  an  intelligible 
atmosphere,  it  is  an  eternal  and  necessary 
light  emanating  ff'om  God,  by  means  of 
which  our  intelligence  contemplates  all 
ideas. 

Rosmini  then  endeavors  to  explain  the 
process  by  which  all  other  ideas  are  de- 
rived from  the  idea  of  being  in  general. 
According  to  him,  the  idea  of  being  con- 
stitutes the  a  priori  part  or  form  of  all 
cognition.  In  order  to  determine  this 
form  in  individual  cases,  the  mxitter  must 
be  supplied  by  the  senses.  We  give  the 
translation  of  Rosmini's  words :  "  If  there 
be  something  else  in  our  idea  besides  the 
conception  of  being,  this  something  else 
is  only  a  mode  of  being  itself,  so  that  it 
can  be  truly  said  of  every  idea  that  it  is 
either  being  conceived,  or  being  more  or 
less  determined  by  its  modes.      The  mat- 


CUEIOUS  qiUESTTONS.  89 

ter  of  thought,  or  a  posteriori  cognition, 
gives  eacli  particular  determination  of 
the  idea  of  being  in  general.  When  we 
wish,  then,  to  explain  the  origin  of  ideas, 
we  must  explain  two  things :  1st.  The 
manner  in  which  we  obtain  the  concep- 
tion of  being.  2d.  The  manner  in  which 
we  obtain  the  different  determinations  to 
which  being  is  subject.  But,  as  we  have 
demonstrated  that  the  conception  of  being 
is  innate,  there  no  longer  remains  any  dif- 
ficulty, for  the  different  determinations  of 
the  ideas  of  being  are  manifestly  derived 
from  the  senses."  (Essay,  vol  ii.  sec.  5, 
cap.  1.) 

He  exemplified  his  theory  by  the  man- 
ner in  which  we  apprehend  a  ball  of 
ivory.  The  first  idea  in  the  mind  is  the 
idea  of  possible  being.  We  think  a  being, 
and  this  is  the  intelligible  element,  the 
a  priori  part  of  the  thought.  Then,  by 
means  of  sensation,  we  observe  the 
weight,  color,  and  shape  of  the  ball,  and 
this  is  the  matter  of  thought.     Thus,  we 


90  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

have  a  particular  determination  of  the 
idea  of  possible  being.  Hence,  in  accord 
ance  with  this  theory,  E-osmini  endeav 
ors  to  establish  a  proposition  entitled, 
"The  double  cause  of  acquired  ideas  is 
the  idea  of  being  and  sensation."  But,  as 
the  idea  of  being  in  general  gives  the 
form  to  our  thought,  and  is  the  principle 
of  our  cognoscitive  faculty,  the  origin  of 
our  ideas  may  be  said  to  be,  without  re- 
striction, the  idea  of  being  in  general. 
We  must  not,  however,  confound  idea 
and  judgment.  There  are  two  means  by 
which  we  may  have  thought :  either  by 
intuition  or  affirmation.  The  first  deals 
with  possible  beings ;  the  second,  which 
is  a  judgment,  in  which  there  are  an  idea 
and  persuasion  of  the  existence  of  an  ob- 
ject, treats  of  existence  outside  the  mind. 
But  what  relation  has  idea  with  judg- 
ment, or  how  do  we  pass  from  one  to  the 
other?  Rosmini  continues  to  explain: 
In  the  first  place,  the  mind  has  the  idea 
of  being ;  then,  by  means  of  sensations,  a 


CURIOUS  QUESTIONS.  01 

judgment  is  produced,  whicli  is  equiva- 
lent to  the  formula,  "  That  wliich  I  feel 
exists."  This  judgment  has  two  elements  : 
the  idea  of  its  object,  and  the  persuasion 
of  its  real  existence. 

If  the  mind  separate  the  second  ele- 
ment from  the  first  by  a  process  which 
Kosmini  calls  TTniversalizzazione,  we  shall 
have  the  simple  idea.  This  universaliza- 
tion,  however,  is  not  the  same  as  abstrac- 
tion ;  for,  although,  when  we  universalize 
we  abstract  from  the  existence  of  a  thing, 
nevertheless  we  leave  it  as  a  type  or  re- 
presentation what  it  always  was ;  where- 
as, when  we  abstract,  we  take  away  a 
part  of  the  object  or  one  of  its  proper- 
ties, and  thus  give  rise  to  new  ideal  com- 
binations. For  instance,  the  senses  show 
me  a  tree.  I  immediately  say  it  exists, 
and  here  there  is  a  judgment  as  to  the  ex- 
istence. But  I  can  conceive  this  tree  ab- 
stractly, apart  from  its  existence,  as  merely 
possible.  Here,  then,  I  universalize.  I 
have  a  concrete  and  universal  idea,  which 


92  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

may  be  looked  upon  as  a  species  or  type 
participable  by  individuals  ad  infinitum. 
But  if  I  consider  a  tree  in  general,  or  cer- 
tain properties  of  it,  I  abstract.  Hence, 
universalization  gives  us  ideas.  Abstrac- 
tion gives  them  different  teims,  and 
changes  the  manner  of  representing  them. 
Three  things,  therefore,  are  to  be  noted 
with  regard  to  universalization.  1st. 
There  is  a  corporeal  sensation,  a  phan- 
tasm, or  perception  by  the  senses.  2d.  A 
wedding  which  takes  place  in  the  unity 
of  our  conscience  between  this  sensation 
and  the  idea  of  being  in  general — this  is 
intellectual  perception.  In  the  intellec- 
tual perception  there  are  a  judgment  on 
the  existence  of  an  object  and  an  idea  of 
the  object  obtained  by  the  process  of  uni- 
versalization. 3d.  The  separation  of  the 
judgment  from  the  idea  by  means  of  ab- 
straction, so  that  we  may  have  the  idea 
alone.  This  idea  was  universal  from  the 
very  beginning,  but  as  it  was  hidden  in 
an  individual,  it  needs  this  separation  to 


CUBIOUS  QUESTIONS.  93 

be  seen  in  its  universality.  Hence,  as  we 
have  already  said,  all  ideas  are  tlie  idea 
of  a  being  in  general,  modified  by  tlie 
senses.  Hence,  possible  being  in  general 
is  the  form  of  all  ideas.  It  is  the  instru- 
ment by  which  the  mind  renders  an  ob- 
ject intelligible.  It  is  the  necessary 
means  of  all  knowledge,  the  light  of  the 
mind,  and  the  form  of  every  human  intel- 
ligence. 

The  great  merit  of  Rosmini  in  invent- 
ing this  system  consists  in  his  having 
given  the  death-blow  to  materialism  or 
sensism ;  for  although  this  degrading 
school  of  philosophy  had  been  supplanted 
in  France  by  rationalistic  electicism,  it 
still  continued  to  be  taught  in  Italy  by 
Romagnosi.  Galuppi,  it  is  true,  attacked 
it,  but  he  was  too  fond  of  the  system  of 
Locke  to  be  able  to  give  materialism  a 
complete  overthrow.  Rosmini  completely 
destroyed  it ;  but  he  went  so  far  to  the 
other  extreme  as  almost  to  fall  into  the 
contrary  en*ors  arising  from  the  transcen- 


94  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

dental  pliilosophy  of  the  Germans.  Hence 
he  plants  his  system  nearly  on  the  same 
platform  as  that  of  Kant;  for  after  de- 
molishing the  other  system  of  philosophy, 
he  writes  thus  of  'Kant :  "  Kant  came 
after  these.  He  gave  a  more  accurate 
and  profound  analysis  of  our  cognitions 
when  he  asserted  that  they  are  the  result 
of  two  elements — one  sensible  and  not 
innate,  the  other  not  sensible,  and  hence 
to  be  looked  for  in  our  mind.  He  pro- 
perly calls  one  of  these  the  matter^  the 
other  the  fornfi  of  thought.  Hence  he 
does  not  make  all  ideas  innate  in  them- 
selves as  Plato  does ;  nor  in  their  vestiges, 
as  Leibnitz ;  but  he  makes  only  the  for- 
mal part  of  ideas  innate,  so  that  all  ideas 
according  to  Kant  are  factitious,  but  not 
4n  every  respect.  This  was  a  notable 
step  in  the  progi'ess  of  philosophical 
science.  (Essay,  vol.  ii.  sec.  5.  "  Theoria 
deir  origine  dell'  Idee.") 

According  to   Rosmini,  therefore,  the 
system  of  the  philosopher  of  Konigsberg 


CUEIOUS  QUESTIONS.  95 

is  substantially  good  and  acceptable,  pro- 
vided we  lop  off  its  superfluous  excres- 
cences. He  partly  admits  Kant's  system ; 
for  lie  says  that  the  formal  must  be  dis- 
tinguished from  the  material  part  in  cog- 
nition, and  that  ^q  formal  part  alone  is 
innate.  He  endeavors  to  simplify  Kant's 
system  by  reducing  the  seventeen  mental 
forms  to  the  idea  of  heing  in  general,  and 
making  them  objective.  "The  mental 
forms  of  Kant,"  he  continued,  "  were 
seventeen,  two  being  from  the  senses  ex- 
ternal and  internal,  twelve  from  the  in- 
tellect, called  by  him  pure  conceptions  or 
categories,  and  three  of  our  reason,  to 
which  he  gave  the  name  of  ideas.  This 
number  of  forms  is  too  great,  and  the 
formal  part  of  reason  is  far  more  simple." 
He  then  goes  on  to  show  that  the  idea  of 
possible  heing  in  general  is  the  foundation 
and  formal  part  of  all  ideas. 

The  great  mistake  of  Kosmini  lay  in 
his  imagining  that  a  system  which  was 
the  extreme  of  materialism  should  be 


96  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

necessarily  right;  whereas,  in  fact,  Ger- 
man transcendentalism  is  quite  as  erro- 
neous and  dangerous  as  sensism.  You 
can  not  build  the  edifice  of  truth  on  an 
erroneous  foundation.  Indeed,  the  refu- 
tation of  Kosmini's  system  follows  from 
what  has  been  already  said.  Idea  is 
being,  not  an  image  or  subjective  concep- 
tion of  the  mind,  and  hence  it  must  have 
concrete  and  existing  reality  in  itself;  for 
if  we  suppose  it  to  have  existence  in 
another  being,  then  idea  would  be  per- 
ceptible only  in  this  being.  Possible 
being  in  general  is  only  potential  in 
itself;  hence  it  must  have  its  existence 
in  another  being  which  is  concrete  and 
existing.  It  is,  then,  in  fact,  concrete  and 
existing  being  which  terminates  our  in- 
tellect, even  when  we  have  the  idea  of 
possible  being  in  general ;  hence  the  ob- 
ject of  om*  mind  must  be  existing  and 
not  possible  being.  Again,  possible  being 
in  general  has  no  reality  in  itself;  for  that 
which  really  exists  is  determined  and 


CURIOUS  QUESTIONS.  97 

concrete,  not  general  and  possible  ;  lience 
if  being  in  general  were  the  object  of 
our  intellect,  our  mind  would  not  per- 
ceive reality  in  itself,  wbicli  is  contrary 
to  what  Rosmini  would  desire.  Besides, 
possible  being  in  general  merely  indicates 
a  power  possessed  by  a  real  and  existing 
being.  This  power,  when  used,  causes 
possible  beings  to  pass  from  the  state  of 
potentiality  to  that  of  act;  but  an  idea 
must  be  real  being,  as  we  have  sjiown ; 
therefore,  possible  being  in  general  is  not 
the  fountain  of  our  ideas.  Moreover, 
Rosmini  makes  this  possible  being  neither 
a  creature  nor  yet  the  Creator,  but  a 
mysterious  and  (as  he  calls  it)  a  terrible 
idea. 

Now,  as  Kosmini  gives  this  idea  of 
possible  being  in  general  to  some  of  the 
attributes  of  God,  we  can  not  see  how  he 
can  distinguish  it  from  the  Creator.  This 
being  in  general  must  be  nothing  at  all, 
or  else  it  must  be  either  a  creature  or  the 
Creator ;  and,  as  Rosmini  will  admit  it  to 


98  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

be  neither  of  the  two  first,  it  must  be  re- 
duced to  the  last ;  for  a  vague,  indefinite, 
infinite  abstraction  like  'Rosmmi^ s  j)osstI>le 
being  in  general  is  a  metaphysical  ab- 
surdity. 


Question     Seventh. 

WHAT    KIND    OF    EXISTENCE    HAS    IDEA  ? 
SYSTEM  OF  GIOBERTI. 

jN"  order  to  answer  tMs  question 
correctly,  namely,  What  kind 
of  existence  lias  idea  ?  we  must 
distinguish  three  kinds  of  existences — 
the  soul,  other  finite  existences,  and  ne- 
cessary being.  There  are  four  opinions 
on  this  point.  The  first  is  that  of  Fichte, 
a  German  philosopher,  which  places  all . 
the  objectivity  of  our  ideas  in  the  think- 
ing principle  or  in  the  to  eyw. 

Fichte  supposes  the  mind  to  have  the 
power  of  presenting  itself  to  itself,  as  the 
object  of  thought ;  so  that  it  is  at  the 
same  time  both  subject  and  object.  Hence 
the  mind  is  every  thing,  and  every  thing  is 


100  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

in  the  mind,  as  its  different  modifications. 
Hence  the  idea  of  God  as  well  as  the  idea 
of  creature,  is  nothing  but  the  idea  of  the 
mind  making  itself  the  object  of  its  own 
intellectual  faculties.  This  system  is 
fully  explained  by  Fichte  in  the  appendix 
to  his  theodicy. 

This  system  is  refuted  by  what  geo- 
metricians call  "  reductio  ad  absurdum ;" 
for  if  we  suppose  for  an  instant  that  the 
subject  and  object  of  thought  are  identi- 
fied, it  will  follow  that  what  is  finite  is  at 
the  same  time  infinite. 

Two  conditions  are  necessary  to  realize 
Fichte's  hypothesis.  First,  that  the  think- 
ing subject  should  really  apprehend  itself 
as  the  object  of  thought;  secondly,  that 
the  thinking  subject  thus  apprehended  as 
the  object  of  thought  should  have  all  the 
characteristics  of  the  real  object  of  thought. 
But  in  the  first  place,  the  mind  does  not 
apprehend  itself  as  the  object  of  thought ; 
for  if  it  did,  we  should  be  conscious  of  tlie 
fact ;  we  should  feel  that  we  were  thought 


CUEIOUS  QUESTIONS.  101 

as  well  as  that  we  think.  Eacli  of  us 
would  not  only  say,  "  I  think,"  but  "  I  am 
thought."  Now,  no  matter  how  much 
we  may  reflect,  we  are  only  conscious 
that  we  think,  not  that  we  are  thought. 
Our  intellect  never  apprehends  the  ob- 
ject of  thought  as  identified  with  the 
subject.  Again,  the  thinking  subject 
considered  as  the  object  of  thought  could 
not  have  all  the  characteristics  of  the 
ideal  object  which  we  apprehend;  be- 
cause we  intue  an  objective  reality  as 
distinct  and  separate  from,  and  indepen- 
dent of  us,  having  full  being  in  itself. 
Besides,  we  have  the  idea  of  an  infinite 
object,  necessarily  existing  and  possessing 
a  creative  power ;  but  it  is  evident  that 
the  thinking  subject  has  not  a  single  one 
of  these  qualities.  It  is  not  independent 
of,  nor  separate  from,  us,  for  it  is  we^  our 
personality.  It  is  not  injmite^  it  does  not 
necessarily  exist,  nor  can  it  create ;  but  if 
it  were  the  object  of  thought,  it  should 
have  these  qualities.    Moreover,  the  mind 


102  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

as  the  object  of  thought  can  not  he  differ- 
ent from  the  mind  as  the  subject  of 
thought ;  but  our  conscience  or  intimate 
sense  tells  us  that  our  soul  as  the  subject 
of  thought  is  finite,  contingent,  and  mut- 
able. Hence  it  must  be  finite,  contingent, 
and  mutable  as  object  of  thought,  which 
it  is  not,  and  hence  it  can  not  be  the  ob- 
ject of  thought. 

Fichte's  system,  which  destroys  the 
reality  of  God's  existence  and  that  of  the 
world — or  better,  which  identifies  God 
and  the  world  with  the  human  soul  by 
an  unintelligible  pantheism,  is  defended 
by  two  principal  arguments.  He  says 
that  must  be  the  object  of  thought,  with- 
out which  it  is  impossible  to  apprehend 
any  thing,  and  without  which  the  passage 
from  the  subject  to  the  object  of  thought 
is  impossible.  But  such  is  the  soul ;  for 
unless  the  soul  be  its  own  object,  how 
will  you  span  the  chasm  between  the 
subject  and  object  of  thought  ? 

The  answer  is  easily  given.     We  deny 


CUEIOUS  QUESTIONS.  103 

the  soul  to  be  the  complete  cause  of  our 
appreliension.  We  know  the  fact  tliat 
the  mind  apprehends,  but  the  manner  in 
which  it  apprehends  we  know  not.  The 
mode  of  the  intellectual  act  is  a  mystery 
which  can  not  be  solved.  We  know  that 
there  is  no  contradiction  in  asserting  that 
the  mind  apprehends  an  object  distinct 
from  itself,  though  we  be  unable  to  com- 
prehend liow  the  intellect  apprehends  the 
object.  Besides,  it  is  not  more  easy  to 
comprehend  Fichte's  system  in  this  re- 
gard than  that  which  he  attacks ;  for,  let 
him  say  what  he  will,  we  must  always 
suppose,  if  not  a  real  at  least  a  logical 
distinction  between  the  subject  and  the 
object.  The  subject  is  not  the  subject  in 
the  same  way  that  it  is  the  object  of 
thought,  and  hence  there  is  not  a  complete 
identity  between  the  subject  and  the  ob- 
ject. Yet  he  says  there  must  be  this 
identity;  for  if  they  be  distinct,  how 
can  they  become  united  by  intellec- 
tual apprehension  ?    Either  the  subject 


104  CUBIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

must  walk  out  of  itself  to  apprehend 
the  object,  or  the  object  must  jump  out 
of  itself  to  be  received  by  the  subject. 
Still  the  difficulty  remains ;  for  with  this 
logical  distinction  between  the  subject 
and  object,  there  is  the  same  necessity  for 
the  jumping  process  as  in  the  case  of  a 
real  distinction.  But,  in  fact,  the  objec- 
tion of  Fichte  does  not  hold  good ;  for 
the  object  and  subject  touch  each  other 
intellectually,  and  thus  the  subject  appre- 
hends the  object  without  either  of  these 
being  obliged  to  go  out  of  itself.  More- 
over, every  philosopher  knows  that  the 
Tnode  or  the  Tww  of  intellectual  apprehen- 
sion is  one  of  those  natural  mysteries  so 
frequent  in  philosophy,  inexplicable  but 
not  absurd.  Hence  Fichte's  system  is 
to  be  rejected. 

The  second  opinion  with  regard  to  the 
kind  of  existence  which  idea  possesses,  is 
that  of  Reid,  which  we  have  already  par- 
tially explained ;  and  the  third  is  that  of 
St.  Thomas,  which  has  also  been  given. 


CUKIOUS  QUESTIONS.  105 

St.  Thomas  makes  the  object  of  thought 
distinct  from  the  subject.  This  object 
is  identified  with  contingent  beings,  and 
God  is  not  immediately  intued  by  the 
mind.  The  idea  of  Grod  is  derived  from 
the  idea  of  created  existences.  Now,  al- 
though we  may  not  say  that  created  ex- 
istences may  not  be  the  object  of  intellec- 
tual vision,  still,  we  deny  that  they  make 
up  the  sufficient  object;  for  in  order 
that  the  objectivity  of  our  ideas  should 
exist  wholly  in  contingent  facts,  one  con- 
dition is  necessary.  The  contingent  must 
include  in  itself  whatever  is  the  object  of 
our  thought.  But  it  does  not;  for  be- 
sides contingent  we  perceive  necessary 
being,  and  besides  the  finite  we  have  an 
idea  of  the  infinite,  and  conscience  bears 
testimony  to  the  fact.  But  contingent 
facts  can  not  include  the  idea  of  the  neces- 
sary and  infinite.  The  infinite  idea  must 
be  in  an  infinite  object.  Finite  and  con- 
tingent are  ideas  that  come  after  the  idea 
of  the  infinite  and  necessary.     Hence,  the 


106  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

system  of  St.  Thomas,  gives  us  only  one 
series  of  objects,  namely,  objects  that  are 
finite.  Nor  does  it  explain  even  the 
manner  in  which  we  apprehend  these. 
For  we  have  already  refuted  his  system 
of  image  ideas,  or  intelligible  species. 

Let  us  now  exaniine  the  system  of  Gio- 
berti.  Tliis  great  philosopher  was  born 
in  Piedmont,  in  the  beginning  of  the  pre- 
sent century,  and  died  in  Paris  not  many 
years  ago.  Shortly  after  his  ordination 
he  was  made  Chaplain  of  the  Court,  and 
Professor  of  Philosophy  in  the  University 
of  Turin.  On  account  of  his  political 
principles  he  was  exiled  in  1833,  went 
to  Paris,  and  afterward  to  Brussels.  He 
returned  to  Italy  during  the  troubles  of 
1848,  and  was  made  Prime  Minister  of 
Charles  Albert.  He  wrote  many  works, 
most  of  them  on  philosophical  subjects. 
All  were  put  on  the  Index  shortly  before 
his  death.  Few  of  them  are  free  from 
error,  and  all  of  them  deserved  to  be  con- 
demned "  in  odium  auctoris,"  for  the  bit- 


CURIOUS  QUESTIONS.  107 

ter  attacks  made  By  him  against  the 
Court  of  Rome,  and  the  learned  and 
zealous  "  Society  of  Jesus."  It  is  cer- 
tain that  he  died  excommunicated,  and 
very  probably  a  Pantheist.  Yet  Gioberti 
is,  without  doubt,  the  greatest  philoso- 
pher of  the  nineteenth  century. 

This  age  is  revolutionary,  but  its  revo- 
lutions are  caused  as  much  by  principles 
and  ideas,  as  by  the  force  of  arms.  It  en- 
deavors to  lay  aside  all  supernatural  reli- 
gion ;  but  not  being  able  to  do  so  without 
something  to  put  in  its  stead,  it  exalts 
and  deifies  every  thing  natural.  Hence, 
we  see,  where  revelation  has  been  rejected, 
a  longing  after  the  mystic,  the  wonderful, 
the  preternatural,  the  extraordinary,  man- 
ifesting itself  in  politics,  in  religion,  and 
in  philosophy.  Its  fruits  are  socialism, 
spiritism,  rationalism,  and  pantheism.  It 
has  produced  men  like  St.  Simon,  Pierre 
L6roux,  the  Pere  Enfantin,  Hegel  and 
Schelling,  Lamartine,  Victor  Hugo,  and 
above  them  all  Gioberti. 


108  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

We  have  to  remark  of  Gioberti's 
character  as  it  appears  in  his  writings, 
that  he  was  too  violent  in  his  denuncia- 
tions, too  exaggerated  in  his  theories, 
though  we  do  not  believe  that  his  system 
of  metaphysics  as  given  in  his  "  Introduc- 
tion to  the  Study  of  Philosophy"  has  ever 
been  satisfactorily  refuted.  Hence,  while 
we  condemn  him  as  a  ruthless  assailant 
of  the  Jesuits,  in  the  "  Gesuita  Moderno," 
and  in  the  Prolo(?omena  to  the  "  Primato 
d'ltalia,"  we  admire  his  genius  and  learn- 
ing. His  eiTors  have  been  so  great  and 
numerous  that  they  cause  every  thing 
from  him  to  be  suspected;  "  Timeo  Danaos 
et  dona  ferentes."  In  fact,  it  must  be  ad- 
mitted, that  Gioberti  has  done  much 
harm  to  religion  and  to  society.  His 
style  is  powerful  and  eloquent ;  torrent- 
like, it  cames  away  the  reader's  imagina- 
tion, and  hence,  it  has  a  special  tendency 
to  exalt  the  minds  of  the  young  with 
vague  theories  and  ethereal  systems. 

The  system  of  Gioberti  has  been  well 


CURIOUS  QUESTIONS.  109 

translated  into  Englisli  in  Brownson's 
Quarterly  Review.  Gioberti  makes  tlie 
immediate  intuition  of  God,  wMle  Des 
Cartes  makes  the  soul  the  basis  of  his 
system.  Hence,  Gioberti  is  a  strong  op- 
ponent of  Des  Cartes,  and  ridicules  him 
at  every  step  in  his  Introduzione. 
Among  other  hard  things,  Gioberti  says 
this  of  the  French  philosopher :  "  Non 
credo  in  tutti  gli  annalli  del  genere  hu- 
mano,  se  posse  trovare  un  essempio  di 
temerita  e  di  leggerezza  simile  a  questo."* 

Gioberti's  system  may  be  summed  up 
as  follows: 

The  philosopher  may  start  either  from 
the  subject  or  object.  If  he  start  from 
the  subject,  he  may  either  take  realities 
existing  outside  of  our  mind,  or  the  re- 
presentations in  our  mind  as  the  fiil- 
crum  of  his  system.  Reason  determines 
the  realities,  and  conscience  or  intimate 

*  "  I  do  not  believe  that  in  all  the  annals  of  mankind, 
you  can  find  an  example  of  rashness  and  levity  similar 
to  those  of  this  man,  (Des  Cartes.)" 


110  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

sense,  determines  tlie  images.  The  ob- 
ject of  reason  is  the  intelligible.  Of  con- 
science  the  proper  object  is  the  sensible, 
contained  in  the  internal  modifications  of 
the  mind.  The  one  is  ontological,  the 
other  psychological.  "Ontology,"  says 
Gioberti,  "is  as  old  as  the  world,  and 
may  be  found  in  the  different  systems  of 
philosophy,  both  pagan  and  Christian,  np 
to  the  days  of  that  philosophical  heretic, 
Rene  Des  Cartes.  It  is  the  basis  of  Orien- 
tal philosophy,  from  which  it  passed  into 
the  school  of  the  Pythagoricians,  Eleatics, 
and  of  Plato,  among  the  Greeks.  Onto 
logism  was  taught  in  the  school  of  Alex 
andria,  by  the  early  Christian  Fathers, 
and  by  the  Realists  of  the  middle  ages, 
It  is  true  that  the  Nominalists  and  Con 
ceptualists  were  somewhat  opposed  to  it 
but  it  was  especially  Ren6  Des  Cartes  who 
broke  the  golden  chain  of  ontologistic 
tradition,  by  putting  the  internal  sensible 
instead  of  the  objective  intelligible.  Gio- 
bei*ti  puts  the  foundation  of  all  philoso* 


CURIOUS  QUESTIONS.  Ill 

pliy  in  tlie  immediate  vision  of  God, 
whicli  lie  calls  the  ideal  vision,  "  Visione 
Ideale."  All  pliilosopliy  in  this  system 
mnst  start  from  the  idea,  the  province  of 
philosophy  being  to  work  upon  idea,  and 
evolve  it  by  reflection.  But  the  idea  is 
not  a  mere  image  or  representation  of  the 
object ;  it  is  the  object  itself,  and  is  called 
being  autonomastically.  Creatures  in  the 
system  of  Gioberti  are  called  existences. 
Being  is,  therefore,  the  '"'■jprimum  philoso- 
pliicum^''  the  principle  and  cause  of  all 
things,*  and  hence  the  '■'■  primuTn  psycTio- 
logicum  "  and  the  '''' primum  ontologicum  " 
are  its  effects,  have  their  last  reason  in  it. 
Now,  the  intuition  or  vision  of  being 
imparts  an  apodictic  judgment  in  which 
all  evidence  and  certainty  are  based. 
Gioberti  explains  this  as  follows:  "The 

*  By  the  "primum  psychologicum "  is  meant  the  first 
idea,  and  by  "primum  ontologicum"  the  first  thing. 
But  as  the  first  idea  and  the  first  thing  are  the  same  in 
the  system  of  Gioterti,  hence,  leing  is  the  "primum 
philosophicum,"  the  basis  of  all  reality,  and  of  all  the 
hnoioaile. 


112  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

idea  of  being  contains  this  judgment — 
being  is  necessarily.  In  pronouncing 
this,  the  mind  is  not  a  judge,  but  merely 
a  witness  or  hearer  of  a  judgment  which 
does  not  go  out  of  the  mind  itself.  Being 
proposes  itself  to  the  mind's  eye,  and 
says,  'I  am  necessarily.'  In  this  objective 
affirmation  we  have  the  foundation  of  all 
evidence  and  certitude."  (Introduzione, 
vol.  ii.  chap.  1.) 

The  first  step  that  philosophy  makes, 
is  to  repeat  this  judgment  by  reflection. 
Gioberti  says,  "  The  repetition  of  the  ob- 
jective and  divine  judgment,  made  by 
means  of  reflection,  is  the  first  link  in  the 
chain  of  philosophy."  But  in  order  to 
make  this  repetition,  we  need  speech  or 
language.,  which  is  the  bridge  or  passage 
in  our  mind  from  the  direct  to  the  reflex 
state.* 

We  quote  from  Gioberti:  "Between 
the  primitive  divine   judgment  and  the 

*  The  nature  of  the  direct  and  reflex  state  will  be  ex- 
plained hereafter. 


CUKIOUS  QUESTIONS.  113 

secondary  human  judgment,  that  is  to 
say,  between  intuition  and  reflection, 
speech  acts  as  the  medium.  It  is  by 
means  of  language  that  intuitive  truth 
becomes  accessible  to  reflection."  The 
necessity  of  speech  arises  from  the  neces- 
sity of  circumscribing  the  idea  of  being, 
and  of  concentrating  the  mind  to  contem- 
plate it  in  a  limited  form.  In  short,  a 
word  is  like  a  niche  in  which  idea  puts 
itself  to  be  apprehended  by  the  mind. 
The  sum  of  all  this  is,  that  the  mind 
intues  God  as  being,  and  all  things  in 
Him.  Hence,  being  is  the  foundation  of 
reflection,  and  consequently  of  all  philo- 
sophy. Gioberti  speaks:  "L'ente  e  in 
effetto'  il  supremo  criterio,  e  giudicatorio 
del  vero,  il  supremo  assioma  di  tutto  lo 
scibile,  perche'  e  1'  intelligibilita'  e  I'evi- 
denza  stessa  delle  cose." 

The  intuition  of  God  as  being,  gives  us 
only  a  knowledge  of  His  attributes  and 
existence.  But  besides  these  conceptions, 
we  have   others  that   regard  creatures. 


114  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

Whence  came  these?  Gioberti  replies 
by  the  idea  of  creation,  which  is  the 
means  of  passing  from  God  to  finite  exist- 
ence. We  intue  God  as  real,  not  as 
merely  possible  being.  But,  as  it  is  a  fact 
that  His  being  is  always  cause  and  crea- 
tor, so,  in  the  intuition  of  His  being,  we 
also  have  His  creating  act  and  its  effect. 
Beholding  God,  we  see  the  divine  crea- 
tion, and  those  things  that  receive  exis- 
tence by  it.  Hence,  the  ideal  formula, 
the  foundation  of  the  whole  system  : 
Being  creates  existences,  "  Ens  creat  exis- 
tentias."  Gioberti  thus  speaks  of  his 
ideal  formula,  "La  vera  formula  ideale 
suprema  base  di  tutto  lo  scibile,  de  la 
quale  andavano  intracla  peno  dunque 
essere  ensciata  in  questi  termini,  I'ente 
crealee  estenze."  (Vol.  ii.,  cap.  Intro.)  In 
this  formula  we  have  the  three  realities, 
God,  the  world,  and  the  creation.  The 
last  is  the  bond  between  the  first  and  the 
second.  Being  is  the  first  and  centre 
with  regard  to  all  realities.     All  other 


CURIOUS  QUESTIONS.  115 

ideas  are,  as  it  were,  rays  emanating  from 
being,  as  from  the  centre  of  a  circle.  All 
conceptions,  then,  derived  from  this  intui- 
tion are  divided  into  two  classes.  Abso- 
lute, that  regard  only  God  or  possible 
beings,  and  contingent,  which  concern 
only  finite  existences.  But,  although 
being  is  only  intelligible  in  itself  as  the 
object  of  thought,  there  is  a  part  of  it 
unintelligible,  namely,  essence ;  and  as 
all  the  properties  of  this  being  come 
from  its  essence,  they  can  not  be  known 
by  conceptions  derived  from  the  idea  of 
being  as  the  object  of  thought.  Whence, 
therefore,  do  they  come  ?  How  have  we 
these  ideas  ? 

They  are  given  at  the  same  time  with 
the  idea  of  being  which  precedes  them 
logically,  but  not  chronologically.  Hence, 
the  conceptions  of  eternity,  immensity, 
unity,  infinity,  etc.,  make  what  Gioberti 
calls  the  synthesis  of  the  infinite,  and  this 
he  calls  a  true  revelation,  "vera  rivela- 


116  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

The  same  may  be  said  of  contingent 
and  relative  conceptions,  wLich  are  syn- 
chronous in  our  mind  with  the  idea  of 
contingent  existences.  They  can  not  be 
deduced  from  each  other,  since  their  prin- 
ciple is  unapprehended  by  us.  The  root 
of  all  these  qualities  is  the  essence  of  the 
esistenza.  But  this  essence  is  as  unknown 
to  us  as  the  essence  of  the  ens.  These 
conceptions,  then,  come  along  with  the 
idea  of  being  into  our  mind  by  intuition. 
They,  too,  are  revealed.  Intuition  is, 
therefore,  a  natural  revelation.  Hence, 
all  our  judgments  are  synthetical,  a  priori^ 
except  the  first,  namely,  being  is.  This  syn- 
thesis, however,  is  not  subjective,  as  Kant 
maintains,  but  objective,  coming  fi-om  the 
revelation  of  being,  whose  essence  is  un- 
known to  us  in  this  life.  To  sum  up, 
then,  all  our  knowledge  commences  by 
contemplating  truth  in  itself;  truth,  centre 
of  all  truths,  truth,  God.  But,  as  we  see 
God  concrete,  not  abstract,  we  see  Him 


CURIOUS   QUESTIONS.  117 

acting  by  creation,  and  hence  this  ideal 
formula,  ens  creat  existentias. 

Language  enables  us  to  reflect,  to 
evolve  this  formula,  and  thus  make  philo- 
sophy, which  is  the  product  of  reflection. 
But,  as  in  the  intuition  of  being,  as  well 
as  in  the  intuition  of  existence,  the  es- 
sence is  always  invisible  to  intellectual 
perception,  it  follows  that  all  our  judg- 
ments are  synthetical  except  this  one : 
"  Being  is  necessarily."  This  is  the  first 
in  the  order  of  judgments,  and  the  only 
one  that  is  analytical. 

We  shall  examine  the  arguments 
brought  for  and  against  this  system.  It 
is  argued  in  favor  of  it,  that  psycholo- 
gism,  its  opponent,  begets  scepticism  and 
pantheism.  It  is,  indeed,  a  fact  that  mod- 
ern Pantheism  is  not  the  child  of  ontolo- 
gism.  The  German  pantheists  derive 
their  system  from  Kant,  and  Kant  was  a 
psychologist.  Indeed,  if  we  deny  that 
the  mind  immediately  perceives  objective 
reality,  how  shall  we  bridge  the  chasm 


118  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

between  the  subjective  and  objective  or- 
ders? How  shall  we  avoid  scepticism, 
which  consists  precisely  in  a  certain  inca- 
pacity of  man's  mind  to  pass  from  the 
subject  to  the  object  ?  We  have  hinted 
at  this  impossibility  in  our  refutation  of 
the  system  of  St.  Thomas  and  of  Reid. 
Again,  the  logical  should  be  the  same  as 
the  ontological  order.  But  in  the  onto- 
logical  order  God  holds  the  first  place, 
creation  the  second,  and  existence  the 
third.  Hence,  in  the  logical  order,  or  or- 
der of  thought,  God  must  be  first.  Be- 
sides, unless  we  admit  the  immediate 
vision  of  God  we  never  can  have  an  idea 
of  God.  We  should  have  to  derive  his 
intelligibility  from  that  of  creatures.  That 
is,  we  should  derive  the"  infinite  from  the 
finite,  as  the  psychologists  absurdly  do. 
There  is  no  doubt  that  we  apprehend 
God  ideally,  for  we  know  what  the  word 
God  means.  We  distinguish  the  idea  of 
the  infinite  from  every  other  idea.  Now, 
this  idea  can  be  contained  in  no  other, 


CURIOUS  QUESTIONS.  119 

indeed  it  must  precede  all  other  ideas. 
The  idea  of  God  is  the  idea  of  a  being 
supreme  by  essence,  self  existing,  and  ne- 
cessary ;  a  being  in  external  operation 
omnipotent.  Now,  what  idea,  except  God 
himself,  can  represent  such  a  being  to 
our  mind  ?  How  could  any  other  reality 
represent  such  a  being?  For  either  the 
reality  that  would  represent  it  would 
have  the  same  properties  as  the  object  re- 
presented or  it  would  not.  If  the  first  be 
asserted,  then  it  would  be  God,  for  it 
would  have  infinite  attributes  ;  and  if  the 
second  be  said,  then  we  ask  how  could  it 
represent  to  us  qualities  that  it  does  not 
possess  ?  Therefore,  God  is  apprehended 
ideally  in  himself,  and  not  in  any  repre- 
sentative. Besides,  we  have  shown  that 
the  object  of  thought  is  neither  possible 
being  in  general^  as  Rosmini  asserted,  nor 
representative  being,  as  the  Aristotelians 
maintain ;  therefore  it  must  be.  being  it- 
self—God. 
The  adversaries  of  this  system  do  not 


120  CUKIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

dispute  its  power  to  captivate  the  imagin- 
ation and  the  heart.  Indeed,  no  one  can 
deny  its  elevating  influence  on  the  mind, 
for  there  is  something  ennobling  in  the 
thought  that  the  human  intellect  appre- 
hends God,  and  nothing  out  of  Him,  that 
He  is  the  centre  'of  all  truth  and  science, 
pervading  all  human  knowledge.  How 
far  removed  is  this  system  from  grovel- 
ing materialism  and  narrow-minded  scep- 
ticism !  All,  then,  admit  the  charms  of 
ontology.  Indeed,  these  charms  have  at- 
tracted some  of  the  ablest  and  noblest 
minds  of  modern  times.  But,  while  its 
adversaries  admit  its  brilliancy,  they  deny 
its  truth,  and  it  is  only  right  that  we 
should  now  examine  the  arguments 
ao:ainst  it. 

They  say,  in  the  first  place,  that  this 
system  is  refuted  by  the  testimony  of  con- 
science. Conscience  should  bear  testi- 
mony to  all  the  phenomena  of  the  mind, 
and  hence,  if  the  intuition  of  God  be  an 
internal  fact,  conscience  must  make  us 


CURIOUS  QUESTIONS.  121 

certain  of  its  existence.  But  we  may  in- 
terrogate conscience  forever  on  this  point, 
yet  it  will  be  mute.  It  knows  nothing  of 
this  ontological  vision,  and  hence  it  must 
1)6  rejected  as  the  offspring  of  a  fervid 
imagination,  rather  than  the  child  of  a 
logical  head.  This  difficulty,  however,  is 
easily  solved.  For  we  deny  that  the  in- 
tellectual vision  of  God  belongs  to  the 
domain  of  conscience.  Conscience  tells 
us  of  the  subjective  modifications  of  the 
mind  in  the  reflex  state.  But  it  neither 
tells  us  all  our  ideas  nor  all  the  facts  in 
the  mind.  Nor  can  it  enter  the  sanctu- 
ary of  the  soul  in  its  direct  state.  It  can 
not,  especially,  inform  us  of  the  presence 
of  the  infinite  in  our  souls.  For  if  it 
could,  it  would  be  infinite  itself.  The 
soul  would  have  an  infinite  modification. 
It  is  reason  that  instructs  us  in  the  rfa- 
ture  of  the  soul's  direct  state,  and  proves 
that  we  intue  God's  existence.  When 
man  shall  have  attained  his  last  end  after 
the  reflex  state  of  the  soul  has  been  fully 


122  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

developed,  and  made  equal  to  the  direct 
state  by  man's  becoming  a  participant  of 
the  Divine  nature,  then  conscience  will 
feel  the  presence  of  God  in  the  mind. 
But  here  below,  nothing  short  of  a  mira- 
cle can  make  us  aware  of  God's  presence 
in  us,  either  in  the  natural  or  supernatu- 
ral order.  Nor  does  the  fact  that  con- 
science tells  us  that  the  sensation  of  a 
creature's  presence,  or  that  an  oral  term, 
which  is  always  finite,  is  always  necessary 
to  evoke  the  idea  of  the  infinite,  prove 
that  we  do  not  intue  the  infinite,  or  that 
the  idea  of  the  infinite  is  not  prior  to  that 
of  the  finite  in  our  mind.  At  most  it 
shows  the  simultaneousness  of  the  two 
ideas  in  our  mind  in  the  order  of  reflec- 
tion— a  fact  which  we  do  not  deny,  since 
the  formula  ens  co'eat  eocistentias  supposes 
the  three  ideas  of  being,  creation,  and  ex- 
istences to  be  synchronologically  in  our 
inind.  This  formula  gives  us  the  ideal 
system  in  the  direct  state  of  the  mind,  as 
well  as  the  real  order  which  the  objects 


CURIOUS  QUES'nON'S.  123 

have  to  each  other,  the  idea  of  being 
coming  fii^st.  But  in  the  order  of  reflection, 
since  existences  have  two  modes  in  which 
they  may  be  apprehended — one  as  ideas 
in  the  creative  act,  and  in  this  way  they 
are  perceived  by  God's  intellect  as  well  as 
by  ours ;  the  other  as  the  causes  or  sensa- 
tions, and  in  this  way  they  are  not  ap- 
prehended by  the  intellect  but  felt  by 
the  senses — it  follows  that  there  is  a  great 
difference  between  ideal  perception  in  the 
direct  state  and  in  the  order  of  reflection. 
For  while  conscience  has  no  part  in  the 
one  it  comes  into  the  second.  For  con- 
science tells  us  about  facts  and  never 
about  ideas,  unless  in  connection  with 
facts.  Hence,  conscience  plays  the  same 
role  with  regai'd  to  spiritual  perceptions 
as  the  senses  with  regard  to  the  apprehen- 
sion of  sensations.  Just  as  the  senses  seem 
to  tell  us  that  the  sun  turns  around  us 
while  the  earth  stands  still,  though  it  is 
vice  versa;  so  conscience  seems  to  assert 
that  we  only  see  creatures,  while  reason 


124  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

teaches  us  that  we  see  God.  As  con- 
science is  the  peculiar  faculty  which  deals 
with  what  we  feel,  it  is  finite ;  for  the  pre- 
dominating element  in  the  order  of  reflec- 
tion is  the  sensible,  which  is  always  finite. 
The  intelligible,  or  God,  must  be  inclosed, 
as  it  were,  in  a  word,  in  order  to  be  con- 
templated. But  here  there  seems  to  be 
a  contradiction.  K  the  reflective  act,  be- 
cause it  is  finite,  can  not  perceive  the  intu- 
ition of  God  in  our  souls,  how  is  it  that 
reason,  which  is  also  finite  in  the  intui- 
tive act,  apprehends  the  existence  of  God  ? 
The  cases,  however,  are  not  similar.  For 
the  object  of  conscience  is  especially  the 
finite,  the  sensible,  the  existing;  while 
the  object  of  reason  is  especially  the  in- 
finite, the  invisible,  and  the  possible. 
How  finite  reason  can  intue  an  infinite 
object  is  a  natural  mystery  included  in 
the  mystery  of  creation.  We  know  it  is 
a  fact,  without  knowing  its  manner  of  ex- 
isting ;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  we  know  it 
is  a  fact  that  reflection  or  conscience  does 


CURIOUS  QUESTIONS.  126 

not  apprehend  tLe  infinite.  And  an  in- 
ference drawn  from  the  first  case  to  the 
second  would  not  be  allowable.  Yet, 
even  in  the  reflective  order,  conscience 
seems  to  have  some  perception  of  the  in- 
finite. It  knows  what  that  idea  is;  we  dis- 
tinguish it  from  other  ideas.  And  have 
we  not  often  felt,  when  under  the  influ- 
ence of  some  great  passion,  when  behold- 
ing some  vast  prospect  or  moved  by  some 
great  idea,  as  if  the  infinite  touched  our 
minds  and  warmed  our  hearts  ?  Just  as 
saints  have  often  felt  the  movements  of 
grace  or  inspiration  in  the  supernatural 
order.  Have  we  not  somethino;  in  our  con- 
science  which  tells  us  of  the  infinite  abid- 
ing in  our  minds  in  a  manner  somewhat 
similar  to  that  mysterious  sentiment  called 
by  Gioberti  the  "  faculty  of  super-intelli- 
gence," which  in  every  natural  man  seems 
to  admonish  him  of  the  existence  of  the 
supernatural  ?  It  is  hardly  correct,  then, 
to  say  that  conscience  is  entirely  mute 
with  regard  to  oui'  ideal  perceptions  of 
the  infinite. 


126  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

But  it  will  be  objected  against  this  sys- 
tem, that  in  the  order  of  reflection  it  de- 
stroys the  idea  of  the  infinite.  For  how 
can  we  have  this  idea  except  by  means  of 
language  ?  But  this  infinite  wrapped  up 
in  a  word  is  not  the  infinite;  for  it  is 
limited  and  circumscribed  by  its  "in- 
volucrum,"  and  hence,  in  the  order  of  re- 
flection, we  can  not  have  an  idea  of  the 
infinite.  Hence  the  ontologists  are  in 
the  same  condition  as  the  partisans  of  the 
other  systems  which  we  have  been  re- 
futing. 

But  we  answer,  that,  in  the  order  of 
reflection,  we  have  not  the  idea  of  the  in- 
finite in  its  perfection  or  in  its  integrity. 
We  see  it  obscurely,  as  the  eye  sees  the 
sun  partially  hidden  by  the  clouds.  What 
we  see  in  the  word  is  but  a  ray  emanat- 
ing from  it.  Conscience  becomes  aware 
of  its  presence  in  the  mind  by  the  sensi- 
ble form  or  sign,  while  the  intellect  is  en- 
lightened by  this  ray  of  light  from  God, 
and  mounts  by  its  aid  right  to  the  centre 
fi'om  which  it  has  gone  forth.     We  proved 


CURIOUS  QUESTIONS.  127 

by  reason  tliat  in  the  direct  state  of  our 
soul  tliere  must  be  tlie  idea  of  the  infinite 
in  its  integrity ;  but  in  the  order  of  reflec- 
tion our  intellect  can  not  grasp  the  whole 
of  this  idea  at  the  same  time.  Every 
man's  intellect  is  illuminated  by  the  in- 
finite. But  no  human  intellect  in  this 
life  is  able  to  bear  the  full  blaze  of  infi- 
nite majesty.  As  the  rays  of  the  sun 
coming  into  a  darkened  chamber  give 
light  to  the  objects  in  it,  and  are  connect- 
ed with  the  sun  itself  and  emanate  direct- 
ly from  it,  so  that  we  may  say  it  is  the 
sun  that  dispels  the  darkness;  so  it  is 
with  God's  intellectual  light  beaming;  on 
the  human  intellect  and  enliglitening 
every  man  that  comes  into  the  world. 

Another  great  objection  against  this 
system  is,  that  it  tends  to  pantheism.  In 
this  regard  the  example  of  Gioberti  is 
cited,  who,  toward  the  end  of  his  career, 
is  said  to  have  become  a  pantheist,  and 
to  have  written  a  letter  to  Young  Italy, 
in  which  the  following  expression  occurs : 


128  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

"  I  hold  that  pantheism  is  the  only  true 
and  solid  philosophy."  The  authenticity 
of  this  letter,  however,  has  never  been 
sufficiently  jiroved.  It  is  probably  a  for- 
gery of  the  Mazzinian  faction.  But  as  a 
special  dissertation  will  be  given  by  us 
on  pantheism  in  another  part  of  the  trea- 
tise, and  as  we  shall  then  see  that  onto- 
logism  alone  satisfactorily  refutes  that 
error  in  its  various  foi-ms,  we  need  now 
say  no  more  of  this  difficulty. 

It  is  also  objected  against  Gioberti's 
system,  that  it  is  not  necessary  that  there 
should  be  an  identity  of  relation  between 
the  logical  and  ontological  order.  Let 
us,  then,  show  the  truth  of  this  assertion. 
The  ontological  order  is  the  order  of 
things  as  they  are ;  the  logical  order  is  the 
order  of  things  as  they  are  apprehended 
by  the  mind.  Now,  in  the  first  place, 
there  is  no  reason  why  the  mind  should 
not  apprehend  things  as  they  are,  and 
hence  there  is  no  reason  why  the  logical 
and  ontological  order  should  not  be  the 


CURIOUS  QUESTIONS.  129 

same.  In  the  second  place,  there  is  a  rea- 
son wliy  they  should  be  the  same.  For 
if  the  logical  order  be  not  the  same  as  the 
ontological,  the  mind  will  not  apprehend 
things  as  they  are ;  and  if  it  does  not  ap- 
prehend them  as  they  are,  it  will  not  ap- 
prehend them  truly,  and  it  will  not  ap- 
prehend truths  which  would  be  contrary 
to  the  nature  of  the  mind.  There  is  truth 
in  our  mind  subjectively  considered  be- 
cause there  is  conformity  with  the  object ; 
and  where  this  conformity  does  not  exist, 
there  is  eiTor.  Now,  in  the  ontological 
order,  God  is  first  and  creatures  second. 
Hence,  in  the  logical  order,  the  mind  must 
apprehend  God  first  and  creatures  second. 
For  if  it  apprehended  creature  first  and 
God  second,  it  would  not  apprehend 
things  as  they  are,  it  would  not  apprehend 
truth.  Hence,  however  much  we  may 
condemn  Gioberti  personally,  we  can  not 
help  admitting  his  philosophical  system. 


Question     Eighth. 

does  the  intellect  apprehend  contin- 
gent facts? 

IE  have  thus  far  seen  that  the 
idea  of  God  is  intelligible  in 
itself.  Let  us  see  if  creatures 
be  intelligible  in  themselves.  In  other 
words,  does  the  mind  apprehend  the  indi- 
vidual in  itself?  To  this  St.  Thomas  an- 
swers, "  iVb."  For  he  denies  that  mate- 
rial individuals  are  intelligible  in  them- 
selves. We  are  glad,  then,  to  be  able  to 
join  hands  with  the  disciples  of  the  An- 
gelic Doctor  in  establishing  the  opinion, 
that  finite  or  contingent  facts  are  not  the 
object  of  thought.  Those  who  defend 
the  intelligibility  of  finite  or  contingent 
facts  might  do  so  either  by  maintaining 
that  nothing  but  the  contingent  or  finite 


CURIOUS  QUESTIONS.  181 

facts  are  apprehended  by  tlie  mind,  or 
that  they  are  perceived  together  with  the 
infinite  and  their  types  or  possibilities. 
But  neither  of  these  hypotheses  can  be 
maintained.  In  order  that  the  object  of 
thought  should  be  wholly  in  the  contin- 
gent, two  conditions  must  be  fulfilled. 
Firstly,  that  the  contingent  should  be 
capable  of  immediately  terminating  our 
thoughts.  Secondly,  it  should  include  in 
itself  whatever  we  apprehend  by  thought. 
But  the  contingent  fulfills  neither  of  these 
two  conditions.  It  does  not  terminate 
the  mind  by  itself,  because  it  is  con- 
tingent, and  being  contingent,  it  must 
have  a  cause  prior  to  itself,  and  therefore 
the  idea  of  cause  goes  before  it,  and  is 
the  condition  sine  qua  non  of  its  appre- 
hension. 

Nor  do  contingent  facts  include  in 
themselves  every  thing  we  apprehend  by 
thought.  For  beside  the  contingent,  we 
have  an  idea  of  the  necessary,  and  beside 
the  finite  we  have  an  idea  of  the  infinite. 


132  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

Now,  neither  the  infinite  nor  the  necessa- 
ry can  be  contained  in  the  finite  and  con- 
tingent. Hence  the  finite  and  contingent 
can  not  be  said  to  be  the  only  object  ap- 
prehended by  the  mind. 

The  hypothesis  that  the  objectivity  of 
ideas  is  partially  ifiade  up  of  contingent 
facts  is  equally  absurd.  For  that  can  be 
in  no  sense  the  object  of  thought  which 
can  not  at  all  terminate  our  intellect. 
But  such  are  contingent  beings,  whose 
existence,  indeed,  we  can  feel  by  means 
of  sensations,  but  never  apprehend  as 
ideas.  For  they  have  no  essential  con- 
nection with  our  perceptions.  The  ob- 
ject of  thought  is  essential  to  eveiy  per- 
ception, and  if  there  be  any  object  which 
we  can  perceive  as  unnecessary  to  intel- 
lectual perception,  it  is  no  longer  the  ob- 
ject of  thought.  But  every  finite  exist- 
ence may  be  conceived. as  not  existing, 
and  we  can  conceive  God  as  producing 
all  the  impressions  made  on  our  minds 
by  physical  existences,  even  though  they 


CURIOUS  QUESTIONS.  133 

did  not  exist ;  Lence  their  existence  lias  no 
essential  connection  with  our  perception. 
In  fact,  if  this  connection  between  the 
finite  object  of  our  perception  existed,  it 
would  either  exist  always,  so  that  we 
could  think  of  no  creature  which  would 
not  be  at  the  same  time  existing ;  or 
this  connection  would  only  exist  in 
certain  cii'cumstances  —  that  is  to  say,  in 
what  we  call  external  perceptions.  But 
this  connection  between  our  perception 
and  the  finite  object  exists  in  neither  of 
these  two  cases.  To  show  the  first,  we 
have  only  to  cite  the  case  of  a  dreamer  or 
madman,  who  may  have  many  finite  ideas, 
or  rather  sensations  of  the  finite,  without 
their  having  any  connection  with  existing 
finite  realities ;  and  to  show  the  second, 
we  have  only  to  say  that  circumstances 
can  not  change  the  essence  of  any  thing, 
and  hence  if  the  connection  between  the 
perception  and  finite  existence  be  some- 
times wanting,  the  finite  can  not  be  intel- 
ligible in  itself,  nor  in  any  sense  be  the 


184  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

object  of  thought.  Hence,  finite  or  con- 
tingent facts  are  not  intelligible  in  them- 
selves or  as  individuals,  but  only  in  their 
types  or  species,  which  are  in  God.  In 
themselves,  however,  they  are  felt ;  we 
become  certain  of  their  existence  by  means 
of  sensations.  All  ideas  are  therefore  dif- 
ferent aspects  of  the  divinity  viewed  by 
the  intellect,  and  hence  they  constitute 
the  intelligible  part  of  thought,  the  ob- 
ject of  our  intellectual  perceptions.  But 
ideas,  perceptions,  sensations,  and  facts 
have  a  real  relation  to  each  other;  for 
every  idea  implies  a  possible  fact,  and 
every  fact  implies  a  real  idea,  for  facts 
are  but  the  individualization  or  actuation 
of  ideas.  And  all  sensations  are  the  sub- 
jective modifications  of  the  mind  produced 
by  facts,  and  they  give  us  the  sensible 
elements  of  thought.  By  ideas  we  arrive 
at  the  knowledge  of  the  existence  of  God 
and  of  the  possibility  of  creation,  and  by 
sensations  we  are  made  certain  of  the  fact 


CURIOUS  QUESTIONS.  18.5 

of  our  own  existence  and  of  tlie  existence 
of  other  created  things. 

But  it  may  be  asked,  if  contingent  facts 
are  not  apprehended  by  the  intellect  as 
ideas,  how  can  it  be  certain  of  their  exist- 
ence ?  Since  the  intellect  is  the  seat  of 
certitude,  every  thing  that  is  certain  must 
have  a  relation  to  it.  To  this  question 
we  answer,  that  contingent  facts  have  a 
relation  to  the  intellect,  though  they  be 
not  apprehended  by  it  in  themselves. 
All  the  faculties  of  the  mind  are  connect- 
ed; for  the  mind  is  a  simple  substance, 
and  hence  nothing  can  affect  one  of  these 
faculties  without  affecting  at  the  same 
time  all  the  others.  Yet  the  modifica- 
tions and  the  acts  of  one  faculty  have  not 
the  same  relations  to  all  the  other  facul- 
ties, for  each  faculty  has  its  peculiarities 
and  its  idiosyncrasies.  Hence  the  wiU 
can  not  be  separated  from  the  intellect, 
nor  the  intellect  from  the  will,  etc.,  though 
the  acts  of  the  will  are  not  formally  the 
same  as  the  acts  of  the  intellect,  and  the 


186  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

same  may  be  said  of  the  acts  of  the  im- 
agination and  the  memory.  Hence  sen- 
sations by  which  we  become  certain  of 
the  existence  of  the  finite  or  contingent 
facts  have  relation  with  the  intellect ;  but 
the  manner  in  which  sense  acts  upon  the 
reason,  as  well  as 'the  manner  in  which 
one  faculty  relates  to  another,  is  a  psycho- 
logical mystery  impervious  to  reason. 
Mysteries  of  this  kind  are  common  in 
every  order.  In  fact,  the  last  reason  of 
every  thing  is  a  mystery.  We  know, 
with  regard  to  finite  or  contingent  facts, 
that  our  senses  apprehend  tiiem,  and  we 
feel  an  invincible  propensity  in  our  na- 
ture to  believe  the  testimony  of  those 
senses.  This  propensity  is  called  common- 
sense,  the  second  in  the  order  of  the 
motives  of  certitude,  evidence  being  the 
first.  Now,  evidence  is  peculiarly  the 
certitude  of  pure  intellect,  and  hence,  just 
as  common-sense,  the  principal  element  of 
which  is  sensation  or  the  sensible  of 
thought,   is  based    upon    evidence,  the 


CURIOUS  QUESTIONS.  187 

principal  element  of  wliicli  is  idea  or  tlie 
intelligible  of  thought ;  so  sensation  de- 
pends upon  idea  or  reason,  wliicli  is  pro- 
perly the  mistress  of  the  mind,  whom  all 
the  other  faculties  must  obey.  Hence  we 
see  that  the  intellect  may  be  certain  of 
the  existence  of  finite  or  contingent  facts, 
though  it  does  not  apprehend  them  ide- 
ally. 


Question   Ninth. 

what  is  meant  by  the  history  and  solu- 
tion  of  the  controversy  concerning 
the  universals? 

IND,  speeieSy  difference^  property^ 
(propriura,)  and  accident,  are 
called  tlie  universals.  It  is 
certain  tliat  the  ideas  suggested  by  those 
words  are  distinct  from  the  idea  of  indi- 
vidualities. Thus,  when  I  think  of  man, 
the  object  which  I  represent  to  myself  is 
not  any  particular  individual,  as  James 
or  John,  but  something  which  is  common 
to  all  of  those  individuals,  and  conse- 
quently belongs  to  none  of  them  exclu- 
sively. The  question  for  us  to  treat  is, 
are  those  five  universals  mere  names,  or 
do  they  indicate  realities  ?     This  question 


CURIOUS  QUESTIONS.  189 

gave  rise  to  many  quarrels  in  the  middle 
ao:es,  wlien  intellectual  tilts  were  almost 
as  common  and  as  esteemed  as  knightly 
tournaments. 

There  were  three  great  schools  holding 
different  opinions  with  regard  to  the  na- 
tm-e  of  universals.  These  were  called 
the  Nominalists,  the  Conceptualists,  and 
the  Realists.  Roscelin,  a  French  canon  of 
the  eleventh  centuiy,  denied  the  objec- 
tive reality  of  the  univerSals.  According 
to  him,  a  universal  was  but  a  name,  a 
word  indicative  of  no  reality,  but  used 
to  designate  a  collection  of  individuals. 
Hence  his  system  was  called  Nomi- 
nalism. He  acknowledged  no  reality 
but  that  of  individuals. 

The  second  system  was  called  Concep- 
tualism,  invented  in  the  twelfth  century 
by  Abelard.  According  to  him,  univer- 
sal ideas  are  not  mere  names  or  empty 
sounds,  nor  yet  objective  realities.  But 
they  are  intellectual  conceptions — mental 
realities — which  our  intellect  forms  by 


140  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

means  of  abstraction — that  is  to  say,  by- 
noting  tlie  difference  and  comparing  the 
relations  between  individuals.  But  this 
system  differs  from  Nominalism  only  in 
name.  For  when  the  Nominalists  say 
that  the  universals  are  mere  sounds,  they 
do  not  suppose  that  the  mind  does  not 
understand  their  sense.  But  as  the  mind 
can  not  understand  the  sense  of  any  thing 
without  having  a  conception  of  it,  the 
Nominalists  must  admit  the  universals 
to  be  conceptions  of  the  mind.  In  fact 
the  difficulty  between  the  Nominalists 
and  the  Realists  does  not  lie  in  this 
point,  but  in  the  objectivity  to  be  given 
to  the  universals,  outside  of  the  mind. 
Therefore  Nominalism  and  Conceptualism 
agree  in  substance. 

Realism  is  directly  opposed  to  Nomin- 
alism. It  maintains  that  univei'sals  have 
a  real  objectivity  "  a  parte  reV  The 
principal  defenders  of  this  system  were 
St.  Anselm  in  the  eleventh  century, 
William  Champeaux  in  the  twelfth,  and 


CURIOUS  QUESTIONS.  141 

Scotus  in  tlie  fourteenth.  All  the  Real- 
ists agree  in  one  point,  namely,  that  the 
universals  have  reality,  but  they  disagree 
in  explaining  its  nature.  Some  say,  with 
the  Nominalists,  that  there  is  no  reality 
which  is  not  an  individual.  Yet  they 
admit  a  kind  of  reality  for  the  universals. 
They  say  that  there  are  many  respects 
in  which  each,  individual  might  be  con- 
sidered. For  instance,  in  the  essence  of 
each  individual  we  find  something  which 
makes  it  similar  to  others  of  its  species, 
and  something  which  makes  it  unlike  all 
other  individuals.  The  former  property 
they  called  its  species,  and  the  latter  its 
difference.  The  difference  is  indivisible, 
but  the  species  is  by  nature  multiple,  for 
it  may  be  found  in  several  individuals, 
and  hence  it  is  called  a  universal.  To 
illustrate  this,  let  us  take  a  scholastic 
example:  Socratitas^  in  Socrates,  indi- 
cates the  individual  Socrates.  But  Am* 
manitas  desicrnates  somethinjj  which 
Socrates  has  in  common  with  all  men , 


142  CUEIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

and  hence  it  is  the  universal  or  species, 
while  the  other  is  the  individual.  Other 
Realists  consider  universals  as  realities 
entirely  distinct  from  individuals,  so  that, 
for  instance,  though  no  human  individual 
should  exist,  still  humanitas  would  have 
its  reality.  But  these  Realists  disagree 
^gain  upon  the  nature  of  this  reality,  as 
well  as  with  regard  to  the  manner  in 
which  individuals  are  distino-uished  from 
the  species  as  well  as  from  each  other. 

Some  make  the  reality  of  the  univer- 
sals a  distinct,  uncreated,  and  independ- 
ent existence^  and  they  interpret  Plato's 
theory  of  ideas  in  this  sense.  Others,  in 
giving  them  a  distinct  existence,  say  they 
were  created  by  God ;  while  others  again 
identify  the  universals  with  the  eternal 
archetypes  of  things  contained  in  the 
essence  of  God,  which  is  creation's  model. 
There  are  also  several  opinions  as  to 
what  constitutes  and  distinguishes  in- 
dividuals. According  to  some,  individ- 
uality is  but  a  mere  accident,  which,  being 


CURIOUS  QUESTIONS.  143 

added  to  the  universal,  constitutes  the  in- 
dividual. 

Others,  with  Scotus,  admit  a  universal 
reality  found  in  all  individuals,  and  called 
liWGceitas^  Avhich  distinguishes  one  indi- 
vidual from  another,  as  well  as  from  the 
species.  Having  thus  explained  the  dif- 
ferent systems  regarding  the  nature  of 
universals,  we  shall  now  examine  doc- 
trinally  the  three  following  questions: 
Fii'stly :  Are  the  universals  objective 
realities,  or  mere  conceptions  of  the 
mind  ?  Secondly :  Are  they  distinct 
from  mere  individuals  and  independent 
of  them  in  their  being  ?  Thirdly  :  What 
is  their  nature  ?  In  answer  to  the  first 
question  we  assert  that  universals  are 
objective  realities.  In  order  to  prove  this 
assertion,  three  things  are  necessary  to  be 
made  evident,  namely,  Firstly :  That  we  can 
have  no  intellectual  conception  which  has 
not  an  object.  Secondly:  That  we  can 
have  an  intellectual  conception  of  the 
universals.     Thirdly:   That  this  concep- 


144  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

tion  has  its  foundation  only  in  objective 
reality.  That  there  can  be  no  thought 
in  our  mind  which  does  not  imply  an 
object  is  a  piinciple  included  in  the 
very  nature  of  intellectual  conception,  as 
we  have  already  shown.  Besides, 'there 
is  no  necessity  of  proving  what  is  ad- 
mitted by  our  adversaries,  who  do  not 
deny  that  conceptions  imply  an  object, 
but  deny  that  this  object  is  a  universal 
reality. 

As  to  the  question  whether  we  have 
a  conception  of  the  universals  or  not, 
Abelard  himself,  as  well  as  the  Nominal- 
ists, admits  that  we  think  of  kinds  and 
species,  and  hence  we  have  ideas  of  them. 
Finally,  that  the  reality  of  the  universals 
is  objective  and  self  existing  can  be  easily 
proved ;  for  in  this  respect  nothing  can 
exist  in  itself  but  universals  and  individ- 
uals. Now  if  it  be  denied  that  the  uni- 
versals have  realities  in  themselves,  their 
realities  must  be  taken  from  individuals 
by  means  of  mental  abstraction.     In  fact, 


CURIOUS  QUESTIONS.  145 

this  is  what  tlie  Nominalists  and  Concep- 
tualists  assert.  But  this  can  not  "be 
said ;  for  then  it  would  follow  that  we 
should  have  an  idea  of  the  individual 
before  that  of  the  species  to  which  it 
belongs.  Yet  in  order  to  conceive  an 
individual  as  such,  it  is  necessary  that 
we  should  conceive  it  by  that  note  or 
characteristic  which  makes  it  an  indi- 
vidual of  such  a  nature,  rather  than  of 
such  another;  that  is  to  say,  with  the 
scholastics,  the  "  Quidditas  m."  Thus, 
before  we  conceive  the  individual^  Peter, 
it  is  first  necessary  that  we  should  have 
the  idea  of  man — the  species  of  which  he 
is  a  member.  For  if  we  have  not  the 
idea  of  man,  we  could  not  assert  that  he 
was  such  or  such  a  man.  But  this  quid- 
dity or  essence  is  the  universal  or  species, 
which  may  be  participable  by  an  in- 
definite number  of  individuals.  There- 
fore we  have  the  idea  of  the  universal 
before  we  conceive  the  idea  of  the  indi- 
vidual.  But  even  if  we  admit  the  priority 


146  CURIOUS  QUESTIONa 

of  the  conception  of  the  individual  to  that 
of  the  species,  still  the  hypothesis  of  our 
adversaries  would  not  hold  good.  For  in 
order  that  the  mind  should  obtain  one 
idea  from  "another  by  means  of  mental 
abstraction,  it  is  necessary  that  the  latter 
should  have  a  greater  extension  than  the 
former ;  for  the  greater  can  not  be  con- 
tained in  the  less.  But  the  universal  is 
greater  than  the  individual,  and  there- 
fore the  universal  can  not  be  derived 
fifom  the  individual  by  any  kind  of 
abstraction.  And  hence  the  universals  are 
objective  realities. 

Are  the  universals  constituted  in. their 
realities  independent  of  individuals  ? 
We  answer  affirmatively.  If  not,  we 
should  have  to  say,  with  a  certain  class 
of  Realists,  that  they  are  nothing  else 
than  those  properties  which  are  possessed 
in  common  by  several  individuals.  But 
this  assertion  can  by  no  means  be  main- 
tained. For  it  makes  the  individual 
contain    the   universal.      The    uiiixersr.l 


CUKIOUS  QUESTIONS.  147 

would  be  an  integral  part  of  the  indi- 
vidual, and  concur  in  its  formation.  But 
as  tlie  individual  can  contain  nothing 
which  is  not  individual  without  losing 
its  nature,  we  can  not  suppose  it  to 
contain  the  universal  without  becoming 
a  universal  instead  of  an  individual. 
Besides,  when  our  adversaries  say  that 
the  universal  is  part  of  the  individual, 
they  must  mean  either  that  the  universal 
is  a  reality,  found  the  same  in  all  in- 
dividuals, or  in  the  relation  of  simili- 
tude among  individuals  by  means  of  dif- 
ferent aspects,  which  make  them  similar 
without  being  identical. 

But  in  neither  sense  can  the  universals 
be  said  to  be  in  the  individuals.  For  in 
the  fii'st  case  the  universal  should  pertain 
no  more  to  one  individual  than  to  an- 
other, and  hence  no  individual  could 
claim  the  universal,  and  therefore  the 
universal  would  be  independent  of  indi- 
viduals for  its  reality.  For  instance,  let 
us  suppose  that  humanity  is  identical  in 


148  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

two  individuals,  A  and  B.  Since  the 
individuality  is  that  which  constitutes  A 
distinct  from  B,  humanity  must  be  dis- 
tinguished from  the  individuality  of  each. 
But  in  this*case  individuality  can  be  con- 
ceived only  as  an  accident  which  may 
affect  the  same  essence  differently ;  and 
humanity,  which  is  the  universal,  will  be 
independent  in  its  reality  of  all  indi- 
viduals. Nor  can  it  be  said  that  nni- 
versals  are  contained  in  the  individ- 
uals in  the  second  manner;  for  several 
individuals  can  not  be  similar  to  each 
other  in  any  respect,  witliout  being  in 
that  respect,  individualizations  of  the 
same  universal  distinct  from  each  of  them. 
Thus,  I  can  not  say  that  A  and  B  are 
similar  in  any  respect  to  hmnanity,  with- 
out conceiving  a  certain  archetype,  of 
which  each  of  them  is  an  exact  copy,  and 
yet  from  which  each  of  them  is  distinct. 
Arid  hence  the  universals  are  in  no  sense 
either  constitutive  or  accidental  parts  of 
individuals. 


CURIOUS  QUESTIONS.  149 

Besides,  tiniversals  are  absolute  and 
necessary,  while  individuals  are  relative 
and  contingent.  But  the  absolute  and 
necessary  do  not  depend  upon  the  con- 
tingent for  their  reality,  sin6e  the  abso- 
lute and  necessary  would  have  their 
reality  although  neither  relative  nor  con- 
tingent should  exist.  However,  though 
the  universals  do  not  depend  upon  indi- 
viduals for  their  reality,  they  nevertheless 
always  imply  at  least  possible  individuals. 
For  two  things  may  be  considered  in 
them,  namely,  either  the  degree  of 
being  which  makes  them  perceptible  to 
the  mind ;  or  their  partlcipability  by  an 
indefinite  number  of  individuals.  Only 
in  this  latter  respect  are  they  called  uni- 
versals. Thus,  the  uniyersal  humanity  is 
conceived  as  participable  by  an  indefinite 
number  of  individual  men;  hence  the 
conception  of  the  universal  always  im- 
plies the  conception  of  the  individual. 
All  that  we  maintain  is,  that  universals 
would  be  real  if  there  never  were  any 


150  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

individuals;  so  that  tlie  reality  of  the 
universal  does  not  depend  on  the  indi- 
vidual; though  the  universal  and  indi- 
vidual, being  correlative  terms,  can  never 
be  eonceived  one  without  the  other. 

We  assert,  in  the  third  place,  that  uni- 
versals,  considered  in  themselves,  are 
nothing  else  than  the  archetypes  of  all 
things,  contained  from  all  eternity  in  the 
essence  of  God.  In  order  to  prove  this, 
three  facts  must  be  established.  Firstly, 
that  archetypes  of  things  must  be  admit- 
ted in  God ;  secondly,  that  those  arche- 
types fulfill  the  conditions  necessary  to 
make  them  identical  with  the  universals ; 
thii'dly,  that  nothing  else  can  fulfill  those 
conditions.  In  the  first  place,  the  arche- 
types of  things  are  in  God ;  for  God  must 
have  a  knowledge  of  possible  things,  and 
this  knowledge  must  be  terminated  by 
reality.  Moreover,  as  this  knowledge  is 
essential  and  necessary,  the  reality  which 
terminates  must  have  the  same  qualities, 
and  must  exist   in    God;    otherwise  a 


CURIOUS  QUESTIONS.  151 

necessary  reality  could  exist  outside  of 
God,  which  is  absurd. 

Secondly,  those  archetypes  fulfill  the 
conditions  necessary  to  make  them  iden- 
tical with  the  universals ;  for  these  con- 
ditions are  three,  namely,  the  archetypes 
must  be  something  real ;  must  be  consti- 
tuted independently  of  individuals ;  and 
participable  by  an  indefinite  number  of 
individuals.  But  they  are  real  since  they 
are  the  object  of  the  divine  knowledge, 
and  the  term  of  the  divine  intellect  must 
be  a  reality.  They  are  constituted  inde- 
pendently of  individuals,  for  the  arche- 
types of  things  would  exist  even  if  no 
individuals  were  ever  created.  This  fact 
is  implied  in  their  conception.  Thirdly 
and  lastly,  they  are  conceived  as  partici- 
pable by  an  indefinite  number  of  indi- 
viduals ;  for  they  are  the  common  exem- 
plars which  God  imitates  in  the  produc- 
tion of  individuals,  and  they  are  conceived 
as  inexhaustible. 

Thirdly,  nothing  else  but  these  arche- 


162  CUEIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

types  can  fulfill  those  conditions;  for  if 
there  be  given  such  reality,  it  must  bo 
either  uncreated  and  necessary  according 
to  Plato's  theory,  and  distinct  from  God ; 
or  it  should  be  a  created  reality.  But 
there  can  be  no  such  thing  as  an  uncreated 
reality  distinct  from  God ;  and  if  we  make 
this  supposed  reality  a  creature,  it  must 
be  identified  with  contingent  individuals ; 
which  is  absurd,  as  we  have  already 
shown.  Hence  universals  are  nothing 
else  but  the  archetypes  of  things  in  the 
essence  of  God. 


Question    Tenth. 

what  is  the  difference  between  the  di- 
eect  and  reflex  state  of  the  soul  ? 


HE  soul  is  said  to  be  in  the  re- 
flex state  when  it  can  analyze 
thoughts  and  distinguish  ob- 
jects from  each  other.  Our  soul  is  now 
in  that  state.  But  we  know  that  this  is 
not  its  primitive  state.  We  know  that 
we  have  come  to  this  state  successively, 
acquiring  knowledge  bit  by  bit.  The 
further  we  go  toward  our  childhood,  the 
less  we  find  in  it  of  our  knowledge ;  and 
we  finally  arrive  at  a  period  where  our 
knowledge  seems  to  begin,  beyond  vrhich 
we  can  remember  nothing.  Besides,  we 
know  from  experience  that  our  knowledge 
has  been  obtained  by  the  influence  which 


154  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

external  objects  have  exerted  on  our  mind 
and  by  education.  Hence,  we  conclude 
that  the  actual  state  of  our  mind  is  not 
primitive;  is  not  that  which  was  from 
the  beginning,  for  we  are  certain  that  our 
mind  existed  before  the  existence  of  mem- 
ory. What  then  was  the  state  of  the 
mind  before  the  reflex  state?  "We  call 
this  primitive  state  of  the  mind  the  direct 
state.  As  to  its  nature  philosophers  dis- 
agree. Some  say  the  mind  before  reflec- 
tion was  a  blank,  something  like  a  clean 
slab  of  marble  without  mark  or  letter,  on 
which  external  objects  inscribed  their 
names  one  after  the  other.  In  short,  the 
mind  was  a  "  tabula  rasa." 

But  we  reject  this  materialistic  opinion. 
For  the  mind  was  never  a  blank.  It  is 
essentially  a  thinking  substance.  It  has 
now  the  power  of  thought,  and  this  power 
constitutes  its  essence.  And  as  the  es- 
sence of  being  is  unchangeable,  the  mind 
always  possessed  the  power  of  thought 
even  in  its  primitive  state.     But  as  the 


CURIOUS  QUESTIONS.  155 

power  in  this  case  essentially  implies  tlie 
act,  the  mind  actually  thinks,  and  has 
ever  actually  thought.  Thought,  there- 
fore, has  ever  been  in  the  mind,  and  hence 
the  mind  has  never  been  a  blank. 

Another  school  admits  that  the  mind 
had  thought  in  this  primitive  state,  but 
denies  that  this  thought  had  any  other 
element  than  a  sensible  one.  But  this 
too  we  must  reject;  for  as  the  essence  of 
thought  never  varies,  and  as  this  essence 
implies  an  intelligible  as  well  as  a  sensible 
element,  the  hypothesis  of  the  merely  sen- 
sible thought  must  be  rejected. 

In  what  way  then  was  thought  in  the 
mind  in  the  direct  state?  We  answer 
it  was  there  in  synthesis.  Experience 
teaches  us  that  we  arrive  at  distinct  no- 
tions by  analyzing  the  elements  of  some 
object  which  at  first  presented  itself  to  us 
synthetically,  and  yet  by  this  analysis  we 
do  not  acquire  new  but  distinct  know- 
ledge. Thus,  a  man  looking  at  a  vast 
landscape  apprehends  the  whole  view  at 


156  CURIOUS  QUESnONS. 

once.  He  seizes  it,  as  it  were,  in  syn- 
thesis. But  it  is  only  by  analyzing  it 
that  he  acquires  a  distinct  perception  of 
its  natural  phenomena.  Yet  he  acquires 
no  really  new  knowledge  by  this  analysis. 
Again,  when  a  professor  of  mathematics 
defines  a  circle  to  the  tyro  in  geometry, 
the  student  apprehends  all  its  properties 
in  the  synthesis  of  the  definition.  He 
may  afterward  analyze  these  properties 
and  acquire  greater  distinctness  of  know- 
ledge. Yet  he  has  acquired  nothing  pos- 
itively new,  since  all  is  contained  in  the 
definition. 

In  this  primitive  state,  therefore,  the 
ideal  formula,  "  Ens  creat  existentias,"  is 
in  the  mind  synthetically,  and,  as  we  ad-* 
vance  in  years,  by  analyzing  this  syn- 
thesis we  obtain  reflex  knowledge.  In 
this  first  state  the  intellect  has  the  simple 
intuition  of  God.  The  will  was  a  pure  ad- 
hesion to  good.  The  mind  in  this  period 
of  its  existence  is  in  a  state  of  involution ; 
it  gradually  evolves  its  faculties.     It  con- 


CUKIOUS  QUESTIONS.  157 

tinues  to  evolve  them  tlirongli  life,  and 
happiness  for  the  soul  consists  in  the  per- 
fect evolution  of  all  its  faculties.  So  that 
the  happiness  of  the  soul  may  be  philo- 
sophically defined  to  be  the  complete  evo- 
lution of  the  synthesis  of  the  direct  state. 
This  hypothesis  is  very  simple,  and  might 
be  received.  It  implies  no  repugnances ; 
there  is  nothing  absurd  in  it ;  besides,  it 
explains  perfectly  the  soul's  nature  at  the 
same  time  that  it  preserves  its  dignity 
better  than  other  systems.  It  is,  more- 
over, in  accordance  with  analogy ;  for  cer- 
tainly experience  teaches  us  that  the  soul 
evolves  its  faculties  and  acquires  greater 
knowledge  with  its  years;  and  it  seems 
to  be  a  law  of  nature  that  all  created 
things  should  thus  evolve  their  latent  en- 
ergies. The  germ  contains  the  plant. 
The  oak  has  its  direct  state  in  the  acorn, 
and  as  things  can  not  change  their  essence 
without  losing  their  identity,  we  can  not 
admit  any  system  which  would  add  in 
the  course  of  time  an  essential  attribute 


158  CUBIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

to  a  being  which  it  had  not  from  the  very 
first  instant  of  its  creation.  The  essential 
elements  of  thought  have  therefore  been 
ever  in  the  mind ;  and  hence  it  does  not 
change  its  nature  but  only  its  manner  of 
existing  when  it  passes  from  the  direct 
to  the  reflex  state. ' 


Question   pi 


lUESTION     pLEYENTH. 
DOES    GOD    EXIST? 

HE  arguments  wLicli  are  derived 
from  the  mere  consideration  of 
our  ideas,  to  prove  the  exist- 
ence of  God,  are  called  metaphysical  argu- 
ments. They  are  three  in  number :  In- 
tuitive^ Deductwe  apriori^  and  Deductive 
a  posteriori  /  they  are  the  basis  of  all 
other  arguments  which  prove  God's  ex- 
istence ;  and  they  are  the  only  arguments 
that  can  not  be  disputed.  We  consider, 
firstly,  the  Intuitive.  We  derive  this 
argument  from  the  mere  fact  of  our  ap- 
prehension of  God  mthout  ratiocination. 
From  this  mere  fact  of  intuition  we  prove 
the  existence  of  God.  We  intue  God 
existing,  and  therefore  we  say  He  exists. 


160  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

This  argument  is  tlie  strongest  on  ac- 
count of  its  clearness.  We  will  explain. 
In  tlie  first  place,  we  liave  an  idea  of  God ; 
secondly,  this  idea  is  the  idea  of  God  ex- 
isting ;  thirdly,  our  idea  can  not  give  us 
God  existing,  if  he  does  not  exist.  We 
know  that  we  hdve  an  idea  of  God,  be- 
cause we  know  what  is  meant  by  the  word 
God;  we  distinguish  this  from  others. 
Secondly,  this  idea  is  the  idea  of  God  ex- 
isting. Existence  is  being  in  act;  pos- 
sibility is  nothing  in  itself,  but  is  some- 
thing in  the  cause  which  brings  the  pos- 
sibility into  the  state  of  act.  Hence  our 
ideas  are  always  realities;  for,  whether 
they  have  for  their  object  existing  reality 
or  possible  reality,  the  groundwork  is 
always  something  real.  Now,  the  idea  of 
God  is  not  the  idea  of  a  possibility,  for 
the  idea  of  God  is  the  idea  of  a  simple 
being,  of  supreme  and  infinite  being. 
But  infinite,  supreme,  and  simple  being 
exists  in  itself,  and  is  not  merely  in  the 
order  of  potentiality ;  for,  gi-anting  for  a 


CURIOUS  QUESTIONS.  '161 

moment  tliat  sucli  being  were  possible  in 
anotHer  being,  so  that  this  other  being 
would  be  its  muse,  this  cause  would  exist, 
and  it  would  be  this  existing  cause  that 
we  would  see  in  contemj)lating  simple,  in- 
finite, and  supreme  being.  Hence  in  any 
case  the  idea  of  God  would  be  the  idea 
of  an  existing  reality.  Thirdly,  our  ideas 
can  not  give  us  God  existing  if  He  does 
not  exist ;  for  perception  is  intuition — in- 
tuition supposes  something  intued.  Now 
the  object  intued  must  be  as  it  is  seen  to 
be.  Now  as  our  intuition  in  the  case  of 
God,  gives  us  God  existing,  God  must 
really  exist,  otherwise  it  would  be  false 
that  we  have  an  idea  of  him.  Therefore, 
from  the  simple  fact  that  we  have  an  idea 
of  God,  we  lawfully  conclude  that  God 
exists. 

From  this  argument  we  may  learn  the 
difference  between  simple,  infinite,  and  su- 
preme being,  and  the  ideas  of  finite  being. 
From  the  fact  that  we  have  the  idea  of 
some  finite  being  present  to  the  mind,  it 


162  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

follows  that  tins  being  is  possible ;  but  not 
that  it  exists  in  itself,  but  that  it  exists  in 
the  infinite  being  which  is«fche  archetype 
of  all  contingent  being.  But  simple,  su- 
preme, and  infinite  being,  or  rather  its 
idea,  can  be  contained  in  nothing  else 
than  in  itself;  it  has  no  archetype,  and 
hence  it  is  conceived  by  itself,  and  exists 
by  the  fact  that  it  is  conceived  as  exist- 
ing. 

SECOND   ARGUMENT. 

We  have  what  is  called  deduction  in 
the  demonstration  of  every  judgment 
when  the  two  terms  are  shown  by  means 
of  a  third  to  express  identical  or  subor- 
dinate notions.  This  deduction  takes 
place  a  priori^  when  the  truth  of  the  pre- 
mises logically  precedes,  or  at  least  does 
not  presuppose  the  truth  of  the  con- 
clusion. Since,  therefore,  besides  the  es- 
sence of  God,  nothing  can  be  conceived 
which  does  not  presuppose  the  tinith  that 
God  exists,  the  argument  thus  exposed 
by  us  now  consists  in  showing,  from  the 


GUEIOUS  QUESTIONS.  -  163 

essence  of  God,  tliat  his  existence  must 
be  included  in  his  essence.  Now,  whether 
we  consider  God's  essence  either  as  simple, 
infinite,  or  supreme  being,  we  must  con- 
clude that  he  exists.  For  what  is  exist- 
ence ?  It  is  a  mode  of  being.  But  simple 
being,  that  is,  which  is  all  being,  being  by 
essence,  and  out  of  which  there  is  no 
being,  must  have  all  modes  of  being, 
therefore,  it  must  have  the  mode  of  exist- 
ence ;  for  if  it  had  not,  it  would  be  only 
a  partial  being,*  or  an  ^' ens  secundum 
quidl^  which  implies  a  contradiction  in 
terms.  It  would  be  saying  that  efns  sim- 
jpliciter  was  at  the  same  time  only  ens 
secundum  quid.  Secondly,  we  conceive 
God's  essence  as  infinite,  therefore  he  ex- 
ists by  essence,  for  existence  is  something 
real  and  positive;  it  is  a  perfection;  it 
means  more  than  its  opposite — possibility. 
Hence  a  being  without  existence  has  noth- 
ing positive  in  itself;  but  that  which 
has  nothing  positive,  is  limited  in  its 
being,  and  hence  is  not  infinite.     Hence, 


164  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

tTiougli  all  being  vtitli  existence  is  not  in- 
finite, infinite  being  must  have  existence. 
Thirdly,  God  is  the  supreme  being.  But 
the  essence  of  the  supreme  being  essen- 
tially implies  its  existence ;  for  supreme 
being  expresses  a  mode  of  being  which 
places  the  being  that  possesses  it  above 
all  other  beings,  no  matter  what  may  be 
their  nature ;  but  a'  being  not  existing 
by  essence  is  not  supreme  or  above  all 
other  beings ;  hence  supreme  being  must 
have  existence  by  its  very  natui*e  and 
essence. 

THIRD    ARGUMENT. 

This  argument  proves  the  existence  of 
God  from  the  idea  of  the  essence  of  beings 
distinct  from  God.  The  fact  that  God 
exists  is  shown  from  premises  in  which  it 
is  contained  as  the  reason  of  their  truth. 
Thus  we  formulate  it :  That  being  exists, 
without  whose  existence  other  beings 
would  neither  exist,  be  possible,  or  even 
intelligible.  But  such  a  being  is  God. 
To  prove  it,  it  is  only  necessary  to  show 


CUKIOUS  QUESTIONS.  165 

tliat  the  Lypotliesis  is  absurd  wMcli 
would  suppose  beings  conceived  by  us 
as  possessing  existence,  possibility,  and 
intelligibility,  and,  at  tbe  same  time,  not 
possessing  existence,  possibility,  or  intelli- 
gibility; such  an  hypothesis  may  be  shown 
to  be  absurd  intuitively  and  deductively. 
Intuitively,  for  by  the  fact  that  those 
beings  are  apprehended  by  us,  they  must 
have  some  reality  outside  of  the  mind 
either  in  themselves  or  in  a  cause  which 
has  the  power  of  creating  them,  which  is 
their  intelligible  archetype,  and  which  ren- 
ders them  apprehensible  by  the  mind; 
deductively,  for,  by  the  fact  that  those 
beings  are  beings,  they  must  be  dis- 
tinguished from  nonentity,  or  nothing; 
for  it  would  imply  a  contradiction  to  say 
that  a  being  was  at  the  same  time  being 
and  nonentity.  But  if  those  beings  had 
no  existence,  possibility,  or  intelligibility, 
they  would  be  nothing.  Yet  if  God  does 
not  exist,  the  above  absurd  hypothesis 
would  be  true ;  for  without  God's  exist- 


166  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

ence  no  other  being  could  exist.  God  is 
simple,  infinite,  and  supreme  being ;  other 
beings  are  finite,  partial,  and  subordinate. 
But  if  simple,  infinite,  and  supreme  being 
do  not  exist,  how  can  the  others  exist,  for 
they  are  only  participants  of  it  ?  They 
would  not  be  possible ;  possibility  means 
existence  in  a  cause  which  has  the  power 
of  reducing  beings  to  act;  but  if  this 
cause  do  not  exist,  there  is  no  producing 
cause.  Hence  finite,  subordinate,  and 
limited  beings  would  not  be  possible ; 
neither  would  they  be  intelligible  with- 
out the  existence  of  God.  Intelligibility 
means  the  capacity  of  a  being  to  be  ap- 
prehended by  the  mind,  either  in  itself  or 
in  another  being.  Now  finite,  subordinate, 
and  secundum  quid  beings  are  not  in- 
telligible in  themselves,  but  in  their 
cause — God.  Hence,  as  we  have  shown 
elsewhere,  without  the  existence  of  God, 
finite,  subordinate, .  and  secundum  quid 
beings  would  be  unintelligible,  impossi- 
ble, and  could  not  exist. 


Question    Twelfth. 

is  god's  existence  identified  with  the 
existence  of  other  beings? 

lEE  great  philosopLical  heresy  of 
the  age  is  Pantheism.  In  every 
nation  in  which  it  has  grown 
Tip' in  modern  times  it  has  produced  the 
wildest  theories  regarding  religion,  civil 
government,  and  morality.  Its  effects  are 
manifested  in  the  literature  as  well  as  in 
the  political  revolutions  of  the  age.  It 
has  infected  not  only  the  minds  of  philo- 
sophers, but  even  of  historians,  poets,  legis- 
lators, statesmen,  and  even  novelists.  Its 
theories  have  been  propagated  even  among 
the  masses,  and,  actuated  by  its  influence, 
they  have  risen  up  in  rebellion  against  all 
law,  human  and  divine.     We  assert  facts 


168  CUEIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

which  prove  how  false  it  is  to  assume  that 
merely  speculative  or  metaphysical  the- 
ories exercise  no  influence  over  the  minds 
of  men.  Most  of  the  philosophers  of 
Geimany,  as  Hegel,  Fichte,  and  Schelling 
— ^many  in  France,  among  others  Victor 
Cousin,  were,  or  are,  all  pantheists.  The 
principal  leaders  of  the  revolution  in 
1848,  and  the  ruling  spirits  of  the  present 
movement  in  Italy  -belong  to  the  same 
school.  The  fruits  of  pantheism  have 
been  socialism,  Fourierism,  philanthrop- 
ism,  radicalism,  and  communism.  As  the 
system  of  philosophy  which  we  have  thus 
far  been  maintaining,  has  been  charged 
with  pantheistic  tendencies,  we  shall  now 
see  that  perhaps  this  modern  error  can  be 
better  refuted  from  an  ontologistic  stand- 
point than  from  any  other.  Besides  the 
essence  of  God  there  are  other  essences 
which  exist  or  may  exist ;  and  the  ques- 
tion to  be  solved  between  the  pantheists 
and  us,  is,  whether  the  existence  of  those 
essences  is  identified  with  that  of  God  or 


CURIOUS  QUESTIONS.  169 

not.  The  pantheists  assert  that  God 
alone  exists,  and  that,  as  he  is  infinite, 
nothing  positive,  no  individual  existence 
is  distinguished  from  his.  It.  is  true  we 
have  the  ideas  of  the  finite  multiple  and 
of  creation,  which  would  imply  terms  dis- 
tinct from  the  Creator.  But  these  are 
either  illusions  of  the  imagination,  or  in- 
ternal evolutions  and  manifestations  of 
God  himself,  who,  though  always  remain- 
ing the  -same,  one,  infinite,  and  uncreated, 
limits,  multiplies,  and  creates  himself  phe- 
nomenally. This  is  the  marrow  of  pan- 
theism. 

There  are  different  schools  of  panthe- 
ists; different  ways  of  explaining  their 
system.  The  three  great  pantheistical 
schools  are  called  Emanatism,  Formalism, 
and  Idealism.  According  to  the  first 
system  God  existed  as  a  complete  and  in- 
dependent person  when  he  desired  to 
manifest  himself  in  creation.  But  crea- 
tion is  not  a  production  of  being  out  of 
nothing,  but  a  communication  of  the  Ore- 


170  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

ator's  being  in  a  finite  manner.  By 
means  of  this  communication  new  indi- 
viduals are  begotten  having  distinct  per- 
sonal life  in  God.  Their  substance  is  the 
substance  of  God  which  they  possess  in  a 
finite  manner,  while  God  has  it  in  an  in- 
finite degree. 

Hence,  in  the  unity  of  the  divine  sub- 
stance, there  are  several  terms  each  of 
which  is  constituted  by  a  determinate 
particle,  and  the  divine  substance  is  con- 
scious of  its  existence  in  as  many  difl:erent 
ways  as  there  are  terms  of  this  character. 
But  this  distinction  of  persons  in  God 
will  cease;  for  creatures  will  return  to 
their  pristine  unity  by  complete  absorp- 
tion in  the  divine  personality.  Creation 
will  return  to  its  source  in  this  way. 
Therefore  creation  is  like  a  stream  going 
out  from  the  sea,  but  returning  again  to  its 
source  after  trarersing  rarious  regions. 
It  is  in  this  manner  that  the  humanitarian 
school  of  pantheists  explain  the  identifi- 
cation of  the  world  with  God. 


CURIOUS  QUESTIONS.  171 

The  second  school  of  pantheists  is  that 
of  the  formalists.  This  school  does  not 
admit  even  a  personal  distinction  between 
God  and  other  beings.  God  is  not  an  in- 
dividual being  endowed  either  with  the 
faculty  of  understanding  or  of  loving.  He 
is  infinite,  and  for  this  reason  can  not  be 
a  distinct  individuality ;  for  eveiy  indi- 
vidual is  limited  as  such,  and  hence  not 
infinite.  God  is  therefore  a  force  every- 
where diffused,  and  determined  by  no 
limits.  This  force  constitutes  the  reality 
of  all  individuals  conceived  by  us.  But 
in  itself  considered,  independently  of  in- 
dividuals, it  is  but  a  mere  abstraction 
without  reality.  Hence,  the  various  cre- 
ated beings,  inasmuch  as  they  partake  of 
this  force,  are  identical.  But  they  are  at 
the  same  time  distinct  from  each  other  as 
ideal  forms  or  modifications  which  this 
force  is  ever  producing  by  an  intrinsic 
necessity  of  its  nature.  There  are  two 
kinds  of  forms  in  which  the  divine  being 
manifests  itself — thought  and  extension. 


172  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

The  first  makes  liuman  minds  and  other 
spiritual  substances.  The  second  con- 
stitutes bodies.  This  is  the  sum  of  Spi- 
noza's system. 

We  see  that  the  foimalists  do  not 
perfectly  identify  all  things  with  God, 
since  they  admit  at  least  a  formal  dis- 
tinction among  beings.  But  the  idealists^ 
in  order  to  make  all  things  perfectly 
identical,  deny  this  formal  distinction. 
They  maintain  that  nothing  exists  in 
reality  either  as  forms  or  as  individuals, 
but  that  all  ideas  are  mere  abstractions, 
or  different  modes  in  which  beitig  is  suc- 
cessively apprehended  by  us.  Nothing 
exists  or  can  exist,  though  we  have  the  idea 
of  being  without  any  distinct  form,  unde- 
termined, neither  finite  nor  infinite,  neith- 
er matter  nor  spirit,  neither  one  nor  many. 
Hence,  this  being  is  nothing  in  itself. 
Hence,  there  is  no  created  being,  but 
being  is  ever  being  created,  no  being  is 
in  facto  esse,  but  all  is  in  Tof^ri.  Hence 
all    science    consists    in    asscrtincr    that 


CURIOUS  QUESTIONS.  173 

nothing  is.     This  system  is  called  Ideal- 
ism. 

We  shall  now  begin  to  refute  those 
systems,  and  we  shall  commence  with 
idealism,  for  a  reason  that  will  manifest 
itself  as  we  proceed.  We  must  prove, 
therefore,  firstly,  that  real  ideal  distinc- 
tions must  be  admitted  in  being,  and, 
consequently,  that  the  universal  identity 
of  idealism  is  false.  Secondly,  that  these 
distinct  terms  are  not  mere  forms  of  the 
same  personality,  but  distinct  persons  or 
individuals,  and  hence,  that  formalism  is 
wrong;  and  thirdly,  that  these  distinct 
individuals  can  not  exist  in  the  same  sub- 
stance, but  that  they  imply  a  plurality 
of  substances  and  the  consequent  rejection 
of  emanatism.  Thus  we  refute  the  three 
systems  inversely. 

FIEST   PEOPOSITIOW. 

Heal  distinctions  must  he  admitted  in 
heing  objectively  considered^  and  hence  the 
system  of  the  idealists  is  refuted.    To 


174  CUBIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

prove  ttis  assertion  we  Lave  only  to  olv 
serve  tliat  if  onr  intellect  sees  real  distinc- 
tions tliey  must  at  least  exist  subjectivel)'', 
and  so  must  have  objective  distinctions 
con'esponding  to  them.  Now,  it  is  clear 
that  there  are  such  subjective  distinctions. 
The  idealists  themselves  admit  it,  and  be- 
sides conscience  informs  us  of  the  fact. 
For  there  are  real  distinctions  where  there 
are  several  terms  so  distinct  from  each 
other  that  they  can  not  be  confounded 
without  contradiction.  Many  such  terms 
are  found  in  the  subjective  order.  In  the 
very  fact  of  thought  we  have  the  subject 
and  object  distinct,  which  we  can  not 
identify  without  destroying  the  possi- 
bility of  a  relation  between  them.  Again, 
the  subject  of  thought  has  consciousness 
of  itself  as  a  finite  being,  that  is  to  say  a 
•being  which  derives  its  existence  from 
another.  But  principle  or  cause  of  exist- 
ence, and  its  term  can  not  be  confounded 
without  contradiction.  Another  proof 
may  be  taken  from  the  fact  that  the  object 


CURIOUS  QUESTIONS.  175 

of  tliouglit  is  varied  in  terni  in  such  a 
way  that  one  term,  by  its  very  nature 
prevents  identity  with  another.  Thus, 
for  instance,  the  terms  finite  and  infinite, 
or  necessary  and  contingent.  Hence,  real 
distinctions  in  being  must  be  admitted  at 
least  in  the  subjective  order.  We  fur- 
thermore assert  that  these  subjective  dis- 
tinctions imply  real  objective  distinctions; 
for  objective  being  is  that  which  termi- 
nates our  intellect  or  what  our  intellect 
apprehends  in  thinking.  Hence,  things 
must  be  objectively  as  we  apprehend 
them  subjectively;  otherwise  the  same 
thins:  would  be  and  would  not  be  at  the 
same  time.  For  if  the  real  distinctions 
which  we  conceive  subjectively  had  no 
corresponding  objective  reality,  we  should 
be  obliged  to  admit  one  of  two  hypothe- 
ses— either  that  what  we  conceive  has  no 
reality  out  of  our  mind,  and  that  it  is  con- 
sequently identified  with  absolute  noth- 
ingness, or  that  it  is  the  mere  indetermi- 
nate being  which  the  idealists  make  it. 


176  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

But  neither  of  these  hypotheses  can  be 
maintained.  The  first  would  lead  us  into 
nihilism,  than  which  nothing  can  be  con- 
ceived more  absurd  or  contradictory. 
And  the  second  is  equally  absurd,  for 
either  our  mind  apprehends  things  as 
they  are  or  it  does  not.  If  it  apprehends 
things  as  they  are,  they  have  all  the  real- 
ity which  we  apprehend ;  and  if  it  does 
not,  we  can  afiirm  nothing  of  them,  not 
even  indeterminate  being,  for  every  affirm- 
ation has  its  foundation  in  the  truth  of 
our  mental  apprehension.  Besides,  in- 
determinate being  is  a  mere  abstraction 
having  no  reality.  For  every  thing  that 
exists  is  determined  in  some  way  or  other. 
The  idealists,  therefore,  can  not  avoid 
nihilism.  They  can  not  get  out  of  it  by 
saying  that  there  is  a  difference  between 
absolute  nothing  and  "  Ens  in  fierij''  for 
that  which  is  nothing  can  not  be  possible 
or  in  fieri.  But  it  may  be  objected  that 
unless  we  admit  the  hypothesis  of  the 
idealists  we  fall  into  a  manifest  contradic- 


CURIOUS  QUESTIONS.  177 

tion  by  supposing  tLe  object  of  the  intel- 
lect to  be  at  the  same  time  finite  and  in- 
finite, contingent  and  necessaiy,  material 
and  spiritual,  relative  and  absolute.  For 
the  object  of  thought  presents  itself  to 
our  mind  under  these  different  aspects. 
But  we  answer  that  those  different  ideas 
do  not  present  the  same  being  formally 
considered.  The  real  object  of  thought 
is  infinite  being,  and  presents  itself  to 
us  as  possessing  infinite  attributes.  But 
with  this  idea  of  the  infinite  we  perceive 
the  possible  existence  of  other  beings  dis- 
tinct in  character  and  attributes  from  in- 
finite being,  yet  dependent  on  it  as  their 
cause  and  creator.  Consequently  the  dif- 
ficulty does  not  hold,  and  the  system  of 
the  idealists  is  refuted. 

SECOND  PKOPOsinoisr. 

The  real  distinctions  which  must  he  ad- 
mitted ill  objective  heing  imply  the  possi- 
hility  or  existence  of  heings  distinct  from 
God,  at  least  in  their  personal  life,  and 


178  CUBIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

consequently,  the  personal  identity  of  all 
tilings  in  tlie  sense  of  the  formalists  must 
be  rejected.  Here  we  assert  two  things. 
First,  that  God  has  personal  life ;  and 
second,  that  there  are  other  beings  which 
either  actually  or  potentially  do  not  be- 
long to  this  personal  life.  To  have 
personal  life  three  things  are  necessary, 
namely.  First,  that  there  be  a  substance 
in  act.  Second,  that  this  substance  be 
not  subject  to  another  as  to  its  term  of 
imputability.  Third,  that  this  same  sub- 
stance be  conscious  of  its  own  power  and 
say  "  Z"  But  God  has  these  three  quali- 
ties. For,  in  the  first  place,  he  exists, 
and  is,  consequently,  a  substance  in  act. 
He  does  not  depend  on  any  other  sub- 
stance as  the  term  of  his  imputability, 
otherwise  he  would  not  be  infinite  or  su- 
preme being.  And  in  the  third  place,  he 
has  perfect  consciousness  of  himself;  for 
that  which  is  infinite  must  have  an  intel- 
lect ;  must  be  capable  of  being  understood 
and  of  biins:  loved:  and  as  in  infinite 


CURIOUS  QUESTIONS.  179 

being  tliere  is  all  good  and  all  truth, 
tlierc  must  be  consciousness  of  the  posses- 
sion of  those  perfections.  Otherwise  there 
would  be  something  wanting  in  the  infi- 
nite, and  this  we  know  can  not  be,  for 
that  which  is  infinite  has  no  defects. 
Therefore  in  God  there  is  personal  life. 
The  second  thing  to  prove  is,  that  there 
are  beings  actually  or  potentially  existing, 
yet  not  belonging  to  the  personal  life  of 
God.  For  we  apprehend,  both  subject- 
ively and  objectively,  finite  beings  as  well 
as  the  infinite.  We  are  conscious  of  their 
existence  subjectively,  for  we  are  aware 
that  our  existence  is  limited ;  and  object- 
ively, we  conceive  the  possibility  of  limi- 
tation in  being.  Now,  beings  of  this 
kind  can  not  be  in  the  personal  life  of 
God ;  for  if  they  were,  their  union  with 
this  personal  life  could  be  explained  only 
in  one  of  two  ways.  They  would  either 
be  constitutive  parts  of  his  life,  so  that 
his  life  could  not  be  conceived  without 
them,  or  God  by  a  free  act  would  unite 


180  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

them  to  his  life,  and  make  tliem  partici- 
pate in  his  natui'e.  Now,  the  jfirst  mode 
of  existence  is  impossible.  For  according 
to  this  hypothesis  the  idea  of  God  would 
necessarily  be  connected  with  the  idea  of 
finite  beings.  Nor  could  we  then  con- 
ceive God  as  absolutely  distinct  from 
other  beings.  For  a  being  can  not  be 
conceived  independent  of  its  constitutive 
parts.  But  God  is  complete  in  his  es- 
sence without  relation  to  finite  objects, 
and  his  idea  logically  precedes  the  idea 
of  finite  beings,  and  consequently  these 
finite  beings  can  not  be  constitutive  parts 
of  God's  personal  life.  Besides,  tlie  per- 
sonal life  of  God  is  infinite  and  can  not 
be  made  up  of  finite  parts ;  for  that  which 
is  made  up  of  finite  parts  is  limited,  and 
that  which  is  limited  is  not  infinite.  As 
to  the  second  hypotliesis,  it  is  possible ; 
indeed,  we  know  by  faith  that  such  a 
union  actually  does  take  place  in  the 
mystery  of  the  Incarnation.  But  such  a 
anion  is  a  gift.     It  is  not  something  that 


CUEIOUS  QUESTIONS.  181 

happens  by  the  nature  of  things.  It  is 
effected  by  a  free  act  of  the  Infinite. 

But  it  may  be  said  by  the  formalists 
that  finite  beings  pertain  to  the  personal 
life  of  God  as  forms  or  determinations  or 
mere  manifestations  of  this  life. 

This,  however,  is  equally  objectionable ; 
for,  by  the  fact  that  they  are  conceived 
as  distinct  beings,  they  are  distinct  indi- 
viduals, and  have  distinct  personal  life 
of  their  own.  Now,  that  which  has 
personal  life  of  its  own  can  not  be  a  mere 
form,  determination,  or  manifestation  of 
the  personal  life  of  another ;  consequently 
the  proposition  as  it  has  been  enunciated 
is  true  in  every  particular. 

THIED   PEOPOSITION. 

Beings  distinct  from  God  in  tTieir  per- 
sonal  life  must  he  distinct  from  Mm  in 
substance^  and  hence  the  substantial 
identity  of  the  emanatists  must  be  re- 
jected. 

The  difference  between  substance  and 


182  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

person  is  that  tlie  former  is  the  support 
of  the  latter.  Personal  life  is  the  act 
of  determination  of  a  substance  conscious 
of  itself,  and  whose  acts  are  not  impu- 
table to  another.  And  substance  is  the 
very  force  which  is  put  in  act,  or  rather 
whose  act  is  constituted  by  the  peculiar 
determination  called  personal  life.  We 
shall,  therefore,  prove  our  assertion  if  we 
show  that  the  same  active  force  which 
is  the  subject  of  the  infinite  act,  which 
constitutes  God's  personal  life,  can  not 
be  at  the  same  time  the  subject  of  the 
finite  acts  which  constitute  the  personal 
life  of  beings  distinct  from  God.  For 
the  contraiy  of  this  assertion  could  only 
happen  in  one  of  two  ways — either  by 
the  division  of  this  infinite  force,  or  by 
its  undivided  co-possession.  In  the  first 
case,  the  substances  of  the  beings  dis- 
tinct from  the  divine  act  would  be  so 
many  parts  of  the  active  force  which  con- 
stitutes the  personal  life  of  God.  These 
parts  would  be  contained  at  first  indis- 


CUEIOUS  QUESTIONS.  183 

tinctly  in  the  infinite  force,  so  tliat  they 
would  form  only  one  substance ;  and  the 
j)roduction  of  finite  beings  would  consist 
in  God's  taking  away  one  or  more  of 
these  parts,  by  a  division  of  his  substance, 
from  his  own  act,  and  giving  it  a  new 
determination,  and,  consequently,  distinct 
life.  Thus,  as  the  emanatists  say,  crea- 
tures would  come  from  God  like  the 
web  from  a  spider,  or  the  thread  from  a 
silkworm.  In  the  other  way,  that  is  to 
say  by  co-possession,  the  divine  substance 
remaining  undivided,  would  be  at  the 
same  time  the  substance  of  finite  beings.. 
In  this  case,  to  have  other  beings  created, 
nothing  is  required  but  the  j^roduction  of 
new  determinations  in  the  active  force 
which  makes  the  personal  life  of  God. 
By  means  of  these  determinations  the 
substance  of  God,  at  the  same  time  that 
it  retains  its  own  act,  is  terminated  by 
other  acts,  and  as  it  were  co-possessed. 
Hence  in  creation  something  would  hap- 
pen similar  to  what  takes  place  eternally 


184  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

in  God,  where  tlie  undivided  substance  of 
the  deity  is  co-possessed  by  three  distinct 
persons.  But  neither  of  these  two  modes 
of  explaining  the  system  of  the  emana- 
tists  can  stand  the  test  of  truth.  For 
the  first  mode  supposes  two  absurdities. 
Firstly,  that  the  iindivided  divine  act  has 
a  divisible  substance  under  it.  Secondly, 
that  parts  may  be  taken  from  this  sub- 
stance to  be  the  subject  of  new  determi- 
nations. Now  wherever  there  is  divisi- 
bility there  is  multiplicity;  and  as  the 
act  of  God  is  supposed  to  be  divisible, 
Ms  substance  must  be  multiple  also,  and 
there  must  be  multiplicity  of  acts.  Act 
is  the  determination  of  substance,  or 
rather  it  is  substance  itself  determined. 
Hence  a  determination  is  nothing  real  out 
of  the  force  which  underlies  it.  Con- 
sequently where  this  force  is  found  mul- 
tiple, the  deteiminations  of  it  must  also 
be  multiply.  It  is,  therefore,  repugnant 
that  one  act,  or  determination  in  exist- 
ence, should  be  supported  by  many  active 


CURIOUS  QUESTIONS.  185 

forces  instead  of  one.  Consequently  tlie 
first  hypothesis  falls  to  the  ground.  Nor 
can  the  second  be  better  defended ;  for  if 
the  divine  act,  or  existence,  could  lose  any 
part  of  its  substance,  it  would  be  pos- 
sible to  separate  an  active  force  from  its 
actual  state^  or  determination  in  exist- 
ence, and  the  force  itself  would  be  some- 
thing independently  real  and  concrete. 
But  this  consequence  is  opposed  to  the 
true  notion  of  substance;  for  just  as 
there  is  no  existing  determination  with- 
out a  substance,  so  there  is  no  substance 
without  a  determination.  Besides,  in  this 
hypothesis,  God  could  lose  some  of  his 
being,  which  is  contrary  to  the  notions 
we  have  of  his  infinity  and  immutability. 
The  other  hypothesis  is  equally  erroneous, 
namely,  that  the  active  force  of  God  re- 
maining undivided  could,  at  the  same 
time,  constitute  the  active  force  of  other 
beings  by  co-possession.  For  the  deter- 
mination of  any  active  force  does  not 
differ  from  its  exercise ;  indeed,  it  is  this 


186  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

force  itself  manifesting  itself  in  act.  Now 
if  this  be  time,  either  the  force  of  God 
would  be  completely  expended  in  each  of 
the  finite  beings  which  would  co-possess 
it,  or  it  would  be  completely  expended 
in  none  of  them,  but  in  their  collection; 
or  finally,  it  would  be  completely  expend- 
ed in  one  of  these,  and  incompletely  in 
others.  But  each  of  these  three  hypo- 
theses is  absurd.  In  the  first  place,  there 
is  no  difference  between  one  comj^lete 
manifestation  of  a  force  and  another ;  is 
it  not,  therefore,  a  contradiction  of  terms 
to  suppose  at  the  same  time  several  com- 
plete manifestations  of  the  same  force  in 
different  beings?  Besides,  in  the  first 
hypothesis,  each  of  these  manifestations 
would  be  God,  which  is  another  absurd- 
ity. And  if  the  second  hypothesis  be 
maintained,  each  of  the  manifestations 
would  be  finite ;  and  hence  God  as  infinite 
being  will  be  supposed  without  personal 
life,  since  a  finite  manifestation  can  not 
express  infinite  personal  life 


CURIOUS  QUESTIONS.  187 

Moreover,  this  hypothesis  would  make 
us  admit  multiplicity  of  parts  in  God. 
For  if  there  be  several  existences  or  beings 
in  act,  different  in  their  nature  and  inde- 
pendent of  each  other,  they  can  not  be 
manifestations  of  the  same  force,  but  of 
different  forces.  The  same  distinction 
that  exists  among  them  must  exist  among 
their  forces.  Nor  is  the  third  supposi- 
tion more  tenable  than  the  other  two, 
.namely,  that  it  would  manifest  itself  com- 
pletely in  one  and  incompletely  in  an- 
other. For  there  is  a  contradiction  in 
supposing  that  the  same  active  force  may 
be  and  not  be  completely  manifested  in 
the  same  act  at  the  same  moment.  And 
yet  this  contradiction  is  implied  in  the 
third  supposition.  For,  according  to  it, 
the  substance  of  God  would  be  shown 
forth  in  several  acts  or  existences  at  the 
same  time,  being  in  one  of  them  complete 
and  in  the  others  incomplete.  Hence,  the 
divine  substance  would  have  a  complete 
act,  and  yet  it  would  not  be  complete. 


188  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

For  it  would  not  be  complete  in  many 
other  acts.  Therefore,  we  conclude  that 
beings  which  are  separated  from  God  in 
their  personal  life  must  be  also  separated 
from  him  in  their  substance,  and  conse- 
quently emanatism  is  false. 

Several  objections  are  made  by  pan- 
theists against  us.  For  instance,  they  say 
that,  according  to  Christian  faith,  there  are 
three  distinct  persons  in  God  in  the  same 
substance;  and  if  this  be  not  qibsurd, 
neither  is  it  absurd  to  suppose  the  sub- 
stance of  God  co-possessed  by  an  infinite 
number  of  persons. 

We  answer  this  difficulty  by  denying 
the  parity.  For  the  three  persons  of  the 
Trinity  are  not  three  acts  or  three  inde- 
pendent determinations  of  the  divine  sub- 
stance, but  only  distinct  terms,  none  of 
which  is  complete  without  the  others,  as 
the  three  are  essentially  necessary  to  the 
nature  of  God.  But  this  is  not  the  case 
with  the  co-possession  of  the  emanatists. 
For  the  co-possessing  beings  would  in 


CUEIOUS  QUESTIONS.  189 

their  system  be  real  and  separate  acts  of 
the  same  substance,  and  this  hypothesis 
we  have  refuted. 

It  is  objected,  in  the  second  place,  that 
every  being  produced  by  another  must 
be  a  mere  mode  of  its  producer,  and  hence 
the  anti-pantheistic  idea  of  creation  is  ab- 
surd. For  if  the  being  produced  be  not 
a  mere  mode  of  its  cause,  either  the  cause 
and  effect  have  the  same  attributes  or 
they  have  not.  If  they  have  the  same 
attributes,  they  are  identical;  and  if  they 
have  not  the  same  attributes,  how  can  we 
suppose  the  cause  to  give  its  effect  at- 
tributes which  the  cause  does  not  possess  ? 
We  answer,  in  the  first  place,  by  observ- 
ing that  herein  lies  the  mystery  of  crea- 
tion ;  which  being  a  fact  well  attested  by 
reason,  can  not  be  given  up  because  of 
obscurity  met  with  in  trying  to  under- 
stand it.  The  sun  is  still  the  sun  though 
clouds  may  obscure  its  shining.  Besides, 
in  fact  it  is  no  more  difficult  for  us  to  ex- 
plain tlie  production  of  one  substance  by 


190  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

anotter  than  for  the  pantheists  to  explain 
the  production  of  modes  by  a  substance. 
And  now  that  we  have  made  this  remark, 
we  answer  the  difficulty  directly  by  say- 
ing that  it  is  neither  tiTie  nor  certain  that 
because  the  producer  and  produced  have 
the  same  attributes  they  are  therefore 
identical.  For  to  be  identical  they  must 
have  the  same  existence  and  essence. 
And  as  to  the  second  hypothesis,  it  is 
true  the  cause  must  have  the  reality 
which  it  gives  to  the  effect ;  but  the  cause 
may  have  this  reality  in  a  different  way, 
or  in  a  different  degree  from  the  effect. 

It  is  again  objected  that  finite  beings, 
from  the  very  fact  that  they  participate 
in  the  nature  of  infinite  being,  must  be 
identified  with  it.  For  only  that  being 
is  distinct  and  separate  from  infinite  being 
which  in  no  ways  participates  in  it. 

Tliis  we  deny.  Participation  is  not 
identity ;  it  is  only  similitude,  whicli  will 
be  greater  or  less  according  to  the  degree 
of  participation. 


CURIOUS  QUESTIONS.  191 

It  is  finally  objected  that  unless  we 
admit  the  theory  of  pantheism  we  must 
deny  the  infinity  of  God.  For  if  God  be 
infinite  he  must  contain  all  being,  and 
hence  there  can  be  no  being  out  of  him. 
In  a  word,  let  us  suppose  the  being  of 
God  to  -be  represented  by  the  letter  X, 
and  the  being  of  creatures  by  the  letter 
Y.  If  we  suppose  Y  not  to  be  included 
in  JfJ  as  we  do ;  then  JC,  the  infinite,  will 
be  less  than  Jr+  Y.  In  other  words,  JT 
will  be,  at  the  same  time  infinite  and  not 
infinite.  It  will  be  infinite  as  it  is  sup- 
posed, and  it  will  not  be  infinite  since  it 
will  not  contain  the  beinsc  Y. 

We  answer  this  difficulty  by  observing 
that  the  expression  Jr+  3^>  JTis  only  true 
when  Y  adds  something  to  the  intrinsic 
value  of  jr.  In  the  present  case  Y  adds 
nothing  to  X  intrinsically  but  only  exten- 
sively. A  man,  for  instance,  who  has 
several  copies  of  the  same  book,  has  not 
more  science,  by  this  fact,  than  he  who 
has  only  one  copy.     X  possesses  in  an 


192  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

eminent  degree  all  the  perfections  con- 
tained in  Y;  for  Y'\b  an  exemplar  struck 
off  from  its  type  whicli  is  in  X.  Of  course 
there  is  a  natural  mystery  in  the  distinc- 
tion caused  by  creation  between  JTand  Y. 
In  this  answer  the  natural  mystery  is 
supposed,  but  in  the  opinion  of  the  pan- 
theists there  is  an  absurdity  implied; 
since  the  being  JTcan  not  be  infinite^  for 
it  has  finite  parts,  namely,  Y. 


Question    Thirteenth. 
what  is  beauty  in  art  ? 

|HEN  we  beLold  certain  objects 
either  in  nature  or  in  art,  as  a 
landscape,  a  palace,  or  a  statue, 
we  experience  in  the  first  place  a  sensa- 
tion accompanied  with  the  idea  of  some 
excellence  in  the  object.  Secondly,  we 
pronounce  it  to  be  pretty,  handsome, 
beautiful,  or  sublime.  Finally,  we  expe- 
rience a  certain  pleasure  in  our  soul  which 
incites  us  to  love  the  object  contemplated. 
And  those  three  phenoinena  give  us  the 
psychological  analysis  of  what  is  called 
the  aesthetic  taste.  Let  us  then  endeavor 
to  expose  the  systems  of  different  au- 
thors reo:ardin2:  the  nature  of  the  beau- 
tiful;  and  secondly,  let  us  give  its  true 


194  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

notion.  Many  indeed  are  the  systems  of 
different  authors  regarding  the  nature  of 
the  beautiful.  Some  identify  it  with 
utility  I  some  place  it  in  novelty  or  cus- 
tom; some  in  magnitude  or  exaggera- 
tion  /  others  in  imitation  or  illusion ;  in 
jproportion  of  parts,  or  in  unity  joined  to 
vaHety.  Let  us  expose,  in  the  fii'st  place, 
the  system  of  utility. 

A  thing  is  said  to  be  useful  when  it  is 
advantageous  to  us,  that  is,  when  it  sat- 
isfies our  natural  wants,  or  procures  us 
pleasure.  An  object  may  be  useful  either 
in  the  present  or  in  the  future,  as  we  en- 
joy it  actually  or  only  in  hope.  It  may 
be  immediately  or  mediately  useful,  ac- 
cording as  it  gives  us  immediate  pleasure 
or  is  only  the  means  by  which  we  may 
procure  objects  capable  of  imparting 
pleasure.  Thus  the  fruit  which  we  eat 
is  useful  in  the  present ;  the  fruit  as  yet 
unplucked  from  the  tree  is  an  example 
of  the  future  usefuL  In  both  cases, 
whether  we  eat  it  or  only  have  the  ex- 


CUEIOUS  QUESTIONS.  195 

pectatioa  of  consuming  it  or  enjoying  it, 
it  is  immediately  useful,  wliile  the  money 
with  which  we  may  procure  it  is  only  me- 
diately useful. 

Thus  far  the  whole  utilitarian 
school  agree ;  but  now  they  begin  to  di- 
verge into  many  systems.  The  sensual- 
ists make  beauty  consist  in  present  and 
immediate  utility;  thus  identifying  the 
beautiful  with  the  sensible  impression 
which  objects  incite  in  us.  According  to 
this  system  things  are  beautiful  when 
they  give  us  pleasant  sensations;  ugly, 
when  the  impressions  produced  are  not 
pleasant.  Hence  beauty  and  deformity 
are  mere  sensible  facts  with  which  reason 
or  idea  has  nothing  to  do. 

Hence,  it  is  impossible  to  make  any 
theory  on  the  beautiful,  or  try  to  deter- 
mine, a  priori,  why  external  objects  af- 
fect us  pleasantly  or  unpleasantly.  There- 
fore the  two  latter  elements  of  36sthetic 
taste  mentioned  above  are  rejected;  for 
the -sensualists  admit  no  judgment  or  aos- 


196  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

thetic  sense  as  distinguished  from  the  first 
impression  of  an  object,  in  their  psycho- 
logical analysis  of  the  beautiful. 

Others  of  the  sensualist  school  make 
beauty  consist  in  the  future  useful,  whe- 
ther mediate  or  immediate.  They  ex- 
plain their  theory  thus :  When  an  object 
is  presented  to  our  regard,  it  impresses  a 
beautiful  sensation  upon  us,  and  either 
by  the  force  of  the  impression  itself,  or 
by  calling  in  the  aid  of  the  memoiy,  we 
pronounce  the  object  to  be  either  useful 
or  useless  and  injurious. 

If  we  judge  it  useful,  we  desire  to  en- 
joy it,  and  hence  it  is  beautiful.  If  it  be 
useless,  we  experience  no  aesthetic  sense 
whatever ;  we  are  moved  towards  it  nei- 
ther by  feelings  of  admiration  nor  dis- 
like. And  if  we  judge  it  to  be  iujurious, 
we  shrink  from  it,  we  abhor  it,  and  call 
it  ugly  or  deformed.  Thus  ripe  crops  in 
the  fields  or  trees  laden  with  fi'uit  are 
beautiful,  because  they  are  useful ;  whilst 
a  shipwreck,  or  any  thing  else  betokening 


CURIOUS  QUESTIONS.  197 

destruction,  is  ugly  because  it  is  or  may 
be  injurious  to  us.  Thus  far  tbe  second 
school  of  utilitarians. 

In  order  to  refute  both  opinions 
we  establish  the  following  proposition 
The  beautiful  or  the  deformed  in  nature 
does  not  consist  in  the  pleasant  or  un 
pleasant  impressions  made  on  us  hy  sen 
sible  objects.  To  prove  this  proposition 
we  remark,  in  the  first  place,  that  the  im 
pressions  produced  on  us  by  external  ob 
jects  are  entirely  subjective  and  relative, 
depending  on  the  peculiarity  of  each  in 
dividuaPs  mind,  and  having  no  existence 
in  the  objects  themselves.  But  when  we 
judge  a  thing  to  be  beautiful,  we  sup- 
pose something  objective  and  absolute  in 
beauty ;  we  are  persuaded  that  beauty  is 
in  the  object,  and  that  it  would  exist 
ev§n  though  the  impressions  should  cease 
to  exist.  Consequently  we  can  not  iden- 
tify beauty  with  our  sensible  impressions. 
Besides,  unity  is  one  of  the  conditions  of 
the  beautiful ;  thus,  that  a  house  may  be 


198  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

"beautiful  it  must  constitute  one  whole  be- 
ing, though  having  several  distinct  parts ; 
but  unity  is  altogether  an  intellectual  con-, 
ception  which  no  sensible  impression  can 
give  us.  For  unity  essentially  expresses 
either  a  relation  of  parts  to  a  whole  or 
of  parts  to  each  other.  Now  the  notion 
of  such  relation  sensibility  can  not  give ; 
for  it  is  the  nature  of  this  faculty  to  give 
us  as  many  impressions  as  there  are  parts 
in  the  external  object.  And  again  the  same 
species  of  beauty  is  found  in  objects 
giving  entirely  different  impressions. 
For  instance,  the  solemn  music  of  a 
church  choir,  the  pomp  of  the  ceremonies, 
and  the  religious  architecture  of  the  build- 
ing excite  the  same  species  of  aesthetic  feel- 
ings in  us,  and  have  a  relation  to  each  other ; 
while  the  music  of  the  opera,  the  archi- 
tecture of  a  theatre,  and  the  mazes  of  the 
ballet,  though  giving  similar  impressions, 
and  though  beautiful  in  themselves, 
would  be  out  of  place  in  the  sanctuary, 
because  the  beautiful  is  different  in  both 


CXJEIOUS  QUESTIONS.  199 

cases.  But  this  difference  is  inexplicable 
in  the  system  which  we  are  refuting. 
For  if  beauty  consists  only  in  the  sen- 
sible impression  produced  in  us  by  an 
object,  any  two  objects  would  be  beauti- 
ful only  in  case  the  impressions  produced 
were  alike:  but  this  would  not  hold 
good  in  the  examples  cited;-  for  what 
similarity  is  there  between  the  sounds  of 
the  music  and  the  colors  of  the  objects 
mentioned  ?  This  opinion  may  be  refut- 
ed also  by  considering  how  the  aesthetic 
faculty  acts.  For  according  to  the  sys- 
tem which  we  are  discussing,  whenever 
the  impression  is  the  same,  the  sesthetical 
judgment  should  be  the  same.  But  this 
does  not  happen.  For  in  the  first  place, 
if  we  suppose  two  men,  one  a  connoisseur 
and  the  other  not,  to  examine  a  painting 
of  some  excellence,  the  sensible  impres- 
sion produced  will  be  the  same  in  both 
cases,  yet  evidently  the  aesthetical  judg- 
ment will  not  be  identical,  for  that  of 
the  connoisseur  will  show  a  greater  ap- 


200  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

preciation  of  beauty  than  that  of  his  less 
skilled  companion ;  therefore  the  sesthet- 
ical  object  can  not  be  identified  with  the 
sensible  impression. 

Secondly,  the  pesthetical  faculty  may 
be  educated  by  the  exercise  of  attention 
and  with  the  aid'of  documents.  Hence, 
the  beautiful  does  not  consist  in  the  im- 
pression produced  by  the  objects ;  for  if 
such  were  the  case,  the  judgment  of  the 
beauty  of  an  object  could  not  be  changed 
without  changing  the  sensible  impression ; 
but  we  know  by  experience  that  many  an 
object  which  for  a  long  time  may  not 
have  pleased  us,  finally  gives  us  sesthetical 
delight,  without  any  change  of  the  im- 
pression having  been  produced.  Finall}'-, 
from  the  fact  that  men  dispute  daily 
about  the  beautiful  or  deformed,  we  may 
conclude  that  neither  consists  in  the  plea- 
sant or  unpleasant  impressions  produced 
in  us  by  external  objects.  For  as  these 
impressions  are  merely  subjective,  it  Avould 
be  folly  to  dispute  about  the  fact  wheth- 


CUEIOUS  QUESTIONS.  201 

er  they  were  pleasant  or  unpleasant,  since 
it  would  depend  on  each  individual's  pri- 
vate appreciation,  against  which  no  argu- 
ments would  avail.  Nor  can  it  be  ob- 
jected in  favor  of  this  opinion  that  the 
presence  of  beautiful  objects  affects  us 
pleasantly,  while  the  presence  of  deformed 
objects  affects  us  unpleasantly,  and  that 
this  phenomenon  is  therefore  the  effect 
of  the  sensible  impression  produced ;  for 
this  is  confounding  the  cause  with  the 
effect.  It  is  the  idea  of  the  beautiful  that 
produces  the  SDsthetical  judgment.  The 
impression  is  the  result  and  not  the  cause 
of  the  beautiful. 

In  the  second  place,  we  assert  that  the 
notion  of  the  beautiful  consists  neither  in 
the  mediate  nor  the  immediate  futv/re  utility 
of  objects.  This  assertion  is  the  opposite 
of  utilitarianism — a  system  which  is  par- 
tially the  result  of  the  philosophy  of  the 
materialists  of  the  last  century.  In  the 
first  place,  we  observe  that  there  are  many 
objects  useful  which  are  not  beautiful; 


202  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

for  instance,  tlie  tools  of  workmen  and 
artisans.  Besides,  if  we  identify  tlie 
beautiful  with  the  useful,  it  will  follow 
that  the  more  useful  the  object  is,  the 
more  beautiful  it  will  be.  But  experi- 
ence teaches  this  -to  be  false.  For  instance, 
antique  vases  are  much  less  useful  for 
drinking  purposes  than  modern  goblets, 
yet  not,  on  that  account,  less  beautiful. 
And  this  same  principle  holds  in  archi- 
tecture, for  it  is  not  always  the  most  com- 
modious or  useful  house  that  is  the  most 
beautiful.  Again,  a  fruit-tree  is  more 
useful  to  the  possessor  than  to  the  travel- 
er who  contemplates  it,  yet  it  is  equally 
beautiful  to  both.  Again,  it  would  fol- 
low from  the  utilitarian  system  that  those 
would  be  the  best  connoisseurs  of  beauty 
who  would  be  the  best  judges  of  utility. 
But  experience  shows  that  utilitarians 
have  generally  no  taste  for  beauty,  while 
the  admirers  of  beauty  are  usually  poor 
judges  of  utility.  Hence,  countries  like 
our  own,  in  which  the  utilitaiian  spirit 


CUKIOUS  QUESTIONS.  203 

prevails,  seldom  attain  to  'great  eminence 
in  tlie  cultivation  of  tlie  fine  arts.  More- 
over, according  to  the  system  we  are  re- 
futing, we  should  first  see  if  any  thing  be 
useful  before  pronouncing  it  to  be  beau- 
tiful. Now,  this  does  not  happen.  For 
when  the  same  object  is  useful  and  beau- 
tiful, we  judge  it  to  be  beautiful  without 
thinking  expressly  of  its  utility.  In  fact 
we  can  hardly  consider  a  thing  as  useful 
without  making  an  abstraction  of  its 
beauty.  For  instance,  I  may  look  at  a 
tree  and  consider  it  beautiful  without  at- 
tending to  its  utility.  But  when  I  begin 
to  think  that  its  branches,  its  wood,  may 
serve  to  make  a  fire  and  warm  me,  the 
tree  loses  its  beauty.  And,  in  like  man- 
ner, the  symmetry  and  order  of  the  viands 
disposed  on  the  table  for  a  banquet  may 
afford  us  a  beautiful  spectacle;  but  if, 
pressed  by  hunger,  we  think  how  useful 
they  are  to  satisfy  the  cravings  of  our  ap- 
petite, beauty  vanishes  and  utility  takes 
its  place. 


204:  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

Hence,  the  useful  and  the  beautiful  are 
distinct,  and  in  some  way  opposed,  at 
least  as  objects  of  thought.  We  must 
observe,  however,  in  conclusion,  that  al- 
thousrh  the  useful  does  not  constitute  the 
foundation  of  ojar  sesthetical  judgments, 
it  has  often  a  part  in  them.  For  it  some- 
times happens  that  an  object,  beautiful  in 
itself,  fails  to  excite  any  sesthetical  feeling 
in  us  on  account  of  some  injurious  pro- 
perty it  may  possess  or  because  of  some 
danger  connected  with  it.  In  this  case 
the  aesthetical  feeling  is  kept  in  the  back- 
ground by  the  injury  that  is  threatened. 
Thus,  a  man  whose  house  is  on  fire  does 
not  think  much  of  the  beauty  of  the  con- 
flagration, nor  does  he  contemplate  the 
spectacle  with  sesthetical  feelings,  but 
rather  his  mind  is  occupied  with  the  loss 
he  sustains.  But  even  in  this  case  the 
spectacle  of  the  burning  mass  does  not 
cease  to  be  beautiful  if  not  sublime. 

The  next  system  is  that  which  identi- 
fies beauty  with  novelty  or  with  habitual 


CURIOUS  QUESTIONS.  205 

familiarity.  Here  we  have  two  systems 
rather  than  one,  for  continued  familiarity 
is  directly  opposed  to  novelty;  but  we 
discuss  both  together,  as  the  observations 
to  be  made  on  both  are  alike. 

Regarding  the  system  of  novelty,  we 
remark  that  new  things  naturally  please 
us,  and  gradually,  as  we  become  more 
familiar  with  them,  the  pleasure  first  ex- 
perienced decreases,  till,  after  long  posses- 
sion, it  ends  in  disgust. 

Beauty  then  is  in  novelty  and  deformity 
in  long  possession,  say  the  partisans  of 
this  system.  Hence,  beauty  and  deform- 
ity are  not  qualities  inherent  in  objects ; 
they  are  merely  extrinsic  and  accidental 
relations. 

The  partisans  of  the  other  system  say 
that  experience  teaches  that  we  are  pleas- 
ed with  old  and  familiar  thinj^s.  What 
at  first  sight  displeased  us  gradually 
grows  pleasant  to  the  sight,  and  hence 
custom  or  habit  is  the  cause  of  beauty, 
and  novelty  the  cause  of  deformity.     For 


206  CUBIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

instance,  the  deformity  "whicli  the  Cauca- 
sian race  finds  in  the  dark  hue  of  the  Af- 
rican's skin  is  something  which  would 
entirely  disappear  by  practical  miscegena- 
tion. 

Now,  we  admit  the  truth  of  the  facts 
alleged  by  the  partisans  of  these  systems, 
but  at  the  same  time  we  deny  the  infer- 
ence deduced  from  them.  We  assert  that 
neither  novelty  nor  continued  familiarity 
gives  the  true  notion  of  beauty.  We 
shall,  however,  attempt  to  show  the  vari- 
ous effects  of  novelty  and  familiarity,  and 
reconcile  the  apparent  contradictions  al- 
leged by  the  partisans  of  each  system. 

If  beauty  were  identified  either  vdih 
novelty  or  with  familiarity,  these  three  as- 
sertions would  be  true,  namely,«first,  every 
thing  beautiful  should  be  new  or  it  should 
be  old ;  second,  every  thing  new  or  eveiy 
thing  old  should  be  beautiful ;  and  third, 
in  both  systems  the  beautiful  should  con- 
sist in  the  mere  accidental  and  extrinsic 
relation  of  objects.    But  experience  shows 


CURIOUS  QUESTIONS.  207 

that  these  three  assertions  are  false.  For, 
in  the  first  place,  many  things  are  beauti- 
ful which  are  not  new,  which  have  not 
novelty.  For  instance,  the  starry  sky, 
which  we  have  been  contemplating  from 
our  childhood.  And  in  fact,  many  things 
arei  beautiful  to  us,  because  we  have  been 
long  familiar  with  them,  and  on  the  other 
hand,  many  things  are  beautiful  which 
are  not  familiar.  We  see  beauty  in  them 
at  the  first  glance.  In  the  second  place, 
all  new  or  familiar  things  are  not  beauti- 
ful ;  for  some  new  things  are  indifferent, 
others  appear  beautiful,  and  others  ugly, 
simply  because  they  are  new ;  while  many 
objects  do  not  appear  more  beautiful  to 
us  after  long  familiarity  with  them  than 
they  did  when  we  first  became  acquainted 
with  them. 

Thirdly,  we  apprehend  beauty  in  the 
object  as  something  absolute,  and  not  de- 
pending on  our  mind.  Thus,  a  landscape 
in  May  would  be  beautiful,  though  we 
were  not  living   to  behold  it.     Conse- 


208  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

quently  "beauty  does  not  consist  in  a 
mere  accidental  or  extrinsic  relation  of 
objects  to  each  other  or  to  us,  and  hence 
neither  novelty,  nor  habit,  nor  custom,  nor 
long-continued  familiarity  constitutes  the 
beautiful. 

Yet  there  are  certain  sesthetical  effl^cts 
produced  in  the  mind  by  novelty  and  fa- 
miliarity. Novelty  produces  two  effects 
in  tbe  mind.  Firstly,  it  puts  the  mind 
in  a  new  state  of  existence.  Secondly,  it 
excites  the  mind  more  vividly  in  that 
state.  Hence,  there  are  as  many  kinds  of 
novelty  as  there  are  states  of  the  mind. 
Thus,  there  is  novelty  for  the  intellect, 
when  it  begins  to  know  what  has  hither- 
to been  unknown  to  it,  or  when  it  knows 
an  object  in  many  ways  after  having 
known  it  only  in  one.  And  there  is  no- 
velty for  the  sensibility  when  we  have  a 
feeling  not  experienced  before.  Hence, 
there  may  be  novelty  in  our  perception 
of  objects,  whether  beautiful,  ugly,  or  de- 
formed.   If  we  ask  the  reason  why  the 


CUEIOUS  QUESTIONS.  209 

mind  is  excited  so  vividly  by  novelty,  the 
answer  is,  tliat  the  vivacity  of  our  affec- 
tions depends  upon  the  degree  of  atten- 
tion we  give  the  object.  If  there  be  inat- 
tention, there  will  be  neither  joy  nor  sor- 
row. Hence,  when  we  wish  to  divert  the 
mind  of  a  friend  from  grief,  we  advise 
him  not  to  think  of  it ;  that  is  to  say,  not 
to  give  it  his  attention.  A  new  object, 
therefore,  excites  attention,'  and  hence  ex- 
cites the  mind;  but,  when  We  become 
accustomed  to  the  object,  our  attention 
gradually  flags  and  our  mind  grows  cool. 
Hence,  familiarity  or  custom  produces  an 
effect  directly  contrary  to  that  of  novelty. 
Should  we  ask  now  the  cause  of  these  ef- 
fects, we  shall  find  it  first,  in  the  nature  of 
the  object ;  and  second,  in  the  peculiar  dis- 
position of  the  subject.  The  object  may  be 
either  pleasant,  unpleasant,  or  indifferent. 
If  the  object  be  agreeable,  then  the  plea- 
sure caused  by  it  will  be  greater  by  no- 
velty and  weaker  by  familiarity.  In  this 
case  imdoubtedly  novelty  is  the  cause  of 


210  CTTRIOirS  QUESTIONS. 

beauty.  But  if  the  object  be  disagree- 
able in  itself,  tbe  unpleasant  impression 
produced  by  its  novelty  will  gi-adually 
melt  away  with  custom  or  familianty. 
And  if  tbe  object  be  neither  agreeable 
nor  disagreeable,  neither  novelty  nor  fa- 
miliarity will  enhance  its  aesthetic  impres- 
sion. As  to  the  other  cause  of  the  effect 
of  novelty  or  familiarity,  namely,  the  dis- 
position of  the  subject,  we  remark  that 
there  are  two  dispositions,  apparently  op- 
posed, which  have  great  influence  on  the 
aesthetic  taste  as  to  objects  new  or  old. 
One  of  these  dispositions  is  the  love  of 
perfectibility;  the  other  the  love  of  re- 
pose. We  all  desire  to  be  perfect,  and 
hence  we  desire  that  which  may  either 
increase  our  knowledge  or  our  happiness, 
while,  at  the  same  time,  we  love  our  ease, 
and  are  naturally  averse  to  labor.  But, 
as  in  the  present  state  of  existence,  there 
is  no  perfection  possible  without  toil  and 
trouble,  our  love  of  ease  and  desire  of 
perfectibility  can  not  be  satisfied  at  the 


CU-RIOUS  QUESTIONS.  211 

same  time  in  this  life,  and,  consequently, 
one  must  preponderate  over  the  other, 
according  to  the  different  temperaments  of 
individuals.  Hence,  one  class  of  men  love 
novelty,  another  dislike  or  fear  it,  and 
are  pleased  only  with  what  is  old.  In  the 
one  the  love  of  perfectibility  predominates, 
hence  they  love  new  things  and  detest 
routine.  Young  people  are  generally  of 
this  character,  for  their  love  of  knowledge 
and  their  activity  are  great;  while  old 
persons,  being  swayed  by  the  love  of  re- 
pose, distrust  what  is  new,  for  they  fear 
lest  it  should  trouble  their  long-cherished 
theories  and  thus  disturb  their  equanimi- 
ty. The  young  man  is  cupidus  novi,  the 
old  one,  laudator  temporis  acti.  These 
seem  to  be  the  causes  of  the  different  ef- 
fects produced  by  novelty  and  familiarity. 
Let  us  now  endeavor  to  reconcile  the 
opposite  facts  alleged  by  the  partisans  of 
both  these  systems.  It  is  not  difficult  to 
conceive  how  a  new  object  may  be  more 
beautiful  than  an  old  one,  and  vice  versa. 


212  GUBIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

In  the  first  place,  let  us  suppose  an  object 
beautiful  in  itself  to  attract  our  attention. 
We  are  moved  by  its  beauty,  for  in  know- 
ing it  we  are  perfecting  our  faculties,  and 
our  attention  is  more  excited.  Indeed, 
in  the  first  instance,  we  may  admire  it 
more  than  it  deserves,  because  we  expect 
in  it  hidden  beauties  which  it  has  not. 
But  in  a  longer  and  more  careful  exami- 
nation, not  discovering  those  beauties, 
and  the  hopes  that  were  raised  being  dis- 
appointed, we  become  displeased,  our  at- 
tention and  admiration  grow  less,  and  the 
object  partially  or  completely  loses  its 
beauty. 

In  this  case  novelty  begets  beauty  and 
familiarity  creates  deformity.  But  let  us 
suppose,  on  the  other  hand,  that  some- 
thing new  makes  an  unpleasant  impres- 
sion on  us,  or  disturbs  our  tranquillity  of 
mind,  or  attacks  our  deep-rooted  preju- 
dices. Here,  though  the  object  should  be 
really  beautiful,  it  will  not  appear  so  to 
us  at  first,  because  of  the  unpleasant  sen- 


'N 


CURIOUS  QUESTIOKS.  213 

sation  it  produces  being  so  great  as  to 
prevent  our  attention  from  resting  on  the 
real  beauties  of  the  being.  But  when, 
by  familiarity,  the  first  unpleasant  im- 
pression becomes  weaker,  the  beauties 
of  the  object,  at  first  hidden,  gradually 
manifest  themselves  to  our  mind,  and 
that  which  at  first  we  considered  de- 
formed we  begin  to  think  beautiful. 


Question   Fourteenth. 

does  beauty  consist  in  magnitude  or 

exaggeration?  in  illusion  or 

imitation? 

HE  next  system  to  be  discussed 
is  that  of  magnitude  or  exag- 
geration. There  is  a  certain 
school  in  art  and  literature,  called  the  ro- 
mantic, which  contends  that  nothing  is 
beautiful  which  is  not  exaggerated  be- 
yond the  ordinary  proportions  of  nature. 
Hence,  even  in  the  moral  order,  great 
crimes  and  monsters  are  models  of  the 
beautiful,  notwithstanding  the  assertion 
of  the  classic  school  to  the  contrary, 
which  makes  virtue  only  beautiful  and 
vice  hideous.  The  romantic  school  hold 
that  great  vice  constitutes  the  beautiful, 
because  there  is  something  superhuman 


CURIOUS  QUESTIONS.  .215 

in  it;  and  unfortunately,  they  endeavor 
to  realize  their  theory  in  both  the  arts 
and  literature.  We  shall  not  speak  of 
the  injurious  effect  of  this  system  upon 
good  morals,  as  we  are  not  writing  on  a 
question  of  ethics  but  of  aesthetics.  We 
therefore  formulate  the  following  pro- 
position: Beauty  does  not  consist  in 
mere  magnitude.  If  it  were  true  that 
beauty  consisted  in  magnitude,  then  it 
would  follow  that  the  greater  an  object 
is,  the  more  beautiful  it  would  be.  But 
experience  shows  this  to  be  absurd.  For 
in  the  moral  order,  to  which  the  roman- 
tics love  to  appeal,  are  not  the  little  vii'- 
tues  more  beautiful  than  the  great  crimes 
against  nature?  In  the  second  place, 
the  romantics  destroy  the  distinction  be- 
tween the  beautiful  and  the  defonued. 
That  such  a  distinction  exists  no  one  can 
deny,  for  the  deformed  is  the  negation  of 
the  beautiful,  and  no  two  things  can  be 
more  different  than  the  positive  and  the 
negative.      Now,   if   whatever  is  great 


216  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

must  be  beautiful,  an  object  of  few 
cLiarms  or  of  small  deformity  could  be 
made  beautiful  by  increasing  its  deforni- 
ity  to  a  great  degree.  And  consequently 
the  beautiful  would  be  identified  with 
the  greatest  deformity,  which  is  a  con- 
tradiction in  terms.  Again  in  this  system 
every  thing  great  should  be  beautiful, 
whether  good  or  bad.  Now  this  is  ab- 
surd ;  for  let  us  suppose  a  case ;  robbery, 
for  instance,  whether  great  or  small,  can 
never  make  a  beautiful  action.  For  you 
can  not  change  the  deformity  of  its  es- 
sence, which  consists  in  the  unjust  taking 
away  of  an  object.  Indeed,  the  deform- 
ity will  be  increased  in  proportion  to  the 
greatness  of  the  crime.  Nor  can  any  cir- 
cumstance change  its  nature ;  for  instance, 
greatness  of  mind  or  the  audacity  of  the 
robber.  For  although  these  qualities  are 
beautiful  in  themselves,  they  can  never 
change  the  nature  of  the  act,  which  is  at 
the  same  time  bad  and  ugly. 

Moreover,  it  is  absurd  to  suppose  that 


CURIOUS  QUESTIONS.  217 

the  greatest  crimes  and  the  most  heroic 
actions  are  equally  beautiful.  Individual 
consciousness  and  the  common-sense  of 
mankind  reject  this  theory.  We  can 
never  force  ourselves  to  regard  the  crimes 
of  Caligula  or  Nero  as  equally  beautiful 
with  the  virtues  of  Charlemagne,  St. 
Henry,  or  St.  Louis.  But  even  a  priori 
this  system  is  shown  to  be  false,  by 
considering  the  very  nature  of  exaggera- 
tion and  beauty.  Beauty  is  a  quality 
inherent  in  the  very  nature  of  the  object. 
Magnitude  only  increases  or  intensifies 
the  object  without  changing  its  essence. 
Consequently  an  object  beautiful  in  it- 
self may  have  its  beauty  increased  or 
diminished  according  to  its  size.  But 
the  size  can  not  change  the  nature  of  the 
object,  or  make  it  beautiful  if  it  be  de- 
formed or  deformed  if  it  be  beautiful. 
But  it  may  be  objected  that  there  are  in 
reality  objects  deformed  in  themselves 
which  become  beautiful  by  exaggeration ; 
namely,  the  vice  of  pride,  when  person- 


218  CUBIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

ified  in  Milton's  Satan,  becomes  sublime 
and  beautifnl.  But  we  answer  that  here 
it  is  the  representation,  and  not  the  thing 
itself  which  is  beautiful.  For  according 
to  Boileau, 

"H  n'est  point  de  serpents  ni  de  monstre  odieux, 
Qui  par  Tart  imitfi  ne  puisse  plaire  aux  yeux." 

Besides,  in  most  of  the  cases  that  might 
be  alleged  by  the  romantics,  we  would 
find  that  it  was  the  great  power  or  intelli- 
gence displayed,  rather  than  the  .action 
itself,  which  constituted  the  beautiful  in 
them. 

From  the  fact  that  the  representation 
of  vice  or  virtue  may  be  beautiful,  some 
authors  have  concluded  that  beauty  con- 
sists entirely  in  imitation.  Hence,  for  them 
an  object  is  beautiful,  if  it  be  a  perfect 
representation ;  if  not,  it  is  ugly.  Regard- 
ing this  point  we  may  make  three  in- 
quiries :  Firstly,  Whether  there  be  any 
beauty  at  all  in  imitation?  Secondly, 
Whether  all  beauty  be  in  it  ?  Thirdly,  In 
what  the  beauty  of  imitation  consists? 


CURIOUS  QUESTIONS.  219 

There  is  some  heauty  in  imitation. 
This  experience  proves.  For  many  nat- 
ural objects,  indifferent  to  our  taste  in 
themselves,  become  really  beautiful  as 
images.  Indeed  the  real  attraction  of 
the  Flemish  school  of  painting  comes  jfrom 
this.  Moreover,  even  things  which  are 
deformed  in  themselves  please  us  when 
represented  by  art,  or  at  least  do  not  ex- 
cite the  same  horror  as  when  in  their  nat- 
ural state.  Even  objects  which  are  beau- 
tiful in  themselves  acquire  an  increase  of 
accidental  beauty,  merely  on  account  of 
their  representation.  Consequently  it 
follows  that  there  is  some  beauty  in  imi- 
tation. 

Yet  heauty,  generall/y  speaking,  must  he 
distinguished  from,  imitation.  For  other- 
wise all  beauty  would  consist  in  imita- 
tion, and  then  these  four  consequences 
would  follow :  Firstly,  only  works  of  art 
would  be  beautiful.  Secondly,  among  the 
works  of  art  only  those  would  be  beauti- 
ful which  would  be  imitations.     Thii'dly, 


220  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

that  would  be  tLe  more  beautiful  wLicli 
would  be  tlie  better  imitation.  Fourthly, 
in  these  same  works  there  would  be  no 
other  beauty  than  that  which  would  arise 
from  imitation. 

Now  these  four  consequences  are  ab- 
surd. In  the  first  place,  besides  works  of 
art,  other  objects  are  beautiful,  namely, 
the  human  body,  the  sky,  or  a  meadow 
in  summer.  Secondly,  many  works  of 
art  which  are  not  imitations  are  beautiful. 
For  instance,  a  palace,  a  piece  of  music,  a 
painting,  or  a  statue,  may  be  imitations 
of  nature,  but  realizations  of  the  ideal, 
and  yet  be  beautiful.  In  fact,  in  some 
works  of  art  imitation  may  be  merely  ac- 
cidental in  them.  Thirdly,  of  two  works 
of  art,  that  one  is  often  judged  to  be  the 
more  beautiful  in  which  there  is  the  less 
imitation.  Take,  for  instance,  two  statues 
the  one  representing  a  real  man,  and  the 
other  an  ideal  archetype;  the  latter  is 
often  the  more  beautiful.  Again,  in  the 
imitative  works  of  art,  there  are  generally 


CUEIOUS  QUESTION'S.  221 

two  kinds  of  beauty  or  of  deformity: 
one  consisting  in  the  perfection  or  the 
imperfection  of  the  imitation,  the  other 
being  entirely  distinct  from  it.  For  in- 
stance, the  picture  of  a  monster  will  be 
beautiful  inasmuch  as  it  imitates ;  and  de- 
formed inasmuch  as  it  relates  to  an  ugly 
object.  If  a  painter,  who  wishes  to  take 
the  portrait  of  a  man,  makes  an  image 
unlike  his  archetype,  the  picture  may  not 
be  on  this  account  ugly,  but  very  beauti- 
ful, compared  to  the  subject.  Conse- 
quently there  is  another  kind  of  beauty 
besides  that  of  imitation. 

Should  we  ask  now  what  it  is  that 
pleases  us  in  imitation,  there  are  two  dif- 
ferent opinions  on  this  subject.  Some  say 
it  is  the  similarity  itself,  or  the  illusion 
the  image  produces  in  our  mind.  While 
others  deny  this  and  say  it  is  the  judg- 
ment which  pronounces  the  imitation  to 
be  the  work  of  some  intelligent  being; 
that  is  to  say,  we  do  not  admire  the  imi- 
tation, properly  speaking,  but  the  intel- 


222  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

lectual  labor  wliicli  it  supposes.  It  is  the 
skill  of  the  artist  which  pleases  us. 

Of  these  two  opinions  we  reject  the 
former  and  adopt  the  latter,  for  the  fol- 
lowing reasons :  Similarity  can  not  be 
the  sense  of  the  pleasure  which  we  feel  in 
contemplating  the  copies  of  natural  things ; 
for  if  it  were  so,  we  should  experience  the 
same  aesthetic  savor  in  beholding  similar 
objects  in  nature.  "We  should  feel  the 
same  pleasure  in  seeing,  for  instance,  two 
trees  that  are  alike,  as  in  viewing  the 
images  of  the  trees. 

Moreover,  the  latter  opinion  is  based 
on  experience.  Suppose  an  instance.  If 
we  see  two  pictures  that  look  alike,  they 
may  not  strike  us  as  beautiful  so  long  as 
we  imagine  them  to  be  the  work  of  the 
same  artist.  But  when  we  are  told  that 
one  is  the  copy  of  the  other,  our  admira^ 
tion  is  instantly  excited.  We  admire  the 
ability  of  the  copyist.  We  admire  the 
effort  of  one  mind  to  copy  the  work  of 
another.     Hence,  the  greater  the  skill  dis- 


CUEIOUS  QUESTIONS.  228 

played  in  the  execution  of  tlie  work,  the 
more  beauty  shall  we  perceive  in  it,  on 
account  of  the  greater  difficulties  to  be 
overcome.  Thus  far  then  we  have  ex- 
plained the  nature  of  the  aesthetic  element 
in  works  of  imitation.  Let  us  now  exam- 
ine the  next  system,  namely,  that  which 
identifies  beauty  with  proportion  and 
order  of  parts. 


Question    Fifteenth. 

does  beauty  consist  in  proportion  and 
order   of   parts    or   in   unity   and 

VARIETY? 

[BDE  system  which  identifies  beau- 
ty with  proportion  and  order 
of  parts  is  one  of  the  oldest  and 
most  respected  theories  on  the  subject. 
One  of  its  ablest  defenders  in  modern 
times  is  the  Per^  Andr^  in  his  "  Essai  sur 
le  Beau."  The  partisans  of  this  system 
understand  by  order  the  disposition  of 
parts  in  a  being  to  each  other.  Thus, 
order  in  the  human  body  consists  in  the 
fact  that  the  different  members  have  a 
determined  place  as  parts  of  the  whole. 
And  this  order  is  the  first  element  of  hu- 
man beauty.     Thus  the  nose  is  in  the 


CURIOUS  QUESTIONS.  225 

centre  of  the  face ;  the  eyes  are  either  side 
of  it,  and  the  mouth  below  it,  all  in  order. 
But  beauty  is  not  complete  without  pro- 
portion, its  second  element. 

Proportion  consists  in  the  diiference  of 
degrees  in  duration,  intensity,  or  exten- 
sion. Thus  in  music  or  dancing  there  is 
the  proportion  of  duration.  For  the 
sounds  or  motions  must  succeed  each 
other  in  uniform  times.  We  also  find  in 
music  an  example  of  the  proportion  of  in- 
tensity. The  notes  must?  not  be  discor- 
dant, and  consequently  the  number  of 
vibrations  must  be  greater  or  less  to  effect 
the  purpose.  Finally,  in  bodies  we  have 
the  proportion  of  extension,  as  in  the  hu- 
man countenance  the  length  or  shortness 
of  the  features  will  have  relative  effects 
on  a  man's  good  looks. 

But  there  are  various  ways  of  under- 
standing this  system  of  proportion  and 
order  of  parts.  It  can  not  mean  that 
every  order  and  proportion  will  make 
beauty,  for  then  all  objects  would  be 


226  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

beautiful,  since  in  all  there  are  a  certain 
order  and  proportion.  It  means,  there- 
fore, that  among  all  possible  orders  and 
proportions  there  is  one  that  necessarily 
makes  an  object  beautiful.  But  why- 
should  this  order  an(J  proportion  make 
the  beautiful  and  not  the  others  ?  This 
is  a  question  to  which  four  different  an- 
swers are  giv^en,  and  which  give  rise  to 
four  different  opinions.  The  first  holds 
that  the  cause  of  this  beauty  in  order  and 
proportion  is  found  in  the  very  essence 
of  things.  That  among  all  possible  orders 
there  is  one  which  by  its  very  nature  is 
absolute  order  and  proportion,  and  there- 
fore constitutes  the  beautiful.  The  second 
opinion  gives  a  subjective  origin  to  the 
beautiful  in  proportion.  It  maintains  that 
the  beautiful  of  proportion  is  produced 
in  us  by  a  habit  or  by  a  peculiar  disposi- 
tion of  our  nature.  For  instance,  the 
hunchback  appears  ugly  to  us  because 
we  are  accustomed  to  see  all  other  men 
straight.    The  third  opinion  places  the 


CUEIOUS  QUESTIONS.  227 

beauty  of  order  and  proportion  in  tlie 
apt  disposition  of  the  parts  of  the  object 
to  its  end.  While  the  fourth  opinion 
maintains  that  objects,  which  in  them 
selves  are  neither  beautiful  nor  deformed 
are  so  inasmuch  as  they  are  signs  of  in- 
visible beauty.  We  shall  speak  of  this 
last  system  later.  Let  us  now  discuss  the 
three  first  opinions. 

We  affirm,  in  the  first  place,  that  no 
order  or  proportion  of  pa/rts  considered  in 
itself^  or  essentially^  can  constitute  the 
heautiful.  It  is  impossible  to  find  in  the 
essence  of  things  one  order  surpassing 
another ;  for  all  combinations  of  order  or 
proportion  are  equally  indifferent  if  con- 
sidered independently  of  any  extrinsic  re- 
lation. Besides,  according  to  the  hypo- 
thesis which  we  refute,  we  should  be  de- 
lighted with  the  beauty  of  an  object  in 
proportion  to  the  degree  of  knowledge  we 
might  have  of  its  parts.  Hence,  to  use  a 
familiar  example,  we  should  be  less  pleas- 
ed when  we  merely  behold  a  fir^e-looking 


228  CUEIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

man  than  wlien  we  have  a  knowledge  of 
the  proportion  of  all  his  parts,  as,  for  in- 
stance, that  the  circumference  of  the  neck 
is  equal  to  the  circumference  of  the  calf 
of  his  leg.  But  experience  teaches  that 
the  geometrical  -measurement  instead  of 
increasing  our  aesthetic  taste,  disgusts  us. 
In  the  third  place,  if  order  essentially 
makes  beauty,  this  order  must  be  the 
same  for  all  species  of  beings,  or  it  must 
be  different  for  different  kinds  of  beings ; 
that  is,  one  species  of  beauty  would  con- 
stitute that  of  a  horse,  another  that  of  a 
tree,  etc.  But  neither  of  these  two  opin- 
ions can  be  held.  If  the  first  supposition 
be  true,  then  we  should  find  the  same 
proportion  and  order  in  all  beautiful  ob- 
jects, or  at  least  an  approximation  to  a 
common  type.  But  this  contradicts  expe- 
rience, for  where  is  the  similarity  of  pro- 
portion between  a  pretty  woman,  a  fine 
palace,  and  a  beautiful  rose  ?  Nor  is  the 
second  hypothesis  true ;  for,  if  it  were, 
then  there  could  be  no  degrees  in  beauty 


CURIOUS  QUESTIONS.  229 

— no  comparison,  laecause  in  eacli  being 
there  would  be  a  proportion  of  parts  tbat 
would  make  it  perfectly  beautiful  in  its 
kind. 

Tlius,  tlie  proportion  of  parts  in  the 
round,  plump,  and  juicy  body  of  a  fat 
partridge  would  be  equally  beautiful  with 
the  most  perfect  specimen  of  the  Ionian 
style  of  architectui'e.  From  what  has 
been  thus  far  seen,  it  must  follow  that 
beauty  does  not  consist  in  any  order  or 
proportion,  which  by  familiarity  or  a  dis- 
position of  our  natui'e  would  seem  beauti- 
ful in  itself,  since  we  have  shown  the  ef- 
fects" of  familiarity  in  refuting  another 
system. 

Nor  is  the  beautiful  constituted  by 
order  and  proportion  considered  in  the 
aptness  of  the  parts  of  a  being  for  attain- 
ing the  end  of  its  creation.  For  if  this 
system  were  true,  we  should  have  to  ac- 
knowledge the  same  beauty  in  all  created 
beings ;  for  there  are  none  of  them  whose 
parts  are  not  aptly  disposed  by  the  Crea- 


230  CUBIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

tor  to  the  end  for  whicli  they  were  des- 
tined. But  this  consequence  we  know  to 
be  false.  Moreover,  experience  shows  the 
contrary  of  this  system  to  be  true ;  for  the 
form  and  parts  of  a  hog,  for  instance, 
might  be  changed  so  as  to  make  it  more 
beautiful,  yet  they  would  not  be  so  well 
adapted  to  the  attaining  of  its  end. 
Again,  if  beauty  consisted  in  the  aptitude 
of  the  parts  of  an  object  to  its  end,  then  the 
following  absurd  consequences  would  fol- 
low: Firstly,  in  ever}'' judgment  regarding 
the  beauty  of  an  object,  the  consideration 
of  its  end  should  be  first  in  the  order  of 
thought.  Secondly,  we  could  never  pro- 
nounce an  object  beautiful  without  know- 
ing the  design  for  which  it  was  created.  But 
who  does  not  see  the  absurdityof  these 
two  consequences ;  for  who  has  ever  said 
that  a  mouth  ■  was  beautiful  because  it 
was  fitted  for  eating  or  speaking  ?  And 
again,  eveiy  day  we  pronounce  objects  to 
be  most  beautiful  without  knowing  the  end 
for  which  they  were  created.  Yet  although 


CURIOUS  QUESTIONS.  231 

we  have  said  so  mucli  against  tlie  system 
of  order  and  proportion,  it  must  be  ad- 
mitted that  they  partake  of  beauty  inas- 
much as  they  show  forth  the  intelligence 
of  some  ao-ent  accommodatino;  beino;s  to 
an  end. 

SYSTEM   OF   UNITY   IN"   VARIETY. 

Some  very  able  philosophers  hold  that 
beauty  consists  in  variety  reduced  to  uni- 
ty. St.  Augustine  says,  in  his  18th  Epis- 
tle, "  OmnisporropulcJiritudinis forma  est 
unitasr  But  to  this  unity  moderns  have 
added  variety.  There  may  be  unity  in 
variety  in  many  ways.  Thus  the  various 
phenonomena  which  take  place  in  the 
same  space  or  time,  are  said  to  have  unity 
of  time  or  space.  Again,  there  may  be 
several  modes  in  a  substance,  as  in  the 
soul  there  are  various  thoughts  and  sen- 
timents. This  unity  in  variety  may 
exist  when  several  beino^s  have  the  same 
end,  or  are  adapted  to  produce  the  same 
effect.     The  partisans  of  this  system  do 


282  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

not  agree  in  placing  this  nnity  in  variety 
in  any  one  of  these  forms.  They  gener- 
ally explain  it,  however,  according  to  the 
last  example,  and,  indeed,  it  is  the  most 
beautiful  kind  of  unity.  According  to 
this  system,  therefore,  a  musical  composi- 
tion is  beautiful  when  the  various  notes 
and  sounds  have  the  same  general  idea  or 
impression ;  and  the  beauty  of  a  poem  or 
tragedy  consists  in  the  various  actions, 
characters,  or  parts  tending  to  a  common 
end  or  catastrophe.  Before  discussing  the 
claims  of  this  system,  let  us  make  two  ob- 
servations. In  the  first  place,  we  remark 
that  the  system  of  unity  explained  accord- 
ing to  the  third  manner,  does  not  differ 
much  from  the  system  of  order  and  pro- 
portion taken  to  express  the  adaptation 
of  parts  to  the  attaining  of  a  common 
end;  for  order  can  not  exist  without  the 
accommodation  of  means  to  an  end. 

Hence,  the  partisans  of  the  system  of 
order  and  proportion,  as  Pere  Andre  for 
instance,  admit  unity  as  its  complement. 


CUEIOUS  QUESTIONS.  233 

There  is,  however,  a  difference  between 
the  two  systems ;  for  in  the  adaptation  of 
means  to  an  end,  two  things  may  be  dis- 
tinguished :  First,  the  intrinsic  fitness  of 
each  part  to  an  end ;  and  secondly,  the  har- 
mony of  all  the  parts  in  producing  that 
end.  In  the  first  consists  the  idea  of  pro- 
portion ;  in  the  second  that  of  unity.  We 
observe,  in  the  second  place,  that  the  sys- 
tem of  unity  is  the  same  as  the  system  of 
symmetry,  for  symmetry  is  only  an  effect 
of  unity.  Having  premised  these  few  re- 
marks, let  us  now  discuss  the  value  of 
this  system,  inasmuch  as  it  pretends  to 
give  the  true  explanation  of  the  sublime 
and  beautiful. 

We  deny  that  the  beautiful  is  found  in 
unity  considered  in  itself  If  the  contrary 
of  this  proposition  were  true,  it  would 
follow  that  in  all  objects  which  have  the 
same  unity,  we  should  find  the  same  de- 
gree of  beauty.  But  experience  shows 
the  contrary  to  be  the  case ;  for  in  the 
various  works  of  nature,  we  find  beauties 


234  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

the  most  diverse  in  degree  and  kind,  yet 
we  find  unity  equally  in  all.  Thus, 
the  beauty  in  the  horse  and  in  the  ass 
is  different ;  yet  there  is  the  same  unity 
in  their  constitution.  The  same  may  be 
said  of  works  of  art,  for  we  can  conceive 
two  poems  perfectly _  equal  in  unity, 
but  not  so  in  beauty.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  tragedies  of  Shakespeare  have 
less  unity  in  their  plan,  yet  are  far  more 
beautiful  than  the  more  regularly  compiled 
works  of  less  capable  dramatic  authors. 
But  although  unity  in  itself  does  not  con- 
stitute beauty,  nevertheless  it  adds  to  the 
beauty  of  an  object,  inasmuch  as  unity  is 
a  sign  of  intellectual  labor ;  and  experi- 
ence teaches  that  there  are  no  beautiful 
objects  which  have  not  more  or  less  of 
unity.  Unity  is  therefore  a  condition, 
but  not  the  constituent  of  beauty,  and  it 
is  in  this  sense  we  are  to  understand  the 
text  of  St.  Augustine. 


.Question    Sixteenth. 

is  the  beautiful  the  "splendor  veri" 
as  plato  defines  it  ? 

HE  beautiful  may  be  considered 
in  two  ways,  firstly  in  external 
and  visible  forms,  as  in  a  pal- 
ace or  statue ;  secondly,  as  purely  intelli- 
gible, devoid  of  all  sensible  representa- 
tion, contemplated  by  the  intellect.  We 
mean  by  tbe  beauty  of  sensible  forms 
that  wbicb  is  represented  by  the  senses. 
Now,  if  we  should  ask  in  what  this  spe- 
cies of  beauty  consists,  we  should  receive 
two  answers.  The  first  says  that  beauty 
is  in  the  form  itself  as  one  of  its  charac- 
teristics ;  while  the  second  maintains  that 
beauty  is  not  in  the  form,  that  the  form 
is  a  mere  sign  by  which  our  mind's  eye 


236  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

is  enlightened  to  contemplate  the  true 
beautiful,  which  is  in  the  intelligible. 
The  systems  so  far  explained  adopt  the 
first  manner  of  explaining  the  notion  of 
the  beautiful ;  but,  since  we  have  refuted 
them,  we  can  not  admit  their  theory ;  for 
we  understand  by  the  sensible  form  the 
sensation  which  it  excites,  or  the  total 
representation  of  the  object,  which  rep- 
resentation consists  in  the  impression  of 
our  sensibility,  and  the  conception  of  our 
intellect.  But  the  sensible  form  con- 
sidered in  itself  can  not  be  called  the 
beautiful  regarded  in  any  of  the  t^vo 
ways  of  explaining  it.  It  can  not  be 
called  such  in  the  first  manner,  for  we 
have  proved  that  beauty  differs  essential- 
ly from  the  impression.  To  call  it  so  in 
the  second  manner  is  equally  impossible ; 
for  the  intellectual  conceptions  which 
added  to  the  impression  can  all  be  reduced 
to  the  ideas  of  order  and  unity.  But  we 
have  already  shown  that  neither  order 
nor  unity  in  itself  makes  the  beautiful, 


CURIOUS  QUESTIONS.        -  237 

althougli  tLey  are  "both  conditions  of 
beauty.  External  forms  are,  therefore, 
the  signs  of  invisible  beauty  according 
to  the  second  hypothesis  which  we  ad- 
mit. They  are  symbols  or  types  of  in- 
visible beauty.  Let  us  now  develop 
and  explain  this  system,  by  examining 
the  following  questions :  Firstly,  What 
is  a  symbol  ?  Secondly,  Are  all  sensible 
forms  symbols  ?  Thirdly,  Is  their  sym- 
bolism the  foundation  of  all  their  aesthe- 
tic properties  ?  Fourthly,  How  may  the 
beauty  or  deformity  of  objects  be  deter- 
mined by  their  symbolism  ?  Let  us  an- 
swer the  first  question  on  the  nature  and 
division  of  symbols.  A  symbol  is'^a  sen- 
sible phenomenon  exciting  in  us  the  idea 
of  a  reality.  For  instance,  the  figure 
with  the  balance  in  her  hand  is  a  symbol 
of  justice  and  equity.  There  are  many 
kinds  of  symbols,  divided  according  to  the 
principle  of  their  origin,  their  clearness,  or 
their  determination.  The  principle  of 
symbolism  is  the  association  of  ideas  and 


238  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

sensations;  and  hence  there  may  be  as 
many  kinds  of  symbols  as  there  are 
modes  of  associating  ideas  and  sensations. 
Thus  there  are  natural  symbols,  arbitrary 
symbols,  and  symbols  of  custom,  as  there 
may  be  a  natural,  arbitraiy,  or  customary 
association  of  ideas.  As  to  their  clear- 
ness, symbols  are  divided  into  clear  and 
obscure,  according  as  their  meaning  is 
discovered  with  ease  or  difficulty.  But 
this  clearness  is  not  absolute  but  relative ; 
for  a  symbol  which  may  be  obscure  to 
one  may  be  very  clear  to  another.  Thus 
symbols  derived  from  the  manners  or  reli- 
gion of  a  people,  are  very  intelligible  to 
them,  though  quite  obscure  to  others.  A 
more  particular  application  of  this  piin- 
ciple  may  be  found  in  the  symbolism  of 
the  Catholic  Church,  well  understood 
within  its  pale,  though  not  outside  of  it. 
As  to  the  degree  of  determination  of 
symbols,  they  are  either  vague  or  specific. 
Vague  symbols  express  something  in  a 
general  way ;  for  instance,  a  passion  or 


CURIOUS  QUESTIONS.  239 

state  of  tlie  mind,  as  joy  or  sadness,  with- 
out i)articularizing  any  thing.  Specific 
symbols  express  the  thing  with  circum- 
stances. Some  symbols  are  vague  by 
their  very  nature,  as  in  music;  others- 
are  essentially  specific,  as  in  painting; 
while  others  again,  as  words  in  language, 
are  either  vague  or  specific  at  will.  It  is 
not  difficult  to  prove  that  all  sensible 
things  are  symbols  of  invisible  things; 
for  the  sensible  phenomena  of  nature  may 
be  reduced  to  sounds,  colors,  lines,  and 
motions.  All  sounds  have  reference  to 
the  ear,  while  the  three  last  in  the  cate- 
gory are  seen  by  the  eye.  But  all  these 
express  something  invisible,  for  they  all 
have  the  power  of  expressing  the  invis- 
ible. We  might  even  prove  the  symbol- 
ism of  sensible  things  by  an  a  priori  ar- 
gument, for  all  of  them  show  forth  a  de- 
gree of  being.  They  manifest  modifica- 
tions of  an  active  force,  but  the  active 
force  is  invisible.  Hence  sensible  forms  are 
symbols  of  the  invisible.    But  it  will  now 


240  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

be  asked,  In  what  does  this  invisible  con- 
sist? We  answer  that  the  invisible,  ex- 
pressed by  sensible  forms  in  creation,  is  of 
two  kinds ;  the  first  consists  in  some  qual- 
ity, property,  or  attribute  of  the  Author  of 
being,  as  when,'  for  instance,  the  Scripture 
says,  "  The  skies  tell  the  glory  of  God ;" 
or  as  when  a  well-executed  picture  shows 
the  skill  of  the  artist.  It  requires  reflec- 
tion, however,  on  our  part  to  perceive 
this  invisible.  The  otJwr  part  of  the  in- 
visible symbolized  by  sensible  fonns,  con- 
sists in  moral  qualities ;  as,  when,  either 
by  nature  or  from  consent,  certain  sen- 
sible signs  are  used  to  express  invisible 
beings.  They  express,  in  the  first  place, 
undetermined  being,  or  being  in  general ; 
and  in  the  second  place,  they  express 
such  and  such  a  degree  of  being,  which 
it  is  sometimes  very  difficult  to  appre- 
hend. 

Yet  we  always  find  that  the  foundation 
of  the  aesthetic  properties  in  sensible  be- 
ings is  their  symbolism.     If  wo  examine 


CUEIOUS  QUESTIONS.  241 

closely  the  relation  between  tlie  force  of 
expression  in  beings,  and  tlieir  power  of 
exciting  sestlietic  feelings,  we  shall  find 
tliem  to  be  identical.  In  the  first  place, 
objects  please  us  in  proportion  to  their 
power  of  expression ;  and,  as  we  descend 
in  the  scale  of  creation,  we  find  the  beau- 
ty of  beings  grow  less  as  we  descend  in 
species.  Animals  are  more  beautiful  than 
plants,  and  plants  more  beautiful  than 
minerals.  Moreover,  if  we  consider  the 
same  thing  in  two  different  states  of  a  be- 
ing, in  that  one  in  which  it  will  have  the 
greater  expression  it  will  certainly  be  more 
beautiful.  Thus  as  there  is  a  great  differ- 
ence between  the  power  of  expression  in 
the  face  of  a  living  and  of  a  dead  man, 
so  there  is  a  difference  in  their  beauty. 
Again,  some  objects  please  us  only  after  a 
time,  when  we  become  familiar  with  them. 
Pleasure  in  beholding  them  commences 
only  when  we  begin  to  imderstand  their 
meaning.  Experience  also  teaches  that 
those  men  who  appreciate  the  symbolism 


242  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

of  beings  the  best  are  the  most  capable 
of  perceiving  their  beauty.  Thus  many 
natui'al  objects,  whose  beauty  poets  and 
artists  feel  vividly,  move  not  in  the  least 
the  rustic  mind.  The  mstic  looks  only  at 
the  utility  of  th6  object,  and  cares  not  for 
its  expression,  while  the  poet  and  the 
artist  admire  its  expression.  Hence,  there 
is  truth  in  saying  that  it  is  the  poet  and 
the  artist  that  give  sense  and  beauty  to 
inanimate  things.  Even  if  we  observe 
the  impression  which  inanimate  things 
produce  in  us,  we  shall  find  that  it  is  not 
the  form  or  external  shape  that  pleases  us 
in  nature  or  in  art,  but  that  which  it  ex- 
presses. In  a  church,  for  instance,  it  is 
the  religious  expression  of  the  arches  and 
columns ;  or  the  nobility,  the  majesty,  be- 
nevolence, and  generosity,  expressed  by 
the  statues  or  paintings  representing  hu- 
man forms  that  excite  in  us  emotions  of 
beauty.  In  fact,  the  words  we  use  on  be- 
holding such  objects  refer  less  to  them 
than  to  their  expression. 


CURIOUS  QUESTIONS.  243 

But  let  us  now  inquire  how  the  de- 
formity or  beauty  of  objects  is  determined 
by  their  symbolism.  Upon  this  question 
there  are  two  opinions.  The  first  main- 
tains that  beauty  and  deformity  are  joined 
in  beings  in  proportion  to  their  power  of 
expression;  that  is  to  say,  an  object  is 
beautiful  that  can  give  expression,  and 
deformed  when  there  is  no  expression  in 
it.  The  partisans  of  the  second  system 
hold  that  beauty  or  deformity  consists  in 
the  thing  expressed,  and  not  in  the  thiug 
expressing.  Objects  are  beautiful  or  de- 
formed because  they  express  this  or  that 
idea.  Of  these  two  opinions  we  must 
admit  the  latter,  for  the  former  would 
lead  us  into  absurdities.  It  would,  in  the 
fii'st  place,  make  us  maintain  that  every 
object  which  expresses  something  is  beau- 
tiful ;  and  again,  that  two  objects  having 
equal  expression  have  equal  beauty.  It 
is  not  difficult  to  show  the  absurdity  of 
these  consequences.  In  the  first  place, 
experience  teaches  that  beings  whicli  ex- 


244  CUEIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

press  nothing  are  not  therefore  defoimecl, 
since  there  are  many  things  in  the  world 
indifferent  with  respect  to  beauty.  But 
this  could  not  be  the  case  in  the  opinion 
we  refute ;  for  according  to  it  beings  should 
have  expression'  and  therefore  be  beauti- 
ful, or  they  should  be  deprived  of  expres- 
sion and  therefore  ugly,  so  that  there 
could  be  no  such  thing  as  sesthetical  in- 
difference. Nor  can  it  be  objected  that 
there  are  objects  in  which  a  defect  of  ex- 
pression implies  a  defect  of  beauty;  as, 
for  instance,  a  poem  or  a  statue  may  have 
no  value  as  a  work  of  art.  It  is  not  on  this 
account  deformed  in  the  true  sense  of  the 
word ;  and  even  if  it  were  deformed,  this 
would  prove  nothing  against  us ;  for  its 
deformity  would  not  arise  from  a  want 
of  expression,  but  of  the  trv£  expression  ; 
it  would  arise  from  the  defective  skill  or 
genius  of  the  maker.  Again,  it  is  false 
that  beauty  is  found  in  eveiy  object  that 
expresses  something.  The  face  of  a  mon- 
key is  veiy  expressive,  but  certainly  not 


CUEIOUS  QUESTIONS.  245 

beautiful,  and  so  is  tlie  face  of  a  drunk- 
ard or  a  man  excited  by  anger;  yet 
none  of  these  lias  beauty.  It  is  equally 
false  that  two  objects  having  equal  ex- 
pression have  equal  beauty.  We  can 
show  this  by  taking  two  works  of  art, 
two  statues,  for  instance,  one  representing 
the  passion  of  anger,  the  other  the  virtue 
of  purity.  Each  has  great  expression, 
they  may  both  have  equal  expression ;  but 
certainly  their  beauty  will  not  be  equal. 
Take,  for  example,  the  statue  of  Silenus 
and  that  of  Abraham ;  the  one  represent- 
ing drunkenness,  the  other  the  great  pa- 
triarch about  to  offer  up  his  only  son  to 
God.  They  may  have  equal  expression, 
but  certainly  not  equal  beauty.  Beauty, 
therefore,  consists  in  the  invisible  type 
expressed  by  the  sensible  form.  Let  us 
now  examine  the  qualities  and  character- 
istics of  invisible  beauty.  What  is  this 
invisible  beauty  ?  And  what  are  the  con- 
ditions required  that  it  should  affect  us 
aesthetically  ?    According  to  Plato,  beauty 


246  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

is  the  splendor  veri.  That  wLicli  is  true 
is  beautiful,  and  objects  will  be  more  or 
less  beautiful  in  proportion  to  their  de- 
gree of  participation  in  the  reality  of  God 
who  is  truth  itself.  We  must  admit  this 
theory  of  Plato  for  many  reasons.  For  a 
supreme  rule  of  beauty  must  be  admitted, 
and  this  supreme  rule  must  be  God.  In 
our  judgment  upon  beings,  when  we  say 
that  some  are  more  beautiful  than  others, 
we  acknowledge  a  supreme  rule  of  beauty. 
For  when  we  compare  objects  as  greater 
and  less,  we  suppose  an  absolute  rule ;  for 
that  which  is  relative  implies  the  abso- 
lute, and  greater  and  less  are  relative 
terms.  There  is  then  an  absolute  rule  of 
beauty,  which  is  absolute  beauty  itself. 
What  then  are  the  properties  of  this  ab- 
solute rule  of  beauty?  We  answer,  it 
must  be  eternal,  necessaiy,  and  infinite. 
It  must  be  independent  of  time,  place, 
and  circumstances. 

For  example,  the  act  of  a  man  imder- 
going  martyrdom  for  conscience  sake  is 


CURIOUS   QUESTIONS.  247 

"beautiful  in  itself,  independently  of  all 
circumstances  ;  it  is  eternally  beautiful ; 
and  as  this  rule  is  eternal,  it  must  be  ne- 
cessary and  uncliangeable.  This  absolute 
rule  of  beauty  is  also  infinite ;  for  if  it 
were  merely  finite,  a  higher  type  of  beauty 
than  it  could  be  conceived,  and  therefore 
it  would  not  be  the  supreme  rule  of 
beauty.  Besides,  as  this  rule  is  beauty 
itself,  without  limit  or  restriction,  it  is  in- 
finite. This  invisible  beauty,  therefore, 
being  absolute,  eternal,  and  infinite,  is 
God.  Beauty  is,  therefore,  identified 
with  truth,  and  the  truth  of  existing 
beings  is  conceived  in  two  ways :  Firstly, 
inasmuch  as  they  are  imitations  of 
ideas  which  exist  in  God ;  and  secondly, 
as  possessing  liberty  of  will,  and  acting 
in  conformity  with  the  will  of  God.  The 
first  manner  gives  us  real  truth ;  the  sec- 
ond, voluntary  truth  or  moral  goodness. 
Henoe  there  are  two  kinds  of  beauty,  essen- 
tial and  moral.  Now  beauty  in  beings 
can  be  considered  either  ahsolutely  or  relr 


248  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

atively  ;  absolutely,  when  their  activity  or 
the  evolution  of  their  existence  is  com- 
pared with  the  infinite  activity  of  God ; 
relatively,  when  they  are  compared  -with 
individuals  of  the  same  species.  Thus, 
when  we  say  that  man  is  superior  to  the 
beast,  we  compare  beings  according  to 
infinite  activity ;  and  when  we  say  that 
one  man  is  more  beautiful  than  another, 
there  is  question  of  relative  beauty. 

Now,  deformity  is  the  want  of  beauty 
which  should  exist ;  but  the  want  of  es- 
sential beauty,  or  beauty  of  essence,  is  not 
deformity ;  for  if  it  were,  all  finite  beings 
would  be  in  a  certain  measure  deformed, 
since  they  are  all  below  the  infinite  stand- 
ard of  real  beauty  or  God. 

Defoimity  exists  then  only  where  there 
is  a  want  of  moral  beauty,  and  conse- 
(^uently  of  voluntary  truth ;  or  when  rel- 
ative essential  beauty  is  wanting  as,  for 
instance,  where  one  man  is  deformed,  he 
lacks  the  beauty  which  belongs  to  his 
species,  beauty  which  should  exist  but  is 


CURIOUS  QUESTIONS.  249 

wanting,  and  whicli,  therefore,  begets  d© 
formity.  Hence  sensible  forms  are  beau 
tifiil  only  wlien  they  express  moral  or  es 
sential  invisible  beauty.  The  figure, 
then,  which  represents  the  human  coun 
tenance  will  be  beautiful  in  proportion  to 
the  majesty,  benevolence,  generosity,  and 
other  amiable  dispositions  portrayed ; 
and  deformed  in  proportion  as  it  expresses 
a  want  of  virtue.  But  it  may  be  objected 
against  our  theory,  that  an  ugly  face  often 
carries  a  fine  mind,  and  therefore  it  is 
not  true  that  sensible  forms  are  beautiful 
only  when  they  e:^ress  invisible  beauty. 
To  this  we  answer  that  the  form  may 
often  express  a  different  thing  from  that 
to  which  it  is  joined.  The  spirit  of  a 
demon  may  dwell  in  the  body  of  a  dog ; 
hence  this  objection  does  not  contradict 
our  theory.  At  any  rate,  the  objection* 
only  gives  us  an  exceptional  case  in  na- 
ture ;  for,  as  a  inile,  the  face  is  an  index 
to  the  mind  and  character,  just  as  the 
sound    in    the   musical   composition  of 


250  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

a  great  artist  is  ever  an  echo  of  the 
sense. 

All  created  beauty,  then,  as  well  as  all 
created  truth  and  goodness,  is  derived 
from  God.  God  is  the  fulcrum  on  which 
both  the  psychological  and  ontological 
scales  of  philosophy  depend.  He  is  the 
alpha  and  omega  of  philosophy  as  of  the- 
ology ;  He  is  the  beginning  and  the  end. 


Question    Seventeenth. 

are  there  but  two  real  causes  in  the 
world— man  and  god? 


HERE  is  a  system  in  philosophy 
that  has  some  affinities  with  that 
of  Berkeley  and  Kant,  but  which 
is  nevertheless  substantially  distinct  from 
them.  It  is  called  the  system  of  occa- 
sional causes.  Its  partisans  are  Male- 
branche  and  Leibnitz ;  but  Leibnitz  gives 
it  another  name  and  new  modifications. 
He  calls  it  the  system  of  preestablished 
harmony.  The  fundamental  tenets  of  this 
system  are :  1st,  that  only  God  can  act 
outside  of  ourselves ;  2d,  that  all  otheY 
beings  are  incapable  of  exercising  any 
influence  on  each  other;  3d,  that  it  is 
God  who  produces  all  the  modifications 
in  all  created  substances:  so  that  neither 


252  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

man's  thoughts,  nor  his  volitiolis,  nor  Lis 
sensations,  nor  any  other  of  his  acts  is 
caused  by  any  external  finite  being,  but 
only  by  the  immediate  and  dii'ect  action 
of  God  on  his  soul.  He  is,  as  it  were,  a 
harp  placed  in  the  hands  of  God,  and 
only  God's  fingers  can  touch  this  harp 
and  awake  its  latent  harmony.  These 
principles,  if  true,  lead  to  extraordinary 
consequences ;  for  it  will  not  be  then  mere 
poetry  to  say  that  the  voice  of  God  is 
heard  in  the  rustling  of  the  wind  or  the 
roaring  of  the  thunder ;  that  his  omnipo- 
tence appears  in  the  upheavings  of  the 
ocean;  that  his  majesty  is  emblemed  in 
the  cloud-capped  mountains,  and  his 
beauty  manifested  in  the  flowery  prairies ; 
but  all  will  be  philosophic  truth.  Ac- 
cording to  this  system,  created  things  are 
only  causes  of  their  own  internal  acts; 
and  especially  with  regard  to  their  influ- 
ence on  each  other,  they  are  mere  occa- 
sions ;  hence,  it  is  not  the  fire  that  pro- 
duces the  sensation  of  heat,  it  is  God,  and 


OUEIOUS  QUESTIONS.  253 

the  fire  is  but  an  occasion,  and  so  on.  In 
an  especial  manner  can  this  system  be 
applied  to  tlie  reciprocal  action  of  soul 
and  body.  The  body  does  not  act  on  the 
soul,  it  is  God ;  since  the  soul  and  the 
body  are  causes  only  of  their  internal 
acts,  and  with  regard  to  the  external  act 
they  are  but  occasions.  Leibnitz  supposes 
that  the  soul  and  the  body  were  created 
in  such  a  manner  that  the  actions  of  the 
one  would  necessarily  awake  harmonious 
echoes  in  the  other,  as  if  two  clocks  were 
connected  by  a  chain,  and  then,  after  hav- 
ing been  wound  up,  were  set  in  motion  by 
the  maker,  so  that  every  stroke  in  the 
one  would  cause  a  harmonious  stroke  in 
the  other,  and  all  this  in  virtue  of  a  pre- 
established  harmony  between  them.  This 
modification  which  Leibnitz  gave  the  sys- 
tem of  occasional  causes  can  not  be  ad- 
mitted, for  it  destroys  free-will;  though 
there  is  nothing  in  the  system,  as  it  is 
given  by  Malebranche,  that  would  abso- 
lutely prevent  its  admission.    The  differ 


254  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

ence  between  this  system  and  that  of 
Berkeley  and  Kant  is  easily  seen.  Berkeley 
and  Kant  deny  the  existence  of  bodies. 
Malebranche,  on  the  contrary,  admits  the 
existence  of  bodies,  but  denies  their  im- 
mediate influence.  He  argues  that  God 
creates  us  in  act  at  every  instant  of  our 
lives.  The  modifications  produced  in  our 
souls  are  caused  by  God.  Creatures  can 
not  cause  these ;  for  if  they  did,  creatures 
could  create.  A  modification  in  the  soul 
is  a  creation  of  something  new,  not  exist- 
ing before,  and  no  creature  can  have  the 
power  of  producing  such  an  effect. 

From  the  questions  thus  far  treated  we 
are  led  to  conclude  that  there  are  but 
two  beings  in  the  universe  that  can  pro- 
duce their  own  acts — God  and  man. 
Man's  acts  are  those  of  his  will  rather 
than  those  of  his  intellect.  He  should  be 
defined  to  be,  therefore,  not  so  much  a 
rational  animal  as  an  animal  possessing 
free-will. 

Intellect  does   not    specifically  distin- 


CURIOUS  QUESTIONS.  265 

guisli  man  from  the  rest  of  creation. 
All  creatures  liave  a  certain  amount  of 
intellectual  life.  The  elements  of  matter 
are  spiritual.  Properly  speaking,  there 
is  no  such  thing  in  the  world  as  matter 
understood  in  the  vulgar  sense  of  the 
word.  The  elements  of  matter  are  sim- 
ple. Their  coexistence  it  is  which  makes 
extension.  They  all  participate  in  the 
divinity,  and  hence  have  something  of 
the  being  of  Grod.  Now  in  God  all  is 
spiritual.  All  creatures  are  therefore 
spiritual,  and  participate  in  different  de- 
grees of  intelligence.  Intelligence,  there- 
fore, is  not  the  specific  attribute  of  man. 
Nor  is  sensibility.  He  has  less  of  it  in 
many  cases  than  brutes.  The  mother's 
love  for  her  child  is  not  essentially  differ- 
ent from  that  of  the  brute  for  its  young. 
In  both  it  is  instinct ;  sensibility,  there- 
fore, does  not  specifically  distinguish  man 
from  the  rest  of  creation ;  but  will  does. 
It  is  the  will  that  makes  the  man.  Man 
has  free-will,  and  in  this  he  is  most  like 


256  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

God.  It  is  this  will  that  constitutes  him 
lord  of  creation.  It  is  his  power  of 
choosing  his  own  acts  that  makes  him 
above  all  created  earthly  beings,  makes 
him  a  mystery  in  creation.  He  is  not 
the  mere  occasion  of  his  volitions,  but 
their  real  cause.  How  he  is  so  is  a  mys- 
tery which  no  human  intellect  can  solve. 
The  mystery  of  free-will,  the  mystery  of 
creation,  and  the  mystery  of  ideal  intui- 
tion are  three  in  one.  They  are  the 
trinity  in  unity  of  philosophy ;  the  three 
great  mysteries  of  the  natural  order,  all 
centring  in  the  grand  mystery  of  creation, 
or  distinction  between  God  and  the  uni- 
verse. 

We  shall  now  conclude  our  work  by  an 
investigation  into  the  spirit  of  the  age.  Our 
views,  set  forth  in  this  investigation,  when 
compared  with  those  preceding  it,  may 
show  that  the  study  of  metaphysics,  so 
far  from  injui'ing  Christian  faith,  serves 
only  to  make  it  stronger. 


Question   Eighteenth. 

why  is  the  spirit  of  the  age  anti-chris- 
tian and  anti-philosophic  ? 

[VEE,Y  man  given  to  reflection 
must  notice  something  in  the 
spirit  of  the  age  not  in  accord 
with  the  spirit  of  true  philosophy.  There 
is  a  tendency  in  our  century  to  act  con- 
trary to  the  spirit  of  religion;  and  this 
tendency  manifests  itself  in  education  as 
well  as  in  action;  in  the  school,  in  the 
senate-chamber,  in  law  and  politics.  This 
anti-christian,  which  is  the  anti-philosophic 
spirit,  is  the  offspring  of  what  may  be 
called  a  tendency  to  paganism.  We  are 
reviving  paganism  in  every  thing.  There 
is  a  great  difference,  however,  between 
ancient  and  modern  paganism;  and  yet 
in  idea  and  tendencies  they  are  the  same. 


268  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

Our  modern  pagans  do  not,  it  is  true, 
adore  statues  of  Jupiter,  Venus,  and  Bac- 
chus ;  but  tliey  render  worship  to  the 
ideas  of  those  false  deities.  There  are  no 
sacrifices  of  human  bodies,  but  there  are 
of  human  minds;  Two  of  the  old  augurs 
could  not  meet  without  smiling  at  each 
other's  knavery;  yet  our  modem  priests  of 
paganism,  with  the  greatest  gravity,  incul- 
cate their  doctrines  and  believe  in  their 
truth.  There  is  a  revival  of  defunct  paganism 
manifested  in  false  history  and  philoso- 
phy, and  in  attempts  to  do  away  with  the 
necessity  of  revelation  and  redemption. 
Men  preach  the  doctrine  of  human  per- 
fectibility; that  nature  alone  suffices  to 
itself,  and  that  Christianity  should  not 
interfere  with  its  action.  The  intellect  is 
all-powerful.  In  Germany  it  has  created 
God  in  the  school  of  Fichte  and  Schel- 
ling.  We  have  doctors  who  preach  the 
sufficiency  of  natural  religion,  like  Jules 
Simon ;  and  others  who  make  out  Christ 
a  myth  or  an  impostor,  like  Ernest  Renan ; 


CURIOUS  QUESTIONS.  269 

and  others  who  teach  the  necessity  of 
civil  Christianity,  like  the  so-called  libera- 
tors of  Italy.  In  short,  modem  paganism 
is  like  the  ancient  in  all  but  idolatry. 
"We  should  have,  however,  even  this  beau- 
ty of  paganism  among  us  were  it  not  for 
the  fact  that  men  living  under  the  influ- 
ence of  Christianity  can  never  throw  away 
completely  all  their  Christian  education. 
It  has  often  been  noticed  that  the  exist- 
ence and  unity  of  the  Church  is  the  indi- 
rect cause  of  the  non-dissolution  of  secta- 
rian Christianity.  All  sects  unite  in  their 
opposition  to  the  Church;  and  if  this 
cause  of  vitality  were  removed,  they  would 
shortly  decompose  in  virtue  of  the  princi- 
ple of  dissolution  which  is  at  the  bottom 
of  them  all.  For  this  same  reason  there 
can  be  no  thorough  infidel  in  a  Christian 
community.  Christian  Catholic  ideas  are 
afloat  around  him,  and  he  can  not  drown 
them.  They  enter  his  mind  even  against 
his  will.  He  breathes  in  Christian  air, 
and  it  helps  to  give  him  life.     Hence, 


260  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

modem  paganism  is  a  monstrous  medley 
of  Christian  ideas  with  pagan  inclinations 
and  intentions.  The  radical  princijjle  of 
paganism  is  pride,  which  preaches  the 
self  sufficiency  of  human  nature,  and  leads, 
consequently,  to  the  entire  separation  of 
man  from  his  Creator.  When  this  sepa- 
ration took  place,  two  conclusions  natu- 
rally followed ;  man  lost  self-knowledge ; 
and  no  longer  understood  the  end  for 
which  the  inferior  beings  of  creation  were 
produced. 

Nothing  in  nature  is  explicable  without 
the  idea  of  the  Creator ;  this  idea  is  the 
keystone  of  all  knowledge.  It  explains 
every  thing.  But  when  man  lost  it,  every 
thing  became  a  mystery  to  him.  He 
thought  by  separating  himself  from  God 
he  would  become  free,  as  Adam  thought 
he  would  acquire  more  knowledge  by 
eatins'  the  forbidden  fruit  and  become  as 
a  god ;  but  instead  of  freedom  he  found 
slavery;  instead  of  true  knowledge  he 
lost  much  of  what  he  had  hitherto  pos- 


CURIOUS  QUESTIONS.  261 

sessed.  He  was  created  above  natm*e, 
but  by  separation  from  God  lie  became 
nature's  serf,  the  bondsman  of  creatures, 
tlie  slave  of  liis  senses  and  passions.  Sla- 
very was  introduced  into  the  family  and 
into  the  state,  and  man  forgot  his  dig- 
nity. He  introduced  vice  in  the  seat  of 
vii*tue,  and  made  idols  of  his  base  pas- 
sions. This  was  the.  consequence  of  man's 
separation 'from  God,  the  fruit  of  his  self- 
sufficiency. 

St.  Thomas  in  his  "  Summa  Theologica," 
asks  himself  the  question.  Why  the  Re- 
deemer did  not  come  into  the  world  soon- 
er ?  Why  did  he  not  choose  to  be  born 
immediately  after  the  fall,  instead  of 
waiting  till  forty  centmies  after  that 
event  ?  And  the  great  doctor  gives 
this  answer;  he  says  God  wished  to 
let  man  try  his  natural  strength,  to  see 
what  he  could  effect.  God  mshed  to 
let  man  learn  a  lesson  in  humility  from 
the  proof  of  the  incapacity  of  his  nature 
for  any  thing  great  or  virtuous  derived 


262  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

from  so  long  an  experience.  Yet  even 
four  thousand  years  did  not  suffice  to 
teacli  that  great  lesson ;  for  even  in  the 
nineteenth  century  after  the  coming 
of  Christ  men  seem  to  be  still  ignorant 
of  the  weakness '  of  their  natural  forces. 
This  self-sufficiency  is  directly  opposed  to 
the  economy  of  redemption ;  it  is  the  re- 
fusal of  the  helper,  Christ,  and  of  his 
Church.  In  ancient  paganism,  therefore, 
we  find  what  human  nature  does  when 
left  to  itself;  and  yet  not  altogether  to 
itself.  For  the  ancient  pagans  had  many 
revealed  traditions  which  were  carried 
away  by  the  different  peoples  at  the  con- 
fusion of  tongues  in  the  building  of 
Babel.  Paganism  was  the  continuation 
of  Adam's  sin;  it  was  egotism,  natur- 
alism ;  the  substitution  of  human  nature 
in  the  place  of  God.  St.  Jerome  tells  us 
that  paganism  was  symbolized  in  the 
parable  of  the  prodigal  son.  Whether 
this  be  tme  of  ancient  paganism  or  not, 
it  certainly  applies  very  aptly  to  modern 


CURIOUS  QUESTIONS.  263 

paganism.  Our  modern  pagans  leave 
the  house  of  their  parent,  the  Church  of 
Christ,  and  they  go  into  a  far  off  country, 
and  they  are  obliged  to  feed  on  husks. 
They  separate  themselves  as  much  as  pos- 
sible from  God,  by  sundering  religion 
from  civil  government;  the  temporal 
from  the  eternal ;  literature  and  the  arts 
from  religious  influence.  They  make  us 
a  history  without  admitting  a  divine  pro- 
vidence. They  make  us  natural  politics, 
natural  morality,  natural  economy,  and 
they  exclude  the  supernatural  from  their 
philosophy.  In  a  word,  they  separate 
faith  from  reason,  earth  from  heaven ;  and 
the  consequence  is,  that  they  feed  on 
husks.  They  speak,  write,  and  act  like 
pagans.  They  praise  the  material  profi- 
ciency of  a  country,  and  call  it  flourishing, 
though  it  be  an  enemy  of  truth  and  of 
Christianity.  In  their  ideas  a  man  may 
be  a  gentleman  without  religion.  The 
principle  of  sectarian  Christianity  is  iden- 
tical with  that  of  paganism,  for  sectarian- 


264  CUAlOUS  QUESTIONS. 

ism  is  autologj  or  self-worship.  Reli- 
gious self-sufficiency  is,  therefore,  a  help- 
er of  pagan  naturalism.  Hence  in  many- 
countries  the  old  traditions  of  Christian 
faith  have  been  rejected  by  the  govern- 
ments; hospitals,  churches,  and  universi- 
ties have  been  secularized,  and  religion 
thrown  in  the  background  as  if  it  were 
merely  of  secondary  importance.  The 
strangest  feature  in  modem  paganism  is 
that  men  of  intellect  and  rank  are  among 
its  greatest  supporters ;  yet  it  does  not 
require  much  logic  to  discover  its  absurd- 
ity. God  had  but  one  end  in  view  in 
creating  this  world  of  ours ;  and  man,  the 
lord  of  creation,  has  but  one  end  also. 
Yet  there  are  two  orders,  the  natural  and 
supernatural;  but  not  separate  though 
they  are  distinct.  They  are  distinct  in 
nature,  and  in  the  beings  that  constitute 
each;  but  they  have  the  same  ultimate 
end,  though  their  proximate  ends  are  of- 
ten different.  The  ultimate  end  of  all 
things  is  God ;  the  ultimate  end  of  man 


CURIOUS  QUESTIONS.  265 

is  the  possession  of  God.     As  far  then  as 
man  is  concerned,  both  nature  and  gi*ace 
tend  to  the  one  ultimate  end;    nature 
leading    to   it  by  being  subordinate  to 
grace.     These  are  elementary  principles 
of   theology    and    even    of   philosophy. 
For  how  could  it  be  otherwise  ?     If  you 
admit  the  existence  of  the  supernatural 
order,  as  a  fact,  which  is  as  incontrovert 
ible  as  the  existence  of  the  natural.order 
you  must  admit  the  relation  of  subordina 
tion  of  which  we  speak.     The  lower  or 
der  must  be  subordinate  to  the  higher, 
because  nature  must  obey  grace ;  the  nat 
ural  order  must  be  subservient  to  the  su 
pematural.     Hence  the  state  is  below  the 
church;  the  temporal  is  inferior  to  the 
eternal ;  religion  must  hold  the  first  place 
in  all  things,  as  it  is  it  that  tends  most 
directly  to  the  ultimate  end  of  creation, 
and  it  is  through  religion,  that  is,  through 
Christ,   that   all   other   creatures    attain 
their  ultimate  end.    A  system  that  would 
put  the  orders  of  grace  and  nature  on  the 


266  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

same  footing  is  as  absurd  as  one  that 
would  make-  grace  obey  nature,  or  even 
deny  its  existence  altogether.  God  would 
never  create  two  perfectly  equal  moral 
forces  for  the  pleasure  of  witnessing  their 
continual  struggle.  He  has  made  all 
things  in  order,  and  hence  he  has  made 
the  natural  subservient  to  the  super- 
natural order,  just  as  in  Christ,  the  ex- 
emplar of  creation,  there  are  two  natures ; 
but  the  human  is  subservient  to  the  di- 
vine, and  both  are  made  one  in  their  end 
by  the  divine  Person  who  rules  both. 
Any  system,  therefore,  is  pagan  in  prin- 
ciple which  separates  the  state  from  the 
church,  or  makes  the  temporal  equal  to 
spiritual.  Autolatria,  or  sectarianism,  is 
pagan,  for  the  reason  that  every  man  is 
his  own  God,  for  he  is  his  own  judge  of 
faith. 

This  spirit  of  modem  paganism  extols 
ancient  paganism,  its  theories  and  inspi- 
rations ;  and  decries  Christianity,  its  arts 
and  sciences,  its  doctiine  and  moral  code. 


CUEIOUS  QUESTIONS.  267 

Gibbon  is  one  of  its  incarnations.  He 
has  many  disciples.  They  often  assert 
facts  that  are  true,  but  derive  from  them 
conclusions  that  are  false.  It  is  true 
that,  in  a  mere  material  point  of  view, 
Greece  and  Rome  produced  works  of  art 
or  exercised  influence  unknown  to  any 
Christian  nation.  Christianity  may  noa6 
have  produced  a  poet  like  Homer,  an 
orator  like  Demosthenes,  or  a  sculptor 
like  Phidias.  But  this  proves  nothing 
against  Christianity,  nor  should  it  cause 
us  to  desire  a  revival  of  ancient  paganism. 
The  end  of  man  is  not  to  write  poetry  or 
make  statues,  and  hence  the  civilization 
and  progress  of  a  people  are  not  to  be  esti- 
mated according  to  their  excellence  in 
literature  or  sculpture.  Religion  is  the 
only  true  civilizer.  *  The  index  of  true 
progress  is  the  state  of  morality;  the 
knowledge  of  God  and  of  moral  obliga- 
tions. True  progress  does  not  reject  the 
arts  and  sciences ;  but  it  keeps  them  in 
their  proper    place,    it   makes  them  of 


268  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

secondary  impoi'tance.  Progress  is  ten- 
dency to  an  end.  Human  progress  is 
tendency  to  the  end  of  man,  to  God,  by 
means  of  true  religion.  K  this  assertion 
be  true,  then  we  can  not  admire  so  much 
the  civilization  of  the  ancient  Greeks  and 
Romans.  They  were  ignorant  of  the  true 
religion ;  they  had  false  notions  of  God 
and  of  man's  destiny.  They  admitted 
that  the  greatest  science  was  the  know- 
ledge of  self,  and  they  had  an  aphorism  to 
that  effect,  yvo)Oe  oeavrov.  But  what  was 
their  self-knowledge?  They  were  igno- 
rant of  the  destiny  of  man's  soul ;  they 
doubted  its  immortality;  they  were  un- 
certain of  the  existence  of  a  future  state ; 
and  their  gi*eatest  philosophers  were  un- 
able to  answer  those  simple  questions 
regarding  God  and  the  soul  which  the 
Christian  child  of  eleven  summers  can 
now  solve  with  the  greatest  facility. 
Arnobius  speaks  of  this  ignorance  when 
he  says :  "  Potest  quispiam  explicare  mor- 
talium  id    quod   Socrates  ille   explicare 


CURIOUS  QUESTIONS.  269 

nequit  in  Phaidone  ?  homo  quid  sit  ?  unde 
sit  ?  in  quos  usus  prolatus  sit  ?  cujus  sit 
excogitatus  ingenio  ?  quid  in  mundo 
faciat  ?  Cur  malorum  tanta  experiatur 
examina  ?"*  And  Lactantius  tells  us  that 
they  only  told  the  truth  when  they  ad- 
mitted their  complete  ignorance  regarding 
the  most  necessary  knowledge.  "Nun- 
quam  illi  tarn  veridici  fuerunt  quam  cum 
sententiam  de  sua  ignorantia  dederunt  ?" 
Div.  Ins.  in.  2.  Pagan  excellence  is  the 
excellence  of  matter  and  sense.  Pagan  art 
could  form  the  statue  of  a  nude  Venus, 
but  never  create  the  likeness  of  a  chaste 
Madonna ;  their  excellence  was  devoid  of 
the  true  ideal ;  they  were  masters  in  the 
art  of  war  and  in  the  efforts  of  imagina- 
tion, but  they  feU  far  below  the  standard 
of  human  dignity,  on  the  score  of  moral- 

*  •'  Can  any  of  them  explain  what  Socrates  was  unable 
to  explain  in  Phaedo  ?  What  is  man  ?  Whence  does  he 
come  ?  For  what  purpose  was  he  created  ?  What  has 
he  to  do  in  the  world  ?  Why  does  he  suffer  so  many 
iUs?" 


270  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

ity  and  intellectual  truth.  Their  great- 
est god  was  a  libertine,  as  Ovid  tells  us. 
"  Quam  multas  matres  fecerit  ille  Deus." 
Why  then  laud  so  much  ancient  pagan- 
ism, when  its  only  excellence  was  mate- 
rial progress?  IF  material  ingenuity  is  to 
be  the  measure  of  greatness,  is  not  man 
surpassed  by  the  lower  animals  ?  He  can 
make  no  edilfice  so  perfect  in  architecture 
as  the  hive  of  the  bee  or  the  cell  of  the 
beaver.  He  can  produce  no  music  equal 
to  the  warbling  of  the  canary  or  the 
nightingale;  even  an  inanimate  machine 
will  surpass  him  in  some  respects.  The 
light  of  the  sun  in  the  camera  of  the 
photographer  will  produce  the  likeness 
of  the  human  countenance  in  a  few  sec- 
onds more  exactly  than  all  mankind  could 
ever  effect.  Yet  it  is  for  the  sake  of 
material  progress  that  many  wish  to  re- 
vive ancient  paganism.  The  cause  of 
the  success  of  paganism  in  the  material 
order  is  easily  accounted  for.  The  pagan 
mind  was  imbedded  in  sense ;  it  knew  no- 


CUEIOUS  QUESTIONS.  271 

tLing  of  the  life  to  come,  or  not  enough 
to  make  it  give  special  attention  to  the 
future  state.  Its  principle  was  the  Epi- 
curean one  of  Horace,  "  Carpe  diem,"  en- 
joy the  present : 

*'  Pluck  the  rosebud  while  you  may  ! 
Old  Time  is  ever  flying ; 
The  bud  that  blooms  for  thee  to-day, 
To-morrow  may  be  dying." 

Hence  the  attention  of  pagan  genius 
was  paid  solely  to  the  present  life,  to  mat- 
ter, to  sense,  and  not  to  the  ideal,  spiritual, 
or  supersensible.  Hence  materialism  and 
paganism  are  twin  sisters.  It  is  no  wonder, 
then,  that  the  pagans  succeeded  in  this 
world,  since  all  their  attention  was  direct- 
ed to  it.  But  how  deplorable  whs  their 
moral  condition  may  be  seen  from  the  fact 
that  slavery  existed  everywhere ;  and  that 
Aristotle  taught  that  it  was  bgth  ration- 
al and  necessary.  These,  then,  were  some 
of  the  effects  of  that  separation  from  God 
which  constitutes  the  essence  of  paganism 
whether  ancient  or  modem. 


272  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

The  same  effects  show  themselves  now 
in  many  countries  of  the  world.  The  re- 
vival of  pagan  ideas  has  had  many  sup- 
porters in  Europe  and  America,  The 
theories  and  theorizers  that  have  been 
distui'bing  the  good  order  of  society  in 
Europe  for  many  years — socialists,  phi- 
lanthropists, pantheists — are  men  imbued 
with  pagan  ideas.  The  ideas  of  Eu- 
rope before  what  is  called  in  France 
the  "Renaissance,"  were  for  the  most 
part  Christian,  but  since  that  period  pa- 
gan ideas  have  become  prevalent.  Too 
much  attention  began  to  be  given  to  mere 
profane  literature.  The  classics  were 
studied  at  the  expense  of  the  catechism, 
and  gradually  men's  thoughts  became  im- 
bued with  the  pagan  spirit ;  sound  phi- 
losophy was  neglected;  men  could  not 
reason  clearly  because  they  were  not  well 
grounded  in  the  first  principles  of  things. 
Thus  modern  paganism  came  into  exist- 
ence, and  it  still  flourishes.  It  was  the 
ruling  spirit  of  the  first  French  revolution, 


CUEIOUS  QUESTIONS.  278 

and  was  impersonated  by  the  "  Goddess 
of  Reason."  It  has  filled  Germany  and 
France  with  false  philosophy ;  we  can  see 
its  traces  in  the  works  of  Fichte,  Schelling, 
Cousin,  and  Jules  Simon.  It  has  been 
working  mischief  in  England  for  the 
last  two  centuries;  it  has  disturbed  the 
peace  of  Italy — ^filled  that  beautiful  land 
with  demagogues,  radicals,  and  brigands; 
it  has  even  laid  sacrilegious  hands  on  the 
crown  of  the  great  Pontiff  of  Christianity. 
Indeed  it  seems  to  us  as  if  modern  pagan- 
ism were  impersonated  in  the  spirit  of 
opposition  to  the  temporal  power  of  the 
Pope ;  for  this  opposition  is  essentially  un- 
christian. It  aims  at  the  destruction  of 
civil  government,  the  rights  of  justice, 
the  law  of  God  and  of  man.  All  justice- 
loving  men  admit  this.  The  opposers  of 
the  temporal  power  start  from  the  pagan 
principle  of  separation  of  the  temporal 
from  the  spiritual ;  they  are  either  bigots 
or  infidels,  or  vain  and  frothy  theorizers, 
or  corrupt  politicians,   or  Machiavelian 


274  CUEIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

statesmen,  or  restless  demagogues;  and  if 
tLey  be  Christians,  tteir  faitli  sits  as  light- 
ly on  their  conscience  as  a  feather  on  the 
back  of  a  whirlwind;  they  are  all  per- 
vaded by  the  pestilential  spirit  of  modem 
paganism.  When  a  government  becomes 
indifferent  in  religious  matters,  wishes  to 
assume  supreme  control  over  the  asylums 
of  suffering  humanity,  secularizes  churches 
and  schools,  caring  only  for  the  mere  lit- 
erary or  arithmetical  education  of  its  sub- 
jects ;  when  it  makes  laws  infringing  on 
the  rights  of  conscience  or  property; 
when  it  interferes  with  the  sacraments 
and  the  rites  of  the  Church,  then  it  is  pa- 
gan in  spirit.  It  endeavors  to  prevent 
men  jfrom  attaining  the  end  of  creation; 
it  ceases  to  be  a  free  government,  or  ful- 
fill the  end  for  which  all  governments 
were  instituted.  Practical  applications 
of  these  assertions  will  not  fail  to  present 
themselves  to  the  mind  of  the  serious 
reader.  It  is  this  spirit  of  paganism 
which  threatens  to  overturn  all  order  in 


CURIOUS  QUESTIONS.  275 

society.  In  ancient  pagan  nations,  where 
the  poor  were  comparatively  ignorant, 
and  hence  did  not  know  their  rights,  it 
was  easy  to  hold  them  in  bondage ;  hut 
now  things  have  changed.  Discontent  in 
the  lower  orders  of  society  can  no  longer 
be  smothered ;  education  has  become  gen- 
eral, and,  unfortunately,  that  element, 
without  which  it  is  doubtful  whether  sci- 
ence be  a  boon  or  a  curse,  has  been  omit- 
ted. Religious  education  has  been  sep- 
arated from  secular  instruction.  Without 
religion  the  poor  are  unable  to  control 
their  passions  or  bear  their  hard  lot. 
They  see  wealth  around  them,  and  with- 
out religion  they  see  no  reason  why  it 
should  not  be  divided  among  them.  Why 
should  they  starve  while  their  neighbors 
roll  in  splendor  and  luxury?  If  the 
poor  were  ignorant,  they  might  not  ob- 
serve the  disproportion  between  their  con- 
dition and  that  of  the  aristocracy,  nor 
feel  it  so  keenly.  But  they  are  partially 
educated,  they  feel  their  power,  and  not 


276  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

having  the  restraining  influence  of  reli- 
gion to  console  them,  they  use  this  pow- 
er. They  have  done  so  in  Paris ;  and  if 
they  do  not  always  succeed,  it  is  only  the 
bayonet  that  prevents  them.  This  is  one 
of  the  dangers  o£  modem  paganism,  the 
subversion  of  stable  governments;  the 
effect  of  unchristian  education.  It  is  pa- 
ganism in  education  which  begets  restless- 
ness among  the  masses,  so  that  "Nemo 
contentus  soi-te  sua  vivat."  Those,  there- 
fore, who  have  been  so  strong  in  defend- 
ing the  system  of  pagan  education 
adopted  in  the  state  schools  of  Prussia, 
England,  and  our  own  country,  can  hardly 
have  reflected  on  the  pernicious  tendency 
of  those  institutions.  Even  the  reading 
of  the  Bible,  the  great  book  of  Christian- 
ity, will  not  counterbalance  the  danger- 
ous results  of  p'agan  education.  Under 
this  system  the  child  learns  every  thing 
but  the  law  of  God ;  he  unlearns  in  the 
society  of  the  school  what  he  had  learned 
from  his  parents.     He  may  have  certain 


CUEIOUS  QUESTIONS.  277 

general  ideas  of  right  and  wrong,  cer- 
tain vague  ideas  regarding  Christianity 
and  the  economy  of  redemption;  but 
there  is  nothing  solid  in  his  mind,  nothing 
fixed.  He  does  not  learn  to  understand 
correctly  any  one  dogma  of  the  Christian 
dispensation.  His  mind  is  a  religious  va- 
cuv/m,  or  at  least  there  is  but  a  relictions 
mist  in  his  intellect.  What  does  he  learn 
under  a  pagan  system  of  education  that 
will  press  down  his  rising  passions  ? 
What  precept  of  positive  virtue  ?  What 
principle  of  self  restraint  ?  What  does 
he  learn  in  a  school  removed  from  direct 
and  positive  religious  influence  to  make 
him  obedient,  honest,  chaste,  a  good  cit- 
izen and  a  good  Christian?  Experience 
is  teaching  us  every  day  the  dire  effects 
of  paganism  in  education ;  it  begets  pa- 
ganism in  religion.  Yes,  the  age  is  pa- 
ganizing Christianity.  Christianity  is  a 
positive  religion,  with  a  fixed  code  of 
dogmatic  truths  and  moral  principles. 
The  religion  of  Christ,  the  supreme  truth, 


278  CUEIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

could  not  be  a  vague  and  unfinished  reli 
gion.  He  taught  virtue  by  facts ;  He  re- 
vealed dogmas  that  should  be  received 
as  facts ;  his  moral  principles  are  facts ; 
men  should  receive  them.  He  made  the 
Church  their  guardian;  men  should  re- 
ceive truth  through  the  hands  of  the 
Church.  But  the  contrary  spirit  is 
spreading  now.  Christianity,  if  you  ex- 
cept its  Catholic  form,  is  paganized. 
From  the  pulpit  preachers  hold  forth 
against  dogmas  and  precepts.  Religion 
is  said  to  be  every  man's  private  business ; 
'there  is  nothing  fixed  in  it ;  truth  is  rel- 
ative ;  your  Christianity  is  true  and  mine 
is  tfue,  and*  yet  we  disagree  wofully. 
Religion  is  made  to  consist  in  sympathy 
OP  feeling ;  it  is  no  longer  an  affair  of  rea- 
son and  will,  but  imagination.  It  is  the 
poetic  sentiment.  It  is  not  any  longer 
masculine  but  feminine.  It  is  not  for 
men,  but  for  spinsters  and  tender-heart- 
ed young  ladies.  Does  not  experience 
teach  that  this  is  the   character  of  the 


CUEIOUS  QUESTIONS.  279 

fashionable  pulpit  eloquence  of  our  coun. 
try? 

Another  proof  of  the  revival  of  pagan- 
ism is  found  in  the  change  of  sentiment 
manifested  toward  woman.  In  ancient 
paganism  she  was  the  mere  slave  of 
man's  appetites.  She  is  so  in  Mohammed- 
anism; and  she  is  becoming  so  again. 
Modern  paganism  in  appearance  exalts 
woman ;  it  makes  her  even  the  superior 
of  man ;  denies  that  she  should  be  obe- 
dient to  her  husband ;  opens  to  her  the 
liberal  professions,  and  allows  her  to 
mount  the  rostrum  or  the  pulpit.  But 
what  does  this  mean  ?  Does  it  acknow- 
ledge woman  to  be  man's  spiritual  help- 
mate, or  is  it  not  another  way  to  worship 
sensuality  ?  Free-loveism,  communism, 
and  spiritualism  are  but  the  expression 
of  modem  paganism.  It  is  not  through 
real  esteem  or  respect  that  woman  is  now 
honored  so  excessively,  but  from  self- 
love.  Men  worship  their  passions  in 
this  woman- worship.     Ancient  paganism 


280  CURIOUS  questio;ns. 

identified  Imman  passions  in  their  gods. 
Jupiter  was  licentious,  and  the  other  di- 
vinities followed  his  good  example. 
Modern  paganism  is  too  enlightened  to 
worship  the  old  idols,  but  it  hides  the 
deformity  of  its  nature  under  the  vail  of 
woman-worship.  It  lives  in  "*Woman'8 
Rights  Conventions"  and  among  the 
disciples  of  spiritualism.  Divorce  is 
common.  The  sanctity  of  marriage  is 
despised,  and  the  restrictions  of  law 
laughed  at.  The  family  tie  may  be  sun- 
dered even  according  to  law — law  which 
of  its  very  nature  ought  to  mean  limit- 
ation and  restriction.  The  Christian 
may,  indeed,  lead  an  evil  life,  but  still 
his  principles  are  right.  There  is  always 
hope  for  his  amendment,  so  long  as  his 
faith  is  unhurt.  He  yields  to  passions 
more  from  weakness  than  from  malice; 
he  'vvill  seldom  praise  vice,  although  he 
himself  may  be  vicious.  Though  the 
flesh  may  rule  him,  the  spuit  is  willing 
to  acknowledge  the  truth.      But  modem 


CFRIOUS  QUESTIONS.  281 

paganism  erects  vice  into  tlie  dignity  of 
a  principle.  He  that  gives  up  his  Chris- 
tian faith  endeavors  to  sanction  the  grati- 
fication of  his  passions  by  making  us  be- 
lieve that  virtue  which  we  hold  to  be 
vice,  and  that  falsehood  which  we  hold 
to  be  truth.  There  is  a  great  difference 
between  being  bad  and  having  bad 
principles.  Few  men  are  as  good  as 
their  good  principles;  and  few  are  as 
bad  as  the  bad  principles  which  they 
hold.  It  is  principles,  good  or  bad,  that 
influence  states  and  individuals.  That 
state  of  man  is  always  the  worst  when, 
not  content  with  being  wicked  himself, 
he  endeavors  to  corrupt  others  by.  dis- 
seminating immoral  principles  in  society. 
Hence  the  first  pagans,  ignorant  as  they 
were,  and  only  thinking  of  gratifying 
the  passion  of  the  hour,  were  far  less 
guilty  than  their  enlightened  philosophic 
successors,  who  in  cold  blood  teach  im- 
morality in  their  works  of  philosophy, 
sugar-coating,  as  it  were,  the  pill  to  make 


282  CURIOUS  QUESTIOS-S. 

its  bitterness  less  sensible.  Hence,  de- 
praved as  were  the  mobs  of  the  French 
He  volution — the  children  of  modern  pa- 
ganism, who  worshiped  the  goddess  of 
Reason  at  Notre  Dame — ^far  more  heinous 
was  the  offense  'of  the  crowd  of  philo- 
sophers and  writers  of  the  last  two  cen- 
turies who  preached  the  deification  of 
nature  and  sense  in  their  works.  Modern 
paganism,  like  ancient  paganism,  is  sen- 
sual. Hence  it  denies  virginity  to  be  a 
perfection,  and  scoffs  at  celibacy.  It 
denies  marriage  to  be  a  sacrament,  and 
hence  tends  to  debase  woman.  Woman 
under  the  pagan  institutions  was  merely 
MULiER  or  fcemina ;  she  was  far  below 
man.  Under  Christianity  she  has  been 
named  misi/ress  and  lady.  The  greatest 
creature  that  ever  existed  was  a  woman. 
Christianity  teaches  this,  and  hence  the 
dignity  of  woman  is  great  under  the 
Christian  law.  Now  by  raising  up  wo- 
man virtue  has  been  raised  up..  We 
must  learn  to  respect  woman  as   Chris- 


CUEIOUS  QUESTIONS.  288 

tians.  We  can  not  look  upon  her  as  a 
mere  mass  of  soulless  matter,  as  Moham- 
medanism teaches ;  nor  make  an  idol  of 
her  "svith  modern  paganism,  which  makes 
her  an  idol  to  personify  sensuality.  Nor 
is  the  exaggerated  respect  for  woman 
manifested  by  unchristian  philosophers 
in  our  times  substantially  different  from 
the  pagan  view  of  the  sex.  The  parti- 
sans of  "  Woman's  Rights"  do  not  defend 
their  theories  from  the  fact  that  they 
really  believe  woman  to  be  the  superior 
or  even  the  equal  of  man ;  but  rathe?  be- 
cause, their  principles  being  founded  on 
sensuality,  they  deify  woman,  who  is  in 
their  eyes  the  personification  of  sensual 
delight.  It  is  the  same  spirit  as  that 
which  put  the  Goddess  of  Reason  on  the 
altar  of  Notre  Dame  during  the  French 
Revolution.  There  is  a  mixture  of  Chris- 
tian respect  and  pagan  brutality  in  this 
modern  apotheosis  of  woman.  And  this 
modern  paganism  which  debases,  while 
it  seems  to  exalt  the  dignity  of  woman, 


284  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

produces  the  most  direful  consequences  in 
tlie  family,  and  in  the  state  as  well  as  in 
religion.  The  daughters  are  trained  up 
in  the  principles  of  their  parents.  Society 
gives  us  women  without  virtue  and  men 
who  could  not  esteem  it.  In  religion 
woman  usurps  a  position  that  is  not  hers 
by  any  law.  She  mounts  the  pulpit,  and 
men  of  intelligence  and  standing  in  so- 
ciety listen  to  her,  daring  to  speak 
where  good  taste  and  an  apostle  tell  her 
to  be  silent.  She  enters  the  political 
arena,  and  thousands  listen  to  her.  The 
daughters  of  the  land  are  set  an  example 
of  effrontery  in  the  women  lecturers  of 
the  day.  The  press,  which  should  be  one 
of  the  guardians  of  public  morality,  ap- 
plauds the  disgusting  spectacle  of  woman 
throwing  away  her  modesty,  the  only 
true  dignity  of  her  sex.  But  the  press 
could  not  be  expected  to  do  otherwise, 
since  it  too  is  infected  by  modern  pagan- 
ism. What  is  its  tone  throughout  the 
world  at  the  present  time  ?      As  a  rule, 


CURIOUS  QUESTIONS.  285 

tlie  great  organs  of  public  opinion  are 
unchristian.  They  are  so  in  Europe  as 
well  as  in  America.  They  attack  re- 
ligion ;  preach  revolutionism ;  ignore  the 
laws  of  eternal  justice  and  truth ;  care 
nothing  for  the  observances  of  Christian 
politeness ;  despise  charity,  and  fill  the 
country  with  scandals,  falsehoods,  and 
disgusting  items  and  obscenities  to  such 
an  extent  that  no  man  who  cares  for  the 
morality  of  his  children  can  in  conscience 
permit  them  the  promiscuous  reading  of 
the  newspapers  daily  published.  Nor 
are  the  weekly  magazines  better  than  the 
daily  journals.  You  find  sickly  senti- 
mentality in  most  of  them;  enervating 
tales  if  not  immoral  novels.  Yet  what 
must  the  state  of  society  be  when  we 
consider  the  immense  multitude  that  de- 
vour daily  and  weekly  the  contents  of 
such  a  licentious  press  ?  Is  not  society 
thoroughly  paganized  ?  Yet  we  are  told 
that  there  is  much  natural  morality  still 
left ;  that  the  great  vices  are  not  com- 


286  OUEIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

niitted  ;  that  persons  are  more  gentle- 
manly now  than  ever  they  were.  In  a 
word,  natural  religion  and  morality  are 
praised,  and  persons  assert  them  to  be  suffi- 
cient for  the  preservation  of  order  and 
society.  Now,  d,s  for  this  natural  mo- 
rality, few  will  be  found  so  deficient  in 
judgment  as  to  believe  in  it.  Though 
we  know  it  was  an  error  of  the  Jan- 
senists  to  deny  the  existence  of  natural 
virtues,  and  although  but  one  or  two  sects 
admit  "  the  total  depravity"  system,  still 
in  practice  and  as  a  matter  of  fact,  we 
feel  that  little  reliance  is  to  be  placed 
in  human  nature  bereft  of  God's  grace. 
Man's  spiritual  nature  is  very  weak.  Con 
cupiscence  is  strong.  Let  temptations 
arise,  let  the  occasions  present  them- 
selves, and  how  long  will  natural  morality 
stand  the  siege?  And  though  it  may 
stand  a  longer  assault  when  it  has  to  con- 
tend with  less  violent  temptations,  it  will 
certainly  fall  before  greater  attacks.  If 
we    ask  ourselves.  What  is  the  cause  of 


CUIUOUS  QUESTIONS.  287 

modern  paganism  ?  tlie  answer  must  be, 
self- worship.  The  tendency  to  paganize 
every  thing  grew  strongest  from  the  pe- 
riod when  men  made  themselves  each  the 
judge  of  his  religious  belief. 
.  The  family  is  the  groundwork  of  civil 
society;  if  the  family  be  Christian,  the 
state  will  be  so  in  like  manner ;  and  if  the 
family  be  corrupt,  thestate  can  not  remain 
long  untarnished.  That  which  gives 
sanctity  to  the  family,  and  consequently 
strength  to  civil  society,  was  the  Catholic 
sacrament  of  marriage ;  and  when  the  re- 
formers destroyed  it,  they  sowed  the  seeds 
of  revolution  in  Europe.  Revolution  in 
the  family  begets  revolution  in  the  state. 
When  you  allow  the  separation  of  man 
and  wife,  you  allow  the  right  of  revolu- 
tion in  the  family,  and  the  state  must 
feel  the  effects  of  the  doctrine.  Modern 
paganism  may  then  be  laid  at  the  door 
of  sectarianism,  so  much  alike  are  all 
errors,  and  such  is  the  character  of  error 
that  it  must  of  necessity  engender  vice. 


288  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

The  influence  of  all  speculative  doctrines 
is  felt  in  tlie  practical  order.  Truth 
begets  virtue.  The  true,  the  good,  and 
the  beautiful  are  sisters ;  and  so  are  error, 
vice,  and  deformity.  They  imply  each 
other.  Virtue  is  truth  in  practice,  and 
beauty  in  its  splendor.  Vice  is  the 
legitimate  offspring  of  error. 

Hence  the  speculative  doctrines  of 
modern  paganism  have  produced  and 
they  are  producing  the  most  direful  results 
in  the  moral  order.  As  modern  paganism 
is  falsehood,  in  contradistinction  to  Chiis- 
tianity,  which  is  truth ;  so  the  effects  of 
paganism  must  be  immorality,  as  the 
consequence  of  Christianity  must  be 
virtue.  Modern  paganism,  in  endeavor- 
ing to  destroy  Christianity,  and  in  chang- 
ing the  principles  that  govern  society, 
has  begotten  another  excess  in  regard  to 
love  of  country.  It  has  given  birth  to 
false  patriotism,  and  tends  to  make  men 
believe  that  their  country  is  of  greater 
importance  than  either  God  or  religion. 


CURIOUS  QUESTIONS.  289 

There  is  such  a  thing  as  true  love  of 
country;  but  it  must  he  Christian  in 
order  to  be  true.  The  country  is  jiot  an 
idol  to  be  worshiped,  but  a  society  to- 
ward which  we  have  duties  and  obliga- 
tions. All  obligations  centre  in  one, 
namely,  in  that  which  we  have  to  God, 
as  our  Creator  and  supreme  Lord.  We 
have  no  obligations  to  our  fellow- 
men  only  inasmuch  as  we  are  bound 
to  them  by  the  law  of  God.  Men  are 
not  the  property  of  the  state,  for  there 
are  individual  rights  as  well  as  state 
rights.  True  patriotism  is  the  Christian 
love  of  our  neighbor.  It  is  founded  on 
the  love  of  family ;  for  the  family  is  the 
groundwork  of  civil  society.  Hence, 
where  there  is  no  true  love  of  family,  as 
in  modem  pagan  legislation,  which  admits 
divorce,  there  can  be  no  true  patriotism. 
The  patriot  begins  by  loving  his  parish 
and  ends  by  loving  his  country.  He  loves 
his  country  because  he  loves  his  family, 
his  birthplace,  and  his  province.     He  is 


200  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

like  the  Vendean,  "  Breton  en  France,  et 
Fran^ais  k  I'^tranger."  Politicians,  in 
the  modern  sense  of  the  word,  ai*e  not 
true  patriots;  they  are  selfish  dema- 
gogues actuated  by  party  spirit,  not  by 
Christian  charity.  In  Sparta,  the  child- 
ren were  the  property  of  the  state,  and 
the  modem  system  of  education  tends  to 
a  similar  result.  The  true  theory  of 
politics,  that  is  to  say,  the  Christian  the- 
ory, puts  every  thing  in  its  right  place, 
in  regard  to  the  divine  order  of  things. 
The  pagan  idea  of  patriotism  does  not 
give  us  true  independence,  for  it  sacrifices 
the  family  and  individual  rights.  Chris- 
tianity defines  and  limits  the  rights  of 
the  temporal  without  putting  them  above 
the  spiritual;  it  proclaims  the  liberty  of 
the  subject,  denounces  tyranny,  and  re- 
sists usurpation.  For  the  pagan,  the 
state  is  all-powerful ;  for  the  Christian,  its 
power  is  subject  to  reason  and  a  higher 
law.  The  true  Christian  only  can  say, 
"Tu  solus  Dominus,  tu  solus  altissimus," 


CURIOUS  QUESTIONS.  291 

thus  teaching  a  lesson  of  humility  to 
rulers.  How  far  from  crouching  or  ser- 
vility were  our  good,  stout,  yet  pious 
forefathers !  Modern  politics,  therefore, 
which  make  the  country  an  idol,  before 
which  every  right  must  be  sacrificed,  are 
also  pagan.  Paganism,  in  fine,  pervades 
all  society,  its  teachings  and  its  actions. 
In  a  word,  the  spirit  of  the  nineteenth 
century  is  thoroughly  pagan. 

How  can  this  spirit  be  counteracted? 
Odc  great  natural  means  of  stemming  the 
torrent  of  pagan  ideas  is  to  oblige  men 
to  exact  and  serious  study.  A  sound, 
precise  course  of  mental  philosophy,  in 
collegiate  education,  in  which  right  prin- 
ciples regarding  law  and  morality  would 
be  inculcated,  could  do  much  toward  this 
object.  Logic,  metaphysics,  ethics,  and 
aesthetics  should  be  carefully  taught  and 
deeply  studied.  But  this  means  is  not 
sufficient.  It  can  do  something ;  it  can  do 
much ;  but  not  every  thing.  However 
much  we  may  esteem  that  great  science 


292  CURIOUS  QUESTIONS. 

of  reason,  which  we  call  philosophy ;  and 
however  much  we  may  appreciate  its 
utility,  we  are  conscious  of  its  defects. 
Philosophy  alone,  reason  alone,  cam,  not 
put  pagan  ideas  out  of  societ/y.  We  must 
have  recourse  to  'a  supernatural  means. 
Experience  teaches  in  the  present,  as  in 
the  past,  that  paganism  never  yields  to 
any  force  but  that  of  Christian  faith. 
You  may  stagger  paganism  with  a  syllo- 
gism, but  you  can  not  kill  it  without  the 
sign  of  the  Cross. 


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